

Exposing Havana's Digital Influence and Election Meddling

Treadstone 71



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
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Introduction

Cuban influence operations, particularly concerning the United States, have taken on a comprehensive and increasingly sophisticated approach in recent years. The Cuban government, through a variety of state-controlled and aligned entities, has actively engaged in efforts to manipulate public opinion and political outcomes, especially targeting key regions like Florida. The focus is not incidental; Florida's significant Cuban-American population makes it a strategic target for Havana's narratives, particularly those counter to anti-Cuban government stances. The U.S. intelligence community has explicitly named Cuba as a potential actor in influencing U.S. elections, including the 2022 midterms and the upcoming 2024 elections, highlighting the immediacy and relevance of these operations.

The methods employed by Cuban actors are diverse, ranging from disinformation campaigns and propaganda dissemination to more direct cyber operations. Platforms like **Cubadebate**

and **Granma** are the primary channels for spreading pro-government content and shaping narratives favorable to Havana, often aligned with broader geopolitical allies such as Russia. The involvement of **Sputnik** and **RT (Russia Today)** in amplifying these narratives



further illustrates the transnational nature of these influence operations. These media outlets are not merely passive actors but are part of a concerted effort to undermine U.S. political figures perceived as hostile to Cuban interests, such as Miami Republicans Carlos Gimenez, Maria Elvira Salazar, and Mario Diaz-Balart.

Moreover, the Cuban intelligence apparatus, including the **Dirección de Inteligencia (DI)** and the **State Security Department (DSE)**, plays a crucial role in executing these operations. Their capabilities extend beyond traditional intelligence activities, incorporating advanced cyber tactics like hacking and online harassment. The **University of Informatics Sciences** in Cuba has been implicated in providing technical support for these activities, including the use of sophisticated AI tools to create deepfakes and other disinformation. The alignment with Russian and Venezuelan disinformation efforts suggests a coordinated strategy to influence local and global perceptions.

The implications of these operations are profound. They represent a persistent threat to the integrity of U.S. democratic processes, particularly as they leverage advanced technologies and covert tactics to sway public opinion and discredit political opponents. The use of fake social media accounts, as reported by Meta, to target Cuban dissidents and critics in the U.S. underscores the extent of these operations' reach. These accounts, which have amassed substantial followings, are not only spreading disinformation but also engaging in more direct forms of cyber aggression, such as hacking and doxxing.

As the 2024 election season approaches, the potential impact of these operations is significant. The Cuban government's efforts will likely intensify, focusing on undermining key political figures in South Florida. The region's electoral importance and substantial Cuban-American community make it a critical battleground for Havana's influence campaigns. The anticipated use of emerging technologies, including AI-driven tools for creating deepfakes, presents new challenges for countering these operations. The U.S. intelligence community's efforts will be crucial in mitigating these threats, mainly through the Foreign Malign Influence Center.

Despite the comprehensive nature of these operations, there remain gaps in fully understanding the extent and capabilities of Cuban influence networks. The covert nature of these activities, combined with the evolving use of technology, poses challenges for detection and attribution. As such, ongoing vigilance and adaptation in intelligence and security strategies are essential to counter these sophisticated threats and safeguard the democratic process.

Keywords

#CubanCyberOperations, #VenezuelanInfluence, #Disinformation, #CyberWarfare, #USPolitics, #ElectionInterference, #SocialMediaManipulation, #HackingGroups, #Misinformation, #CognitiveWarfare, #FloridaElections, #CyberSecurity, #DigitalPropaganda, #AlinCyber, #Deepfakes, #GeopoliticalTensions, #InformationWarfare, #InfluenceOperations, #CubanAmericanCommunity, #CyberEspionage, #Dissidents, #IntelligenceAgencies, #FakeNews, #MediaManipulation, #Botnets, #CyberAttacks, #DigitalSurveillance, #CovertOperations, #DiplomaticRelations, #PublicOpinion, #CubanGovernment, #RussianCollaboration, #VenezuelanAllies, #Malware, #Phishing, #Doxxing, #CyberHarassment, #Espionage, #PropagandaTools, #DigitalNarratives, #CounterDisinformation, #CriticalThinking, #DigitalLiteracy, #EmergingTechnologies, #InternetInfrastructure, #ElectionSecurity, #USCubanRelations, #TTPs, #CyberThreats, #PublicAwareness, #CyberDefense, #CounterMeasures, #CyberForensics, #MediaOutlets,

#StateControlledMedia, #PoliticalLobbying, #AIGeneratedContent, #GlobalCyberSecurity, #CyberPolicy, #NetworkSecurity, #PublicSafety, #RegionalSecurity, #PoliticalDynamics

Analysis

The U.S. intelligence community has identified the Cuban government as a potential actor in influencing U.S. elections, mainly targeting Florida during the 2022 and upcoming 2024 elections. In 2022, Cuban efforts focused on undermining U.S. candidates perceived as hostile to Havana, including Miami Republicans Carlos Gimenez, Maria Elvira Salazar, and Mario Diaz-Balart. These operations included cultivating relationships with sympathetic U.S. media members and deploying a network of social media accounts to disseminate derogatory content about these candidates.

Meta, the parent company of Facebook, dismantled hundreds of fake accounts linked to the Cuban government. These accounts targeted Cuban dissidents and critics in the U.S., reaching thousands of followers and groups with hundreds of thousands of members. The tactics employed by these accounts included hacking the phones and social media accounts of dissidents and journalists and harassment through fake accounts operated by Cuba's University of Informatics Sciences.

Cuba's alignment with Russian and Venezuelan disinformation narratives further complicates the landscape. The Cuban government actively promotes Russian propaganda, particularly regarding the invasion of Ukraine, and has collaborated with Russia and China to develop its internet and cybersecurity infrastructure. The partnership includes developing artificial intelligence capabilities, which enhance Cuba's capacity to conduct influence operations. The potential use of advanced technologies, such as AI tools capable of generating deepfakes and other disinformation, poses significant risks to election integrity.

The U.S. intelligence community's Foreign Malign Influence Center is preparing to counter these sophisticated threats with specialized analysts and forensic tools. These findings underscore a persistent and evolving threat from Cuban influence operations, necessitating heightened vigilance in the upcoming 2024 elections. Cuban influence operations in the U.S. have primarily targeted politicians and media figures critical of the Cuban government, with a specific focus on Florida. The campaigns aim to undermine U.S. candidates who hold anti-Castro views, particularly those in critical political races within the Cuban-American community in South Florida.

As the 2024 election season approaches, Cuban influence operations are expected to intensify, targeting key political figures in South Florida who are critical of the Cuban

government. Based on previous patterns, Cuban operations will likely oppose Republican representatives such as Carlos Gimenez, Maria Elvira Salazar, and Mario Diaz-Balart. These politicians, known for their strong opposition to the Cuban regime, have supported policies unfavorable to Havana, making them primary targets for Cuban disinformation efforts.

While the Cuban government and its associated networks have not explicitly supported specific candidates in South Florida, they generally aim to undermine candidates who are staunchly anti-Castro and advocate for policies harmful to the Cuban government's interests. These efforts focus on influencing public opinion through disinformation and propaganda campaigns, often using social media to amplify harmful content about targeted individuals. The overarching strategy is to weaken the influence of anti-Cuban candidates and sway Cuban-American voters in Florida.

The operations carried out by the Cuban government are unequivocally pro-Cuban government, designed to undermine those who oppose the Cuban regime. The primary goal of these operations is to discredit and weaken U.S. politicians and public figures critical of the Cuban government, especially in areas with significant Cuban-American populations like South Florida. These operations employ various means to achieve their objectives, including disinformation campaigns, media manipulation, cyber operations, and alignment with other state actors. The following provides more details on these methods:

Methods

1. Disinformation Campaigns

Covert Social Media Networks - Cuban operatives use fake social media accounts to spread disinformation, presenting these accounts as independent news sources or local voices. These accounts disseminate content targeting U.S. politicians critical of the Cuban regime, aiming to discredit and undermine them. The network is "almost certainly covertly tied" to the Cuban government, indicating a strategic and organized approach to influence operations.

2. Media Manipulation

Influencing Media Narratives - Cuban officials have attempted to cultivate relationships with U.S. media members who hold critical views of Havana's detractors in Congress. By using these relationships, Cuban operatives subtly shape narratives and spread misinformation through seemingly legitimate media channels. The tactic seeks to sway public opinion against critics of the Cuban government and amplify pro-Havana narratives.

3. Cyber Operations

Hacking and Harassment - Cuban state security, along with entities like the University of Informatics Sciences, has been implicated in hacking activities targeting dissidents and independent journalists. These operations involve hacking phones and social media accounts, distributing personal information, and disseminating false content to discredit targets. The method is a form of cyber harassment aiming to intimidate and silence opposition voices.

Doxxing and Cyberbullying - The Cuban government employs doxxing and cyberbullying tactics to reveal personal information or create threatening situations online. These methods instill fear and discourage dissent among opposition figures and critical journalists.

4. Alignment with Other Disinformation Campaigns

Collaboration with Russia and Venezuela - The Cuban government aligns its disinformation efforts with those of Russia and Venezuela, promoting pro-Russian and pro-Venezuelan narratives. The alignment involves sharing resources and techniques, amplifying the impact of their combined disinformation campaigns. The cooperation extends to promoting narratives hostile to the West, furthering their geopolitical objectives.

5. Emerging Technologies

Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) - Cuban operatives utilize AI-driven tools to create deepfakes and other digital forgeries. These technologies produce realistic but false images, videos, or audio recordings that misrepresent individuals or events. AI in these operations potentially influences public opinion and electoral outcomes by creating confusion and mistrust.

Likely Use and Timing

Pre-Election Period - The Cuban government is expected to increase its disinformation and cyber activities in the months leading up to elections. The period will likely see heightened efforts to discredit targeted politicians and influence voter perceptions, including ramped-up disinformation campaigns, hacking attempts, and spreading propaganda through social media and allied media outlets.

Election Day and Immediate Aftermath - On election day and in the immediate aftermath, cyber operations target election infrastructure, spread misinformation about voting

procedures, or doubt the election results' legitimacy. Using deepfakes and AI-generated content further confuses and erodes public electoral trust.

Post-Election - Following the elections, efforts continue undermining elected officials, particularly those critical of the Cuban government. These operations promote negative narratives and weaken these officials' political standing and public support.

Social Media Platforms and Accounts

Platforms Used -

Facebook and Instagram - Meta reported removing hundreds of fake accounts tied to Cuban government entities involved in spreading propaganda and disinformation.

Twitter (now X) - Fake accounts disseminate Cuban government propaganda and attack critics.

YouTube - Pro-Cuban content, including state-sponsored narratives, is distributed using the platform's video format.

WhatsApp: The encrypted messaging app is popular in Latin American communities, including among Cuban Americans. It is often used to spread disinformation and propaganda within private groups and chats, making it difficult to monitor and counteract (RAND Analysis) (University of Oxford).

Telegram: Similar to WhatsApp, Telegram offers encrypted messaging and is known for hosting channels that rapidly spread content, including state-sponsored propaganda. It provides a platform for covertly disseminating pro-Cuban narratives and disinformation (Journal of International Affairs).

TikTok: While not traditionally associated with political discourse, TikTok has increasingly become a platform for spreading short, engaging videos. Cuban operatives use the platform to distribute content that subtly promotes state narratives or discredits opposition figures (U.S. Department of Homeland Security).

LinkedIn: Although primarily a professional networking site, LinkedIn has been utilized to spread disinformation, especially targeting professionals and businesses. The platform establishes connections under pretenses and subtly influences opinions through professional groups and discussions (Journal of International Affairs).

Discord: Originally a platform for gamers, Discord has grown into a broader social media platform. It offers private servers where Cuban operatives could potentially engage in coordinated campaigns to disseminate disinformation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security).

Websites, Online Platforms, Groups to Watch (See Appendix A for more details)

- Cubadebate - A state-run news website publishing pro-government content and disinformation aligned with Havana's narratives.
- Granma - The official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, used to disseminate state-approved news and propaganda.
- Sputnik and RT (Russia Today) - Russian state-controlled media outlets often amplify pro-Cuban narratives, particularly regarding geopolitical issues like the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- Dirección de Inteligencia (DI) - The primary intelligence agency of Cuba, responsible for foreign intelligence operations, including espionage and influence operations. It operates under the Ministry of the Interior and is involved in covert activities worldwide.
- State Security Department (DSE) - The DSE, part of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, oversees various security operations, including monitoring and countering online dissent. While not a hacking group, DSE's activities include online surveillance and disruption efforts against dissidents.
- Embassy of Cuba in Washington, D.C. - While not directly involved in intelligence activities, the embassy is a platform for cultural diplomacy and public relations efforts that align with Cuba's strategic interests.
- Cuban Consulates - Located in cities with significant Cuban populations, such as Miami, these consulates engage in outreach and influence activities targeting the Cuban diaspora.
- Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) - While not Cuban, the FSB has been known to collaborate with Cuban intelligence in areas of mutual interest, including disinformation campaigns and cybersecurity.
- Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN) - Venezuela's intelligence agency, which has been aligned with Cuban intelligence efforts, particularly under the leadership of Nicolás Maduro.

- Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) - While not explicitly pro-Cuban government, CANF is a prominent organization within the Cuban-American community. It is important to note that CANF generally opposes the Cuban government, but elements within the diaspora still play roles in influence operations.
- Pastors for Peace - An NGO known for organizing "Friendship Caravans" to Cuba, promoting solidarity and opposition to the U.S. embargo. While not a direct propaganda tool, it has often been aligned with Cuban government perspectives.
- University of Havana - Known for its academic research that sometimes aligns with government narratives. The University's faculty and scholars engage in research and conferences that indirectly support the government's position.
- Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP) - An organization that often collaborates with academic institutions and is known for promoting Cuban government views internationally.
- Alianza Martiana - A coalition of Cuban exile organizations based in Miami that includes pro-Cuban government groups. They advocate for ending the U.S. embargo and improving U.S.-Cuba relations, often echoing Havana's positions.
- Anonymous Cuba - A hacktivist group that has occasionally supported Cuban government positions, although its actions and statements vary widely.
- Ciberclarias - The term, translating to "cyber catfish," refers to Cuban government-backed trolls who spread propaganda and disinformation online. These individuals often operate anonymously or under false identities to influence public opinion and counter criticism of the Cuban government.
- Lazarus Group (North Korean) - Although not Cuban, The group has been mentioned concerning operations that involve or benefit from cooperation with Cuban entities. For example, there have been instances where Cuban and North Korean operations have had overlapping interests or targets, but there is no direct attribution of specific joint operations.
- Brigada Antonio Maceo - The organization has supported better relations between the United States and Cuba. It comprises members of the Cuban diaspora who advocate for normalized relations and lifting the embargo.
- The Cuban Research Institute (CRI) at Florida International University (FIU) - While primarily an academic institution, CRI has occasionally hosted events and discussions,

including perspectives supporting engagement with Cuba. The University is a platform for academic and cultural exchange, sometimes including voices aligned with the Cuban government's views.

- The Marti-Maceo Society - A cultural organization based in Tampa, with some members in Miami, which has historically promoted Cuban cultural heritage. While not overtly political, some of its members have expressed pro-Cuban government sentiments.
- La Habana's Cyber Army - Also known as the "Cuban Cyber Army," The group is believed to be closely affiliated with the Cuban government, explicitly operating under the direction of state intelligence agencies.
- G2 Cyber Division - Linked to Cuba's Directorate of Intelligence (G2), The division focuses on cyber espionage and cyber operations, targeting domestic and international adversaries.
- Technical Department of Investigation (DTI) - A division within Cuba's Ministry of the Interior responsible for digital surveillance and cyber operations.
- Operation Truth - A collective associated with the Cuban government focused on digital propaganda and countering anti-government narratives online.
- Cuban Network of Technicians and Computer Scientists - A loosely organized group of Cuban IT professionals, sometimes implicated in hacking activities that align with state interests.
- Guerreros Cubanos del Ciberespacio (Cuban Cyber Warriors) - A group that has conducted various cyberattacks and has been suspected of collaborating with the Cuban government on specific operations.
- Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (Union of Young Communists) - While not a hacking group per se, The organization is known to engage in digital propaganda and cyber activities, often supporting state-sponsored campaigns.
- Pro-Cuban Hacktivist Collectives - Various unnamed groups have surfaced sporadically to conduct operations supporting the Cuban government's agenda, often targeting dissidents and foreign entities critical of Cuba.
- Cubach - An informal name sometimes used for Cuban hackers involved in various cyber activities. While not a formal group, it refers to individuals participating in government-aligned operations.

- Cuban Electronic Warfare Brigade - Allegedly a more formalized entity within the Cuban military structure, focusing on electronic and cyber warfare. It includes military and civilian personnel trained to conduct cyber operations.
- Tenth March Collective - A lesser-known group suspected of engaging in propaganda and cyber activities to support Cuban government narratives. They often work through covert means, using digital platforms to influence public opinion.
- Mambi Cybernetics - Named after the historical Mambi fighters, The group is believed to operate in the digital sphere, conducting cyber operations to protect Cuban interests.
- Cuban Hacktivists - An umbrella term for various hacktivist groups and individuals in Cuba who engage in digital activism, sometimes aligning with government objectives but often acting independently.
- Raúl Capote - Allegedly involved in Cuban cyber activities, Capote is known as a former Cuban intelligence agent who now provides insights into Cuba's intelligence and cyber operations.
- Félix Rodríguez - A Cuban hacker known for his technical skills and involvement in pro-Cuban hacking activities. While not officially linked to government operations, his actions often align with state interests.
- Juan Almeida - Allegedly an independent hacker who occasionally collaborates with Cuban government initiatives, focusing on cyber propaganda and information warfare.

Comparative Chart – Cuban Influence Operations

The following chart represents a comparative threat assessment of Cuban influence operations, focusing on potential impact, targets, methods, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), along with likely timing up to February 2025.

Category	Potential Impact	Targets	Methods	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)	Likely Timing
Political Influence	High	U.S. Politicians, particularly anti-Cuban figures in Florida	Disinformation, Cyber Operations	- Disinformation campaigns - Social media manipulation - Media narrative influence - Cyber harassment	- Pre-election periods (Aug 2023 - Nov 2024) - Election day and immediate aftermath (Nov 2024) - Post-election (Dec 2024 - Feb 2025)
Public Opinion	Moderate to High	Cuban-American Community, U.S. Public	Propaganda, Cultural Diplomacy	- Pro-Cuban narratives - Community outreach - Cultural and academic exchanges	- Ongoing, with spikes during political campaigns and significant diplomatic events
Cyber Espionage	Moderate	U.S. Government, Cuban Dissidents	Hacking, Data Exfiltration	- Phishing campaigns - Malware distribution - Hacking of dissident networks	- Opportunistic, with heightened activity around crucial political events and diplomatic negotiations
Media Manipulation	Moderate	U.S. Media Outlets, Journalists	Propaganda, Covert Relationships	- Influencing sympathetic journalists - Planting biased stories - Amplifying state narratives	- Continuous, with increased activity during high-profile events and crises
Diplomatic Leverage	Low to Moderate	U.S. Diplomatic Channels, Allies	Political Lobbying, Public Relations	- Advocacy for lifting the U.S. embargo - Engagement with pro-Cuban organizations	- Periodic, aligned with diplomatic summits and bilateral negotiations
Technology Use	High	U.S. Election Infrastructure	AI-Driven Disinformation, Deepfakes	- Creation of deepfakes - AI-generated content - Digital forgeries	- Peak periods during pre-election (Aug 2023 - Nov 2024) and post-election analysis (Dec 2024 - Feb 2025)

Analysis Summary

The impact of Cuban influence operations ranges from moderate to high, particularly in political influence and public opinion manipulation. The strategic focus on Florida's Cuban-American community could significantly sway electoral outcomes and public discourse. Primary targets include U.S. politicians critical of the Cuban government, Cuban-American voters, and media outlets. Secondary targets include U.S. government agencies and the general public. The Cuban government employs a combination of disinformation, cyber operations, propaganda, cultural diplomacy, and diplomatic leverage. These methods are integrated into a cohesive strategy aimed at undermining U.S. interests and promoting Cuban narratives. Key TTPs include disinformation campaigns through covert social media networks, hacking and cyber harassment, influencing media narratives, and using cultural exchanges. Advanced technologies like AI and deepfakes are increasingly used to enhance these operations. The timing of these operations is likely to peak during critical periods, such as the lead-up to the 2024 U.S. elections, election day, and the subsequent period where electoral outcomes are analyzed and contested. Continuous low-level activity is expected in public opinion manipulation and diplomatic efforts, with

There remain uncertainties in fully mapping the extent of Cuban influence networks, mainly covert operatives and sympathetic organizations. The clandestine nature of these operations poses a challenge for detection and attribution. Additionally, evolving technology, such as AI, could outpace existing countermeasures, necessitating ongoing vigilance and adaptation in intelligence and security strategies.

Pro-Cuban Government Organizations in Miami

Some cultural and political groups in Miami express pro-Cuban sentiments or maintain a sympathetic stance toward the Cuban government. These groups engage in cultural diplomacy, academic exchanges, or political advocacy aligning with Havana's interests. However, distinguishing between legitimate cultural organizations and those potentially influenced by state actors requires careful analysis.

Additional Insights

Cuban government operations have been sophisticated, using various platforms and techniques to spread their influence. The alignment with other state actors like Russia and Venezuela further amplifies their efforts. Targeting Cuban-American communities, especially in politically significant areas like Miami, underscores the strategic nature of these campaigns. As the 2024 elections approach, Cuban influence operations are expected to intensify, mainly focusing on undermining key political figures in Florida. These efforts will likely include sophisticated techniques like AI-driven disinformation tools, complicating the information environment and potentially influencing voter perceptions and behaviors. Overall, Cuban influence operations in the U.S. are characterized by a comprehensive approach that combines traditional propaganda with modern cyber tactics, all aimed at protecting and promoting the interests of the Cuban government.

Wrap Up

The Cuban government's cyber capabilities and influence operations represent a sophisticated and multi-layered threat to democratic processes, particularly in the United States. Using a diverse array of social media platforms, from mainstream giants like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter (now X) to encrypted channels like WhatsApp and Telegram, Cuban operatives have crafted a nuanced strategy that spans disinformation campaigns, media manipulation, and cyber operations. These efforts are not merely reactive but are part of a well-coordinated and proactive attempt to shape public opinion, undermine political opponents, and align with other state actors like Russia and Venezuela.

The deployment of advanced technologies, such as AI-driven deepfakes and computational propaganda, further amplifies the reach and impact of these operations. The Cuban government's ability to adapt to new platforms and technologies underscores the dynamic nature of the threat. As the 2024 U.S. elections approach, the potential for these operations to influence electoral outcomes and public perception cannot be underestimated. The need for vigilance, robust countermeasures, and a coordinated response from government and civil society is paramount.

This comprehensive analysis highlights the importance of understanding and countering Cuban influence operations. By exposing the mechanisms and platforms, we better equip policymakers, security professionals, and the public to safeguard democratic institutions and ensure a free and fair electoral process. The stakes are high, and the response must be equally resolute, grounded in a clear understanding of the evolving landscape of digital information warfare.



Appendix A

Media Outlets and Disinformation Channels

- Cubadebate
 - Capabilities - Primarily virtual, using digital media to disseminate pro-government content and disinformation. It shapes public perception both domestically and internationally.
 - Motivation - Support the Cuban government's narratives and counteract dissent.
 - Intent - Maintain control over public discourse and promote a positive image of the Cuban government.
 - Targets - General public, international audiences.
 - Lethality - Low physical lethality but significant influence in shaping opinions and potentially destabilizing public trust.
- Granma
 - Capabilities - Similar to Cubadebate, focusing on print and online media.
 - Motivation – Act as the mouthpiece of the Cuban Communist Party, ensuring uniformity in public messaging.
 - Intent - Disseminate official propaganda and uphold the party line.
 - Targets - Cuban populace, international observers.
 - Lethality - Low physical lethality but high in terms of propaganda dissemination.
- Sputnik and RT (Russia Today)
 - Capabilities - Global media networks with extensive digital reach.
 - Motivation - Promote Russian geopolitical interests, often aligned with Cuban narratives.
 - Intent - Support pro-Russian and pro-Cuban viewpoints to influence global public opinion.
 - Targets - International audiences, particularly in the West.

- Lethality - Similar to Cubadebate and Granma, focusing on influence rather than physical threat.
- Intelligence and Security Agencies
- Dirección de Inteligencia (DI)
 - Capabilities - Extensive physical and virtual capabilities, including espionage, cyber operations, and influence campaigns.
 - Motivation - Protect Cuban state interests and gather intelligence on foreign entities.
 - Intent - Maintain state security, conduct espionage, and influence foreign policies.
 - Targets - Foreign governments, dissidents, and key political figures.
 - Lethality - High regarding espionage and covert operations, potentially leading to significant geopolitical impacts.
- State Security Department (DSE)
 - Capabilities - Surveillance and counterintelligence, monitoring both physical activities and online communications.
 - Motivation - Suppress dissent and protect the state from internal and external threats.
 - Intent - Maintain internal security and prevent anti-government activities.
 - Targets - Domestic dissidents, foreign adversaries.
 - Lethality - Moderate, focusing on suppression and surveillance rather than direct violence.
- Embassy of Cuba in Washington, D.C.
 - Capabilities - Diplomatic channels and cultural diplomacy.
 - Motivation - Promote Cuba's image and foster relations with the U.S. and other countries.
 - Intent - Engage in public relations and influence activities.
 - Targets - U.S. policymakers, Cuban diaspora, and the general public.
 - Lethality - Low, primarily focused on soft power and diplomacy.

- Cuban Consulates
 - Capabilities - Similar to the embassy, it focuses on outreach and influencing operations within the diaspora.
 - Motivation - Maintain connections with the Cuban community abroad.
 - Intent - Influence the Cuban diaspora's opinions and actions.
 - Targets - Cuban expatriates and local political entities.
 - Lethality - Low, focused on cultural and diplomatic influence.
- Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)
 - Capabilities - Extensive cyber and intelligence capabilities, including disinformation and cyber warfare.
 - Motivation - Support Russian geopolitical interests, often aligned with Cuban interests.
 - Intent - Conduct espionage, influence operations, and cyberattacks.
 - Targets - Foreign governments and international organizations.
 - Lethality - High, capable of significant cyber and physical disruptions.
- Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN)
 - Capabilities - Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and collaboration with Cuban counterparts.
 - Motivation - Support Venezuelan and allied interests, including Cuba.
 - Intent - Monitor and suppress opposition and support regional allies.
 - Targets - Domestic and foreign adversaries, opposition groups.
 - Lethality - Moderate to high, depending on operational context.
- Pastors for Peace
 - Capabilities - Organizational influence and advocacy.
 - Motivation - Promote solidarity with Cuba and oppose U.S. policies like the embargo.
 - Intent - Foster positive relations with Cuba and challenge U.S. foreign policy.
 - Targets - U.S. public, Cuban supporters.

- Lethality - Low, primarily focused on advocacy and solidarity.
- University of Havana
 - Capabilities - Academic and research-based influence.
 - Motivation - Support government narratives through academic research and discourse.
 - Intent - Indirectly support the Cuban government's positions.
 - Targets - Academic and international communities.
 - Lethality - Low, focused on soft power and academic influence.
- Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP)
 - Capabilities - Cultural and academic collaborations.
 - Motivation - Promote Cuban government views internationally.
 - Intent - Build international solidarity and support for Cuba.
 - Targets - International supporters, academic institutions.
 - Lethality - Low, centered on cultural diplomacy.
- Alianza Martiana
 - Capabilities - Activism and advocacy within the Cuban diaspora.
 - Motivation - Promote pro-Cuban government stances and oppose the U.S. embargo.
 - Intent - Foster better U.S.-Cuba relations.
 - Targets - U.S. policymakers, Cuban-American community.
 - Lethality - Low, focused on advocacy.
- Anonymous Cuba
 - Capabilities - Hacktivism, including defacement and information leaks.
 - Motivation - Varies, sometimes aligned with government interests.
 - Intent - Conduct cyber operations to support or protest against various causes.
 - Targets - Government entities, private organizations.

- Lethality - Variable, depending on specific actions and targets.
- Ciberclarias
 - Capabilities - Online trolling and propaganda dissemination.
 - Motivation - Support Cuban government narratives and counter dissent.
 - Intent - Influence public opinion and discredit opposition.
 - Targets - Social media users in online communities.
 - Lethality - Low physical lethality, but significant in terms of information warfare.
- La Habana's Cyber Army
 - Capabilities - Cyber operations, including hacking and surveillance.
 - Motivation - Protect state interests and conduct espionage.
 - Intent - Cyber defense and offensive operations.
 - Targets - Foreign governments, dissidents.
 - Lethality - High, capable of significant cyber disruptions.
- G2 Cyber Division
 - Capabilities - Advanced cyber espionage and surveillance.
 - Motivation - State security and intelligence gathering.
 - Intent - Monitor and infiltrate foreign and domestic targets.
 - Targets - Domestic and international adversaries.
 - Lethality - High, focused on intelligence and security.
- Technical Department of Investigation (DTI)
 - Capabilities - Digital surveillance and cyber operations.
 - Motivation - Monitor and control information flow.
 - Intent - Suppress dissent and control digital narratives.
 - Targets - Dissidents, foreign entities.
 - Lethality - High in surveillance and control capabilities.

- Operation Truth
 - Capabilities - Digital propaganda and counter-narrative operations.
 - Motivation - Counter anti-government narratives.
 - Intent - Control public perception and promote government views.
 - Targets - General public, international audiences.
 - Lethality - Low physical lethality, high in information warfare.

