TLP:CLEAR | TREADSTONE 71 COGNITIVE WARFARE AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS DESK | PRODUCT T71-IRN-2026-0929-SEM-01 | 29 SEPTEMBER 2026

The IRGC Letter to the American People: Semiotic, Forensic Linguistic and ASA Evidence Review

Subject: IRGC "An Open Letter to the Honorable People of the United States of America", 26-page English PDF and 18-page Persian companion, released 29 September 2026 (7 Mehr 1405) by IRGC spokesman Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi. Companion to T71-IRN-2026-0929-v8, which holds the 115-row claim matrix, the release chronology and the infrastructure implications. This product re-reads the same evidence through four method families in this order of weight: semiotic analysis, forensic linguistics, the ASA Evidence Standard (Public Edition 1.0, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22662242), and the Treadstone 71 Advanced SATs and decision engines. Audience: critical infrastructure security leads in Europe, Australia, Singapore and the Gulf; trust and safety teams; educators.

- The letter is a state influence product built as a true half welded to a false half. The verified core (the Minab school strike, US aircraft losses, the debt and oil figures, the 1953 coup) carries a shell of fabrications (a 9/11 false-flag aside, ISIS as a US creation, an IRGC that "never harmed civilians"). The design is competent. The execution is not. The gap is the tell. Combined purpose: electoral pressure on US voters plus a Hormuz signal to Washington, inside a legitimation frame for the post-decapitation regime. Likely (55 to <85); moderate confidence.
- Forensic evidence now places the drafting inside Iran on two office machines two days before release. The Persian original was exported from Word 2016 on Sunday 27 September at 21:15 Tehran, on a "Dell" machine, in B Lotus and B Titr fonts; the English came off a second Word installation (LTSC) and both were re-saved by the upload server one second apart at 13:24 Tehran on the 29th. The IRGC's own Persian header calls the Persian a "translation of the substance" of the letter. Highly likely (85 to <95); high confidence.
- For infrastructure owners outside the United States the letter is a tempo marker, not a control problem. The actors it re-energises (CyberAv3ngers under the IRGC, Handala under MOIS, DieNet-class hacktivists) are Likely (55 to <85) to cite the letter or Minab in a publicized lure, leak or claim before 4 November. CISA AA26-097A on Iranian PLC exploitation governs the response. CARM verdicts: APPROVE removal of internet-exposed OT and prebunking; HOLD attribution; DENY operator rebuttals.

The letter is a professionally staged, amateurishly translated cognitive-warfare artifact. Its function is to convert true US battlefield and economic facts into a moral case for American voters to punish the administration on 3 November, while telling Washington through a public channel what Tehran wants on the Strait of Hormuz. Treadstone 71 keeps the v8 primary-purpose finding at Likely. The document mixes claims that survive independent checking with claims that collapse on contact, and the standard defensive error is to answer the whole thing as if it were uniformly false. It is not. Half of it holds. The verified core is what makes the shell dangerous, and the ASA grid exists to keep the two on separate rows. The new forensic evidence from the two Persian files closes the drafting-date question (the weekend of 26 to 27 September, after Trump's 9 September Dallas pledge and before the 29 September presser) and identifies the still-unobtained 390.5 KB Telegram file as, in all likelihood, the English Word export that would carry the English drafting stamp.

Who

Brigadier General Hossein Mohebbi presented the letter at the Hozeh Honari in Tehran at 10:00 on 29 September and is its named voice. The drafting cell was Iranian, Persian-native, working from one outline on at least two Word installations, without a native English editor. Distribution ran from Sepah

News (signed "IRGC Cyber Command") through Fars, Tasnim and Mehr, then Press TV and CGTN Europe, with one sympathiser account on X outrunning the state outlets fifteen to one. The stated addressees are US scholars, students and media. The audiences that matter are wider and are mapped in the HTIM section.

What

Two files. Both matter. The English, 26 pages, 376,484 bytes, Word LTSC, author field "Dell", producer pdfcpu, stamped 13:24:10 Tehran on 29 September. The Persian, 18 pages, 359,334 bytes, Word 2016, same author field, same producer, stamped 13:24:09. A second Persian copy obtained by the client carries the Word-native wrapper (producer Microsoft Word 2016, no pdfcpu) and the export stamp 21:15:13 Tehran on 27 September, with text character-identical to the official file.

The Persian header reads "ترجمه فارسی مضمون نامه سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی به مردم آمریکا": the IRGC's own label describing its Persian text as a rendering of the letter's substance. The English opens with the bismillah, brackets its argument between Qur'an 13:11 and 21:105, cites Jeremiah 18:7 to 10, Matthew 7:12, Luke 6:31 and the Talmud, runs numbered lists (13 objectives, 12 wins, 3 factors, 5 leader criteria), a Karbala cast, a Noah-to-Moses typology, and closes on the Mahdi and Christ returning together. Page 25 answers Trump's 9 September "$5,000" pledge.

So What

The letter is the surface of an active Iranian influence and cyber posture. It landed five weeks before the midterms, on the morning FM Araghchi met Qatari mediators in New York on Hormuz, one day before the 30 September end of the coalition mission in Iraq, and five weeks before the 4 November embassy-seizure anniversary. For defenders the consequence is that Iran-aligned cyber actors now hold a fresh, state-blessed grievance script (Minab, "war crimes", the blockade) to hang lures, hack-and-leak packages and defacement claims on. The letter changes no single control.

It raises the probability that the Iranian PLC campaign and its hacktivist adjuncts spike around the US election.

Why Now

Four dated triggers converge, and the two Persian files now bracket the drafting window from both ends. The "$5,000" line fixes composition after 10 September. The Word export stamp fixes the Persian as finished by the evening of 27 September. The letter was assembled inside roughly seventeen days in which the midterm clock, the Hormuz channel, the Iraq withdrawal and the embassy anniversary were all visible to the drafters. We assess the timing as chosen. Highly likely (85 to <95); high confidence.

Figure 1. Drafting window (days from 9 September) and the release day (UTC, not to scale)



Figure 1. Drafting window and release day, from the two file stamps and the client's captures.

Impacts So Far

Reach was real, modest, and front-run by a sympathiser. On X, @ShaykhSulaiman posted the SNN clip at 07:49 UTC and reached 39,100 views and 316 reposts by 15:01 UTC; Press TV Breaking (09:38 UTC) reached 2,500 and CGTN Europe (11:17 UTC) reached 580. The English PDF moved on Telegram from Sepah News at 10:02 UTC through Fars, Tasnim, a fan channel and Masaf inside 92 minutes, byte-identical at each stop. A fifth channel posted a different English file at 10:18 UTC, 390.5 KB, under a Persian filename; this product assesses it below. Reuters framed the letter as wooing US voters, the contest Tehran wanted and got. Telegram's auto-translate inverted one Persian line in transit, turning "the century of the triumph of the will of nations" into "a century against the will of the nations".

Figure 2. Amplification on X and the Telegram cascade, 29 September 2026



Figure 2. First-post reach on X and the Telegram cascade of the English PDF; source, client captures.

Outlook and Strategic Foresight

The letter's own reach decays inside a week absent a follow-on event. The durable effect sits with the cyber adjuncts. Over 30 days we judge it Likely (55 to <85) that at least one Iran-aligned actor invokes Minab or the letter in a publicized operation against a US, Gulf or European target, and a Roughly even chance (45 to <55) that any such operation produces measurable disruption rather than a nuisance defacement or a recycled leak. Past 60 days the path follows Hormuz: an understanding strands the letter as a historical marker; a breakdown gives Tehran a reason to escalate where attribution is cheap to deny. The Cone of Plausibility in section D sets the branches.

SATs Applied

- Semiotic analysis (Peirce, Saussure, Barthes, Eco, Greimas, Lotman): the letter and its packaging as signs across audiences.
- Forensic linguistics and document forensics: authorship, drafting direction, L1 interference, machine and font fingerprints, dating.
- ASA Evidence Standard, Public Edition 1.0: nine clusters, thirty factors; T, D and F scores; A to F and 1 to 6 anchors never averaged.
- ATCRI: ranked, weighted ledger of the actors and vectors the letter mobilises.
- ACS: game-theoretic model of IRGC, Washington, Gulf states and the US electorate over 30, 60 and 90 days.
- CWC: counter-influence priorities derived from the forensic linguistics.
- CWIA: propagation tracking across platforms and languages, with the projected curve.
- HTIM: human-terrain map of audiences and the cultural nexus each is offered.
- CARM: Approve, Hold, Deny on recommended client actions, with NIS2 and SOCI notes.
- Decoy's Dilemma: the reflex the letter tries to trigger and how to deny predictability.
- Cognitive Bias Validator: an audit of Treadstone 71's own v8 assessment.
- STEMPLES Plus: Iran's position as it bears on the letter.
- Deception Detection (MOM, POP, MOSES, EVE); Red Hat; Quadrant Crunching; Indicators Validation; Cone of Plausibility.

A. Semiotic Analysis

A.1 The cover and the packaging

The cover carries a red-and-white raised fist, the national emblem, the IRGC crest and a bilingual title. In Peirce's terms the fist is an icon of resistance, an index of the organ that raises it, and a symbol inside a fixed revolutionary vocabulary. The bilingual title is itself a sign: English above Persian tells the reader the object was built to cross a border. In Saussure's terms one signifier points to several signifieds by audience. For the US anti-war left the fist reads as protest solidarity. For the domestic reader it reads as steadfastness. For a Gulf reader it reads as threat. One sign, three meanings, which is the ambiguity a cross-border product wants.

Barthes gives the sharper tool.

At denotation the cover is a letter from an army. Connotation borrows the grammar of a grassroots manifesto. Myth is where it builds the story the whole document serves: a righteous people's resistance against the "Pharaoh of our age". The counter-myth the letter fears is the IRGC as a repressive apparatus that killed its own citizens in January 2026. The footnote on page 15, defining "true, honest Iranians" as those who have not "sold their soul to the devil", is a boundary marker in Lotman's sense. It draws the edge of the semiosphere, places diaspora critics outside the circle of authentic Iran, and voids their testimony in advance.

A.2 Eco's model reader

The model reader is a US citizen who distrusts his own government, reads scripture as authority, and will entertain that Washington lies about its wars. The letter constructs that reader and then flatters him. The scriptural bookends and the Jeremiah, Matthew and Luke citations address a religious American who accepts a moral argument in a shared prophetic idiom. The policy-statistical passages address a secular, fiscally minded reader. The letter switches model readers by section.

That is why its register lurches.

A.3 Greimas actantial model

Subject: the IRGC and Iran. Object: American withdrawal of support for Israel and acceptance of coexistence. Sender: God and the Iranian nation, the two authorities the letter grounds itself in. Receiver: the American people. Helper: shared scripture, US anti-war sentiment, and the verifiable facts of the war. Opponent: Trump, Israel, the "military-industrial complex", and the diaspora Iranians the footnote excludes.

Figure 3. Greimas actantial model of the letter



Figure 3. Greimas actantial model of the letter.

The map exposes the structural trick. The American people are cast as receiver-turned-helper, the actor who can cross from Washington's side to Iran's.

That is the electoral-pressure motive rendered as narrative grammar.

A.4 The resignified vocabulary

"Death to America" is resignified on page 10 and again at the presser as hostility to policy, not to people. "Greater Satan", "House of Oppression", "Den of Espionage" and "paper tiger" are retained and do the opposite work: they reassure the domestic and Axis reader that nothing has softened. The letter runs two registers at once, conciliatory outward and defiant inward, because it has two primary audiences. The "come see Hormuz for yourself" invitation (page 2), backed at the presser by a correspondence address and expense-paid trips, is an index in Peirce's sense: it points to control of the strait by performing the confidence of a host.

Hospitality as a sign of possession. The host owns the house.

A.5 The Karbala cast and the "$5,000" line

The Karbala cast (Husayn, Abbas, Zaynab, Ali al-Asghar, Abdullah) and the Noah, Abraham, Joseph, Moses and Pharaoh typology place the present war inside a sacred template of righteous suffering. For a Shia reader this is the deepest available frame. For a US reader it is opaque, which is why the English adds Karbala detail the Persian omits. The "$5,000" line on page 25 is a different kind of sign: a direct index to Trump's Dallas pledge, inserted to show the drafters are current and to turn a domestic vote-buying narrative back on its author. It is the most audience-aware sentence in the document. Someone was reading Dallas coverage.

A.6 The myth and the counter-myth

The myth: Iran as the patient, scripturally sanctioned victim-nation whose resistance is national and cosmic at once, facing a corrupt American leadership distinct from a good American people. The counter-myth it fears: Iran as a regime that shot its own people in January 2026, polices women, and projects force through proxies. Every rhetorical move, the footnote, the "never harmed civilians" claim, the resignification of the chant, is built to hold the first and bury the second. The construction is deliberate and competent as design and degraded in execution by the translation failures documented next. High confidence.

B. Forensic Linguistics and Document Forensics

B.1 Drafting direction

The evidence supports parallel drafting from one outline, and the IRGC's own header now confirms how the drafters saw it. Each version carries content the other lacks. The English adds the 9/11 false-flag aside (page 18), the "Arc de Trump" (page 21), stealth aircraft (page 4), the Abdullah and Abbas details (page 6), the "over 200,000" Iran-Iraq dead (page 12) and the page-15 footnote. The Persian adds the JCPOA passage, "50,000 American advisers", "fewer than 20 million Zionists", "48 years" where the English has 47 or "nearly five decades", "15-fold" objectives in one passage against 13 in another, and a harsher epithet list for Trump of which "lustful" appears only in Persian. Additions in both directions are the signature of two drafts growing from one skeleton. The Persian file's first line, "Persian translation of the substance of the letter", says the IRGC presents the English as the instrument and the Persian as a rendering of its content for the home audience. Highly likely (85 to <95); high confidence.

B.2 Machines, fonts and dates

The Persian Word export is stamped 27 September, 21:15:13 Tehran, producer Microsoft Word 2016, author "Dell". The upload server re-saved it with pdfcpu on 29 September at 13:24:09 and re-saved the English at 13:24:10. The English creator field reads Word LTSC. Two Office installations, both with the unpersonalised default author name, both on Dell hardware. The Persian file embeds B Lotus and B Titr Bold, the Borna Rayaneh faces that ship on Iranian office machines and almost nowhere else, beside Arabic Typesetting and Calibri; the English embeds Garamond, Calibri and Times New Roman. Two desks, one operator, one upload. The Persian export closed at 21:15 on the Sunday; the English true export time is not yet known, because pdfcpu overwrote it. Two-desk reading: Highly likely (85 to <95). The metadata itself: high confidence.

B.3 The 390.5 KB file

The client's Telegram file list shows a channel outside the state chain posting an English PDF at 10:18 UTC under the Persian filename "Letter to the people of America, English version", 390.5 KB. The Word-native Persian weighs 378,929 bytes and its pdfcpu re-save 359,334, a ratio of 0.948. Applied to the English pdfcpu file (376,484 bytes), a Word-native English export would weigh about 387.7 KB. The observed 390.5 KB sits within 0.7 percent of that figure, and the filename follows the same pattern as the Persian original the client obtained ("Letter to America, original version, in Persian"). We assess the

390.5 KB file as the English Word export made before upload, the one file with the English drafting stamp still inside it. Likely (55 to <85); moderate confidence until the file is diffed.

Figure 4. Two drafting desks, one upload, and the leak path of the source files



Figure 4. Document forensics: two desks, one upload, and the path of the source files to a third-party channel.

The corollary matters more than the file: whoever posted these two files had access to the drafting cell's outputs, not to the Fars upload.

B.4 L1 interference

The English shows dense Persian-substrate interference: article drift ("the international law" in Mehr's edit of the opening), preposition choices that track Persian government, comma splices where Persian would coordinate, and capitalisation of common nouns carrying theological weight. Transliteration is unstandardised ("Sayyid" beside "Seyyed", "wali al-faqih" spelled variably), and the corps's own name appears as both "Islamic Revolution Guards Corps" and "Revolutionary Guard Corps". One editing pass would have normalised all of this. None was made. Nobody checked. High confidence.

B.5 Extraction artefacts against human error

Two error classes must be kept apart. "Selfassurance", "selfdetermination" and "millenniaold" are missing-hyphen artefacts of PDF text handling and say nothing about the drafter. "Credulity" for "incredulity" (page 2), "Americanophile" as a coinage (page 11), "rent" for "torn" (page 6), "medal of honor" for the Legion of Merit (page 13), "While House" (page 18), "find as escape route" (page 18) and "to the put an end" (page 24) are human errors by a non-native writer working from imperfect knowledge. The knowledge errors matter most. They map a location. "Arc de Trump" and the renaming of "Lake Ontario" (page 21) are tells: a drafter with US-resident fluency would not produce them. They place the composition inside Iran, by writers who know the United States through media. Highly likely (85 to <95).

B.6 Register and idiolect

Lexical density and sentence length shift by section. The Karbala and eschatology passages run long, subordinated and archaic. The US-statistics passages run short, declarative and numeral-heavy. The Trump polemic runs medium with a spike in evaluative adjectives. The theological and policy passages read as different hands, or one hand working from different source stacks. We assess three to five

contributing drafters coordinated by one outline. Moderate confidence, because register shift alone cannot exclude a single versatile writer.

B.7 Machine translation against non-native composition

The English lacks the flat, over-regular cadence of raw machine output. Its errors are human non-native errors: idiom misfires, knowledge gaps, register lurches. That supports human drafting by Persian speakers with strong but imperfect English rather than a pipeline translation. Highly likely (85 to <95).

B.8 Comparison with prior letters

The 2006 Ahmadinejad letter and the 1 April 2026 Pezeshkian letter both separate the American people from their government and both invoke 1953. The Pezeshkian text is tighter, more secular and edited to Western op-ed register. The IRGC letter is longer, more scriptural and visibly unedited. Across the three the IRGC product is the least polished and the most theologically loaded, which fits a military-clerical drafting cell rather than a foreign-ministry one. Moderate-high confidence.

B.9 The grandchild

The Persian uses "نوه", which has no gender; the English says "granddaughter". A translation decision, not a fact in evidence. It should not be cited as a claim about the child.

C. ASA Evidence Standard Scoring

C.1 Method

Grid: the nine clusters and thirty factors of the ASA Evidence Standard, Public Edition 1.0, with equal cluster weights. Entry anchor: source reliability A to F and information credibility 1 to 6 under STANAG 2511, printed apart and never averaged. T-Score: mean of the quality clusters (C1, C2, C3, C4, C7), capped at 100 minus the higher of the two risk clusters (C5, C6). D-Score: the probability an adversary shaped the evidence, floor 25. F-Score: confidence in the most likely achieved endgame, forward-looking claims only. Rule 1 caps a self-serving source at C for its own assertions; Rule 2 exempts admissions against interest; Rule 7 penalises single sourcing; Rule 9 re-opens a grade rather than overwriting it. The Public Edition withholds per-factor thresholds and the internal weights, and its author has published no inter-rater data, so every T, D and F below is a structured analyst rating under a documented method, not the output of a validated instrument. Moderate confidence on individual scores, high confidence on the rank order. Definitions are in Appendix 2.

C.2 Reading the claim table

Anchor is the Admiralty pair on the letter as the source of that claim. T grades the evidence on the underlying fact, not the IRGC's honesty. D grades the probability Iran shaped the item. Verified facts and adversary claims sit on separate rows. The full set of 42 claim scores and 14 source scores is in the two CSV attachments; the table below is the consolidated view.

#	Claim (page)	Anchor	T	D	F	Band on the underlying fact	Note
1	US strike on the Minab school (p.1)	C3; fact B2	83	30	n/a	Almost certain (Pentagon preliminary review 11 Mar; Amnesty 156 dead, about 120 children)	Verified; Rule 9 refresh on the UN report of 18 Sep
2	168 children killed (p.1)	C3	55	50	n/a	Roughly even chance; Amnesty and HRANA run lower	Partially true

#	Claim (page)	Anchor	T	D	F	Band on the underlying fact	Note
3	42 US aircraft lost or damaged (p.3, as “200 drones, 30 fighters”)	E5 on the letter; fact B2	80	30	n/a	CRS 42 (24 MQ-9, 7 KC-135, 4 F-15E, 2 MC-130J, 1 E-3, 1 A-10, 1 F-35A damaged, 1 MQ-4C): Almost certain on the CRS count	Letter’s 30 fighters disproven; Rule 7 on CRS
4	US warships fled to the Indian Ocean (p.3)	E4	20	78	30	Unlikely; blockade ongoing	Disproven
5	Hormuz under Iranian operational control (p.3)	C3	48	60	55	Roughly even chance; partial, contested	Misleading
6	40 million funeral mourners (p.4)	D4	40	60	n/a	Unlikely as stated; unverified	Unverified
7	210 consecutive nights of rallies (p.21)	C3	50	55	n/a	Roughly even chance	Adversary claim
8	Succession stable, legitimacy intact (p.7)	D3	35	70	45	Unlikely as stated	Legitimation claim
9	Trump trades stocks on war news (p.9)	D4	35	65	n/a	Unlikely; no record	Unverified
10	Debt exceeds $40T (p.22)	B2	88	25	n/a	Almost certain; Treasury $40.047T on 18 Aug	Rule 2
11	Crude exports 500k to 4M bpd (p.22)	B2	85	25	n/a	Almost certain; EIA 4.0M bpd 2025	Rule 2
12	More than 1,300 police killings a year (p.10)	B2	76	35	n/a	Highly likely for 2024 (MPV 1,365); the 2025 MPV total runs lower	Partially true; Rule 9
13	4 percent of people, 20 percent of prisoners (p.10)	C3	60	40	n/a	Likely; dated figures	Partially true
14	40 million below the poverty line (p.23)	C3	62	40	n/a	Likely; Census 36 to 40M by measure	Partially true
15	800 bases (p.24)	C2	70	30	n/a	Highly likely on order of magnitude	Partially true
16	Afghanistan cost $3T, 2,354 US dead, $85B left (p.21)	E4	30	70	n/a	Cost overstated (Costs of War $2.3T); dead near right; $85B disproven (DoD IG $7.12B)	Mixed
17	Iraq cost $4T, 4,800 US dead, 265,000 Iraqi dead (p.22)	C4	45	55	n/a	Roughly even chance; ranges vary by source	Partially true
18	GDP share 23.5 to 14 percent (p.22)	D4	35	60	n/a	Unlikely as stated; mixes nominal and PPP	Misleading
19	Iran Air 655, 290 dead, captain decorated (p.13)	B1	90	25	n/a	Almost certain on the shootdown; Legion of Merit, not a “medal of honor”	Verified with error
20	1953 coup (p.11)	A1	92	25	n/a	Almost certain	Rule 2
21	American opinion moving toward Palestinians (p.24)	B2	82	30	n/a	Almost certain; Gallup Feb 2026, 41 to 36	Rule 2
22	IRGC never harmed civilians (p.16)	F6	10	90	n/a	Highly unlikely; HRANA 7,000-plus verified January 2026 dead	Disproven
23	ISIS created by the United States (p.13)	E5	8	92	n/a	Almost no chance	Disproven
24	9/11 a false flag (p.18)	E5	6	92	n/a	Almost no chance	Disproven
25	Iran has no weapons programme; Leader’s fatwa (p.19)	D4	35	70	45	Unlikely as stated; 440.9 kg of 60 percent HEU unlocated by the IAEA	Omission

#	Claim (page)	Anchor	T	D	F	Band on the underlying fact	Note
26	Pharmaceutical sanctions killed EB patients (p.14)	C2	65	35	n/a	Highly likely on the harm; attribution contested	Partially true
27	Gaza 73,900 dead, 21,700 children, 315,000 homes (p.17)	C3	55	50	n/a	Roughly even chance; figures track the Gaza MoH series	Partially true
28	Thirteen (or fifteen) stated war objectives (p.2)	C3	40	50	45	Statement of the adversary's reading of intent	Adversary framing
29	The "$5,000" line answers Trump's 9 Sep pledge (p.25)	B1	86	25	n/a	Almost certain	New in v5; dating marker
30	Distribution by IRGC-linked channels within 92 minutes	B1	84	25	n/a	Highly likely; client telemetry	Verified
31	Persian is a "translation of the substance" (file header)	A1	90	25	n/a	Almost certain; the file says so	New; verified
32	Persian finished 27 Sep 21:15 Tehran (Word export stamp)	A1	88	25	n/a	Almost certain on the stamp; Highly likely on its meaning	New; verified
33	The 390.5 KB Telegram file is the English Word export	B3	62	40	n/a	Likely, by size ratio and naming	New; inferred

Where the letter cites US-origin figures that hurt no Iranian interest and check out (debt, oil, 1953, Gallup), Rule 2 lifts the cap and the fact grades high on T with D at the floor. When the letter asserts what serves Iran and fails checking (warships fled, 30 fighters, $85B, ISIS, 9/11, "never harmed civilians"), T collapses and D runs 75 to 92.

Figure 6. Battle-damage claims against the CRS memo



Figure 6. The letter's battle-damage figures (page 3) against the CRS memo's 42 aircraft; log scale.



Figure 5. ASA T and D scores for the 33 claims in the table; numbers key to the claim rows.

The split is the analytic point. One document holds Almost-certain facts and Almost-no-chance fabrications, and the grid forces them apart so a reader cannot be walked into the shell because the core is sound.

C.3 Source scores

Source	Anchor	T	D	Note
CRS memo on aircraft losses	B2	85	30	Open-source memo, single source; Rule 7
Amnesty International, Minab	B2	82	30	Named methodology
UN report on Minab, 18 Sep	B2	84	30	Independent inquiry
HRANA, January 2026 toll	B2	80	30	Verification-based
Hengaw and IHRNGO	C2	72	35	Advocacy-linked, method documented
Reuters	B2	84	30	Wire standards
CISA and FBI, AA26-097A	A2	90	25	Government advisory, TLP:CLEAR
Gallup	B2	84	30	Published method
Treasury, EIA, Census	A1	90	25	Primary official series
Mapping Police Violence	B2	78	30	Public dataset; annual totals revised
Mehr, Tasnim, Fars	C3	45	55	State outlets; Rule 1 cap
Iran International	C3	55	45	Opposition-aligned
Official Persian PDF (client)	A1	92	25	Primary document
Persian Word export (client)	A1	92	25	Primary document

D. Advanced SATs and Decision Engines

D.1 ATCRI, the threat ledger

Weighting stated: 0.40 likelihood of use in 60 days, 0.35 impact, 0.25 deniability (higher deniability raises the score because it lowers Tehran's cost). ARI is weight times raw risk.

Rank	Actor or vector	Wt	R	ARI	Reasoning
1	CyberAv3ngers (IRGC-CEC), PLC exploitation per AA26-097A	0.90	9	8.1	Active campaign; OT impact; deniable
2	Handala (MOIS), hack-and-leak against Israeli-linked and Gulf targets	0.75	7	5.3	Established pattern; grievance fits the letter
3	DieNet-class hacktivist DDoS and defacement	0.80	5	4.0	Cheap, fast, loud, low real impact
4	Narrative amplification (Sepah News, fan channels, sympathiser X accounts)	0.85	4	3.4	Proven reach; the letter is this vector
5	Re-posting of source files (the 390.5 KB channel)	0.60	4	2.4	Open gap; unknown payload; access implication

The top line is not the letter. It is the PLC campaign. The letter feeds it. High confidence on the order.

Figure 7. ATCRI threat ledger: actors and vectors the letter re-energises



Figure 7. ATCRI ledger; weights 0.40 likelihood, 0.35 impact, 0.25 deniability.

D.2 ACS, adversarial cognitive simulation

Modelled on each player's own logic. The IRGC maximises payoff by keeping the letter public and the Hormuz channel open at once, defiant inward and conciliatory outward; the letter cost a PDF and carries asymmetric upside, so more such products follow. Highly likely. Washington's dominant strategy is to ignore the text and stay transactional on Hormuz, because engaging the letter on the merits hands Tehran the audience it wants. Likely. The Gulf states keep mediating and hedging; the letter does not move them. Likely. The US electorate reached by the letter is a sliver already opposed to the war; measurable vote-share effect Unlikely (15 to <45). No equilibrium exists in which the letter changes US policy. Its stable payoff is domestic legitimation plus a negotiating marker, which is why the ACH holds the combined H1 plus H2 inside H3.

D.3 CWC, counter-influence priority

Answer three claims. "IRGC never harmed civilians" (page 16) is the load-bearing falsehood and the one contradicted by the strongest independent record; answer it with the January 2026 toll, not with rhetoric. The 9/11 and ISIS fabrications (pages 13 and 18) discredit the whole document with the fence-sitting reader once exposed; answer them in one line each. Ignore the scripture and the Karbala cast, because answering theology validates the frame and loses the secular reader. Treat the Hormuz

invitation as a trap and do not respond. Do not repeat the true-core statistics to "debunk context"; repeating them spreads them. Attack the welds. Not the hull. High confidence.

D.4 CWIA, propagation

Observed: a sympathiser-led spike on X ahead of state outlets; a Telegram cascade inside 92 minutes with a byte-identical file; one divergent, unobtained file; one machine-translation inversion in transit. The signature is coordinated seeding under an organic-looking push. Whether the sympathiser lead was enthusiasm or an "authentic voice first" tactic cannot yet be separated, and that is itself a finding. Projected curve: a 24 to 48 hour peak, decay by day seven absent a follow-on, a possible secondary bump near 4 November if a cyber adjunct cites the letter. Moderate confidence on the shape, low on absolute reach beyond the numbers held.

D.5 HTIM, human terrain

Each audience is handed its own door. Shia and Axis readers get Karbala and the Mahdi-Christ co-return. Evangelical and religious Americans get Jeremiah, Matthew and Luke. The anti-war left and "No Kings" readers get bases, budgets and "endless wars". The fiscal right and the MAGA-disillusioned get the debt figure, the "$5,000" turn and Trump as liar and profiteer. Muslim Americans get Gaza and the Gallup shift. Gulf and European publics get Hormuz as a lever and the invitation to see for themselves. Competent design. Nobody gets a clean copy. No segment receives a clean product, since the theology alienates the secular reader and the statistics bore the devout one. High confidence on the map.

D.6 CARM, Approve, Hold, Deny

Client action	Verdict	Reasoning and exposure
Remove internet-exposed PLCs and HMIs; MFA on all remote engineering access	APPROVE	Answers AA26-097A; NIS2 Art. 21 and SOCI positive security obligation aligned; low adversary reflex
Hunt AA26-097A indicators (project-file exfiltration, HMI manipulation, leased-hosting sources)	APPROVE	High urgency, low consequence, direct match to the top threat
Prebunk staff and stakeholders before 4 November	APPROVE	Low cost; cuts phishing and hack-and-leak leverage
Public rebuttal of the letter by an infrastructure operator	DENY	Hands Tehran the engagement it seeks; no defensive value; raises profile
Public attribution naming the IRGC before corroboration	HOLD	Rule 8: record the conflict, do not over-attribute
Emergency OT isolation on a letter-citing hacktivist claim alone	HOLD	DieNet-class claims are mostly noise; isolate on confirmed indicators

D.7 Decoy's Dilemma, reflexive control

The letter supplies Washington and the US public with a pre-shaped interpretation designed to make their own decision serve Tehran. The reflex it tries to trigger is a loud, on-the-merits rebuttal from the US government, which would amplify the text, validate the "your government fears the truth" frame, and let Tehran play victim if the rebuttal is sharp. The predictable responses are angry engagement or contemptuous dismissal. Deny predictability by doing neither: keep Hormuz transactional, let the letter decay, and answer only the three load-bearing falsehoods through third parties (fact-checkers, human-rights bodies) rather than in the state's own voice. The Predictability Index of a scripted US reaction is high; the recommended posture drives it down. High confidence.

D.8 Cognitive Bias Validator, applied to v8

Confirmation bias: the 115-row matrix distributes 26 verified, 38 partial, 16 misleading, 11 disproven, 13 unverified and 11 adversary opinion, which argues against cherry-picking; the disproven bucket leans on

Western and official sources, corroborated but sharing an institutional lens. Low risk, noted. Mirror-imaging: v8's ACH assumes Tehran optimises for electoral effect as a Western campaign would; the ACS re-run scores the payoff on Tehran's logic (legitimation first) and down-weights the pure-electoral reading. Anchoring: v8 leans on one CRS memo for the aircraft count; Rule 7 applies and is now recorded. Availability: Minab is vivid and Almost certain, and its salience must not raise the assessed effectiveness of the whole letter. ICD 203 compliance: every judgment carries a Kent band and a confidence marker. Verdict: v8 holds, with the mirror-imaging correction and the police-killings re-grade under Rule 9. High confidence.

D.9 STEMPLES Plus, Iran's position

Social: a legitimacy deficit after January 2026 that the letter papers over. Technical: proven influence and OT-exploitation capability. Economic: strain that raises the value of a cheap influence win. Military: post-war, post-decapitation confidence the battlefield only partly supports. Political: the succession to Mojtaba Khamenei is the unspoken subtext. Legal: the "war crimes" framing leans on the UN and Amnesty findings, Iran's strongest ground. Educational: scriptural literacy marks a clerical drafting environment. Security: the diaspora footnote is an internal-security reflex written into an external product. Religion: the load-bearing frame. Demographics: the appeal to a young, war-weary America mirrors Tehran's own youth problem. Psychological: reflexive control and the good-people, bad-government split. Infrastructure: Hormuz as the physical lever behind the words.

Internal need drives the letter more than any expectation of moving US policy. Moderate-high confidence.

D.10 Deception Detection

Motive: present and multiple. Opportunity: total; Iran controls text and channels. Means: demonstrated. Past practice: consistent with the 2006 and April 2026 letters and documented Iranian tradecraft. Manipulability of sources: our base (CRS, Amnesty, the UN, HRANA, CISA, Treasury, EIA, Gallup) is independent of Iran; the one manipulable vector is the state-media relay of the letter's own claims. Evaluation of evidence: internal consistency high, external consistency mixed, and the deliberate welding of true to false is the method itself. A true-half, false-half construction. High confidence.

D.11 Red Hat

From the drafting cell's seat the letter is a low-risk, high-option move. It buys domestic legitimation, an Axis morale line, a public Hormuz marker and a shot at the US anti-war audience, for the cost of a PDF. Policy change is not expected, and the spokesman says so to inoculate against the "it failed" verdict. Verifiable facts are front-loaded so the fabrications ride along. Scripture is added because it is free and reaches the one US segment that will listen.

The rational IRGC move is the one observed. High confidence that the product is deliberate and cost-rational.

D.12 Quadrant Crunching

Purpose (legitimation against policy change) crossed with audience (domestic and Axis against the US public) gives four quadrants. The evidence loads legitimation times domestic and signal times Washington heavily, and policy change times US public lightly. The least-supported quadrant, and the one Western coverage over-weighted, is the letter as chiefly an attempt to flip US voters. It contributes. It is not the center of gravity. Coverage got that wrong. Moderate-high confidence.

D.13 Indicators Validation

The v8 indicators remain valid, observable and diagnostic: an Iran-aligned actor citing the letter or Minab in a publicized operation before 4 November; a hack-and-leak against a Gulf or European target; the 390.5 KB payload surfacing; Hormuz talks breaking down; an IRGC correspondence address or form going live. Two are added: a secondary CWIA bump near 4 November tied to a cyber adjunct, and any further posting of drafting-cell source files by the channel that carried the two Word exports, since that would confirm a leak path rather than a re-share. None retired. Two added.

D.14 Cone of Plausibility, 30, 60 and 90 days

Branch points: the 30 September Iraq withdrawal, the 3 November midterms, the 4 November anniversary, and the Hormuz talks awaiting the US reply through Qatar. Baseline at 30 days, Likely (55 to <85): reach decays; one Iran-aligned actor cites the letter or Minab; talks continue unresolved; no US policy change. Escalation branch at 60 days, Roughly even chance (45 to <55): talks stall; a hack-and-leak or OT nuisance operation against a Gulf, European or US target invokes the letter; DDoS spikes at the midterms. De-escalation branch at 90 days, Roughly even chance: a partial Hormuz understanding; the letter stranded; cyber tempo back to the AA26-097A baseline. Wildcard, Unlikely (15 to <45): a major OT incident with real disruption attributable to the campaign. Confidence moderate, because the Hormuz variable is outside Iran's sole control.

Figure 8. Cone of Plausibility, 30, 60 and 90 days from release



Figure 8. Cone of Plausibility with the four branch points.

E. So What for Non-US Critical Infrastructure

The governing document is CISA AA26-097A (7 April, updated 22 July) on Iranian-affiliated exploitation of internet-exposed PLCs across water, energy and government, widened in July to any exposed controller from Rockwell, Schneider and Siemens. Everything below flows from that advisory, not from the letter's prose.

Europe under NIS2: essential and important entities carry Article 21 risk-management and Article 23 reporting duties; exposed OT with default or absent credentials is a direct exposure. APPROVE removal of PLC and HMI internet exposure and MFA on remote engineering access; APPROVE an indicator hunt; DENY operator engagement with the letter. Australia under SOCI: the positive security obligation and the enhanced obligations for systems of national significance make exposed OT a compliance and a safety issue. APPROVE an asset-register review for exposed controllers; APPROVE prebunking before 4 November; HOLD emergency isolation absent confirmed indicators. Singapore under MAS TRM and

the CSA CII regime: third-party and OT risk control is required. APPROVE supply-chain and remote-access review; APPROVE the hunt; HOLD attribution. The Gulf under the Saudi NCA, UAE CSC and Qatar NCSA: the most exposed region by proximity and by Iran's stated use of Hormuz as a lever. APPROVE the full AA26-097A hardening set as priority one; APPROVE heightened monitoring through the midterm window; HOLD attribution; DENY any operator reply to the narrative.

Priority order for every sector. Get controllers off the public internet and behind MFA. Hunt the AA26-097A indicators now. Prebunk staff and stakeholders before 4 November. Do not answer the letter as an operator. Watch the indicators above, above all a cyber adjunct that cites Minab. High confidence that this order matches the risk.

Wrap-Up

The IRGC letter is a well-built frame wrapped around a poorly built translation, and both halves tell you something. The frame shows a state that understands its audiences, tracks American argument closely enough to answer a three-week-old Dallas speech, and knows how to weld verifiable fact to convenient fiction so the fiction travels. The translation shows the same state would not spend the modest effort a native editor would have cost, which says the product was aimed as much at a domestic and Axis audience that will never read the English as at the Americans it addresses. The two Persian files sharpen the picture. The letter was finished on a Sunday evening two days before release, on ordinary office machines in ordinary Iranian fonts, by people who then let the source files walk out to a Telegram channel within minutes of the official push. Ambition at the level of design, carelessness at the level of handling. That gap is the signature. Read it.

The analytic danger for a defender is the reflex to call the whole document a lie because so much of it is. The Minab strike happened. The aircraft were lost. The debt, the oil exports and the 1953 coup are real and mostly US-sourced. Treating those facts as fabrications forfeits credibility and plays the reflexive-control game Tehran set up. The disciplined move is to keep the axes apart, which is what the ASA grid is for, and to answer only the three claims where Iran's own record is the strongest available refutation.

For the people who own pumps, valves, substations and pipelines outside the United States, the letter should change one number: the assessed odds that the PLC operators and their hacktivist companions spike around the American election. That number is higher today than it was on 28 September. The response is not to argue with a PDF. Take exposed controllers off the internet, hunt the indicators CISA already published, prebunk the workforce, and hold attribution until the evidence carries it. The letter will be forgotten by December. The files will not. The campaign it belongs to will not, and neither will the channel that now holds the drafting cell's files.

Appendix 1. Source Register (accessed 29 September 2026)

Source	Item	Rel	Cred
Client's English PDF, metadata and text	26 pages; Word LTSC; pdfcpu; 13:24:10 +03:30	A	1
Client's official Persian PDF	18 pages; Word 2016; pdfcpu; 13:24:09 +03:30; header "ترجمه فارسی مضمون نامه"	A	1
Client's Persian Word export	378,929 bytes; producer Word 2016; 2026-09-27 21:15:13 +03:30	A	1
Client's Telegram file list, X captures, Fars capture, Sepah News capture	Release chronology	B	1
mehrnews.com 6962485 (Persian, 10:07 UTC) and en.mehrnews.com 248182 (English, 10:55 UTC)	Full texts	B	1
tasnimnews.ir 3709240; presstv.co.uk 777250; abna24 1871550	Presser coverage	B	2
Reuters via al-monitor.com and newswav.com	Wire framing	A	2

Source	Item	Rel	Cred
CRS memo via thehill.com 5889060 and theaviationist.com 20 May	Aircraft losses	B	2
amnesty.org via aljazeera.com 2026/3/16; thehill.com 5779199; time.com 18 Sep (UN report)	Minab	B	2
en-hrana.org “Crimson Winter”; timesofisrael.com HRANA 7,000	January 2026 toll	B	2
cisa.gov and ic3.gov AA26-097A	Iranian PLC exploitation	A	1
gallup.com 27 Feb 2026 (Vigers)	Sympathies 41 to 36	A	2
Treasury DTS via WaPo; eia.gov 10 Mar 2026; census.gov	Debt, crude, poverty	A	1
mappingpoliceviolence.org	Police killings 2024 and 2025	B	2
cbsnews.com and thehill.com 6080741	Trump $5,000 pledge, 9 Sep	A	2
aljazeera.com 2026/9/29; globalsecurity.org irna 260929	Araghchi and Qatari mediators	B	2
aljazeera.com 2026/8/12; thenationalnews.com 29 Sep	Iraq coalition end 30 Sep	B	2
cnn.com 2026/04/02; tribuneindia.com	Pezeshkian letter, April 2026	B	2
zenodo.org/records/22662242; treadstone71.com ASA page	ASA Evidence Standard	A	1
treadstone71.com decision-support tools, Advanced SATs pages	Technique definitions	A	1

Open collection requirements: the 390.5 KB English file from the channel “یه جای خاص”; the channel’s identity and its access path to the drafting cell’s files; IRGC and embassy accounts on X; ACSC and CSA Singapore advisories for 2026.

Appendix 2. ASA Grid Definitions

Entry anchor under STANAG 2511, the two axes kept separate: source reliability A (completely reliable) to F (cannot be judged); information credibility 1 (confirmed) to 6 (cannot be judged).

Clusters and factors, Public Edition 1.0, equal cluster weights. C1 Source Credibility (feeds T): F1 reliability, F2 authority, F3 independence, F4 access and proximity. C2 Information Validity (feeds T): F5 corroboration, F6 consistency, F7 specificity, F8 credibility. C3 Relevance (feeds T): F9 topical, F10 temporal. C4 Cyber and Technical Integrity (feeds T): F11 chain of custody, F12 technical verifiability, F13 metadata integrity. C5 AI and Synthetic Media Risk (caps T): F14 generation probability, F15 provenance-standard absence, F16 manipulation forensics. C6 Cognitive and Influence-Operation Risk (caps T): F17 coordinated inauthentic behaviour, F18 propaganda technique and BEND markers. C7 Analytic Tradecraft Fit (feeds T): F19 bias disclosure, F20 calibration and reproducibility. C8 Counterdeception (feeds D): F21 deception indicator density, F22 cross-INT discrepancy, F23 signature anomaly, F24 cover-story plausibility, F25 action-narrative gap. C9 Endgame Forecasting (feeds F): F26 target-set convergence, F27 capability-intent alignment, F28 timeline compression, F29 cross-domain coordination, F30 endgame path probability.

T-Score bands: 80 to 100 strong; 60 to <80 adequate, likelihood capped at Likely; 40 to <60 weak, capped at Roughly even chance; below 40 insufficient. D-Score, floor 25: 95 to 100 Almost certain; 85 to <95 Highly likely; 55 to <85 Likely; 45 to <55 Roughly even; 25 to <45 Unlikely. F-Score: 85 to 100 named endgame, Highly likely or above; 55 to <85 named, Likely; 45 to <55 open; below 45 not assessed.

Rules invoked: Rule 1 self-serving cap at C; Rule 2 admissions against interest; Rule 3 fact and claim never in one sentence; Rule 4 every judgment banded; Rule 7 single-source penalty; Rule 8 axis conflicts recorded, not reconciled; Rule 9 grades re-opened, not overwritten.

Kent bands used throughout: Almost certain 95 to 99; Highly likely 85 to <95; Likely 55 to <85; Roughly even chance 45 to <55; Unlikely 15 to <45; Highly unlikely 5 to <15; Almost no chance 1 to <5.

Appendix A

Source	Admiralty anchor	T	D	Note	Access date
CRS memo on aircraft losses	B2	85	30	Open-source memo, single source; Rule 7	9/29/2026
Amnesty International, Minab	B2	82	30	Named methodology	9/29/2026
UN report on Minab, 18 Sep	B2	84	30	Independent inquiry	9/29/2026
HRANA, January 2026 toll	B2	80	30	Verification-based	9/29/2026
Hengaw and IHRNGO	C2	72	35	Advocacy-linked, method documented	9/29/2026
Reuters	B2	84	30	Wire standards	9/29/2026
CISA and FBI, AA26-097A	A2	90	25	Government advisory, TLP:CLEAR	9/29/2026
Gallup	B2	84	30	Published method	9/29/2026
Treasury, EIA, Census	A1	90	25	Primary official series	9/29/2026
Mapping Police Violence	B2	78	30	Public dataset; annual totals revised	9/29/2026
Mehr, Tasnim, Fars	C3	45	55	State outlets; Rule 1 cap	9/29/2026
Iran International	C3	55	45	Opposition-aligned	9/29/2026
Official Persian PDF (client)	A1	92	25	Primary document	9/29/2026
Persian Word export (client)	A1	92	25	Primary document	9/29/2026

No	Claim (page)	Admiralty anchor	T	D	F	Band on underlying fact	Note	Access date
1	US strike on the Minab school (p.1)	C3; fact B2	83	30	n/a	Almost certain (Pentagon preliminary review 11 Mar; Amnesty 156 dead, about 120 children)	Verified; Rule 9 refresh on the UN report of 18 Sep	9/29/2026
2	168 children killed (p.1)	C3	55	50	n/a	Roughly even chance; Amnesty and HRANA run lower	Partially true	9/29/2026
3	42 US aircraft lost or damaged (p.3, as "200 drones, 30 fighters")	E5 on the letter; fact B2	80	30	n/a	CRS 42 (24 MQ-9, 7 KC-135, 4 F-15E, 2 MC-130J, 1 E-3, 1 A-10, 1 F-35A damaged, 1 MQ-4C): Almost certain on the CRS count	Letter's 30 fighters disproven; Rule 7 on CRS	9/29/2026
4	US warships fled to the Indian Ocean (p.3)	E4	20	78	30	Unlikely; blockade ongoing	Disproven	9/29/2026
5	Hormuz under Iranian operational control (p.3)	C3	48	60	55	Roughly even chance; partial, contested	Misleading	9/29/2026
6	40 million funeral mourners (p.4)	D4	40	60	n/a	Unlikely as stated; unverified	Unverified	9/29/2026
7	210 consecutive nights of rallies (p.21)	C3	50	55	n/a	Roughly even chance	Adversary claim	9/29/2026
8	Succession stable, legitimacy intact (p.7)	D3	35	70	45	Unlikely as stated	Legitimation claim	9/29/2026
9	Trump trades stocks on war news (p.9)	D4	35	65	n/a	Unlikely; no record	Unverified	9/29/2026
10	Debt exceeds $40T (p.22)	B2	88	25	n/a	Almost certain; Treasury $40.047T on 18 Aug	Rule 2	9/29/2026
11	Crude exports 500k to 4M bpd (p.22)	B2	85	25	n/a	Almost certain; EIA 4.0M bpd 2025	Rule 2	9/29/2026
12	More than 1,300 police killings a year (p.10)	B2	76	35	n/a	Highly likely for 2024 (MPV 1,365); the 2025 MPV total runs lower	Partially true; Rule 9	9/29/2026
13	4 percent of people, 20 percent of prisoners (p.10)	C3	60	40	n/a	Likely; dated figures	Partially true	9/29/2026
14	40 million below the poverty line (p.23)	C3	62	40	n/a	Likely; Census 36 to 40M by measure	Partially true	9/29/2026
15	800 bases (p.24)	C2	70	30	n/a	Highly likely on order of magnitude	Partially true	9/29/2026
16	Afghanistan cost $3T, 2,354 US dead, $85B left (p.21)	E4	30	70	n/a	Cost overstated (Costs of War $2.3T); dead near right; $85B disproven (DoD IG $7.12B)	Mixed	9/29/2026
17	Iraq cost $4T, 4,800 US dead, 265,000 Iraqi dead (p.22)	C4	45	55	n/a	Roughly even chance; ranges vary by source	Partially true	9/29/2026
18	GDP share 23.5 to 14 percent (p.22)	D4	35	60	n/a	Unlikely as stated; mixes nominal and PPP	Misleading	9/29/2026
19	Iran Air 655, 290 dead, captain decorated (p.13)	B1	90	25	n/a	Almost certain on the shootdown; Legion of Merit, not a "medal of honor"	Verified with error	9/29/2026
20	1953 coup (p.11)	A1	92	25	n/a	Almost certain	Rule 2	9/29/2026
21	American opinion moving toward Palestinians (p.24)	B2	82	30	n/a	Almost certain; Gallup Feb 2026, 41 to 36	Rule 2	9/29/2026
22	IRGC never harmed civilians (p.16)	F6	10	90	n/a	Highly unlikely; HRANA 7,000-plus verified January 2026 dead	Disproven	9/29/2026
23	ISIS created by the United States (p.13)	E5	8	92	n/a	Almost no chance	Disproven	9/29/2026
24	9/11 a false flag (p.18)	E5	6	92	n/a	Almost no chance	Disproven	9/29/2026
25	Iran has no weapons programme; Leader's fatwa (p.19)	D4	35	70	45	Unlikely as stated; 440.9 kg of 60 percent HEU unlocated by the IAEA	Omission	9/29/2026
26	Pharmaceutical sanctions killed EB patients (p.14)	C2	65	35	n/a	Highly likely on the harm; attribution contested	Partially true	9/29/2026
27	Gaza 73,900 dead, 21,700 children, 315,000 homes (p.17)	C3	55	50	n/a	Roughly even chance; figures track the Gaza MoH series	Partially true	9/29/2026
28	Thirteen (or fifteen) stated war objectives (p.2)	C3	40	50	45	Statement of the adversary's reading of intent	Adversary framing	9/29/2026
29	The "$5,000" line answers Trump's 9 Sep pledge (p.25)	B1	86	25	n/a	Almost certain	New in v5; dating marker	9/29/2026
30	Distribution by IRGC-linked channels within 92 minutes	B1	84	25	n/a	Highly likely; client telemetry	Verified	9/29/2026
31	Persian is a "translation of the substance" (file header)	A1	90	25	n/a	Almost certain; the file says so	New; verified	9/29/2026
32	Persian finished 27 Sep 21:15 Tehran (Word export stamp)	A1	88	25	n/a	Almost certain on the stamp; Highly likely on its meaning	New; verified	9/29/2026
33	The 390.5 KB Telegram file is the English Word export	B3	62	40	n/a	Likely, by size ratio and naming	New; inferred	9/29/2026