THE INSURED TARGET ON THE GULF

Qatar After Iranian Missiles, Israeli Bombs, and the Badr Memorandum

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Overall confidence: Moderate. Stated once, here, and nowhere else. Qatari and US official originators anchor the kinetic, fiscal, and procurement record. The adversary narrative layer rests on Iranian, Houthi, and Russian originators in Persian, Arabic, and Russian, read on the web and across Telegram and Eitaa channels; the Iranian hacktivist fronts were dormant or out of reach. Channel identifiers, collection methods, and post-level references are held in Treadstone 71's internal evidence pack and are not part of this release. The guarantee question in Section 6 rests partly on an absence of US statements, which is evidence of silence, not of inaction. Three items were still moving at the close of collection, 18:00 UTC on 27 October: the Kremlin's account of the Putin-Tamim meeting, the text of the adopted Moscow Declaration, and Hormuz enforcement. Each judgment below carries a Sherman Kent likelihood band, and each item of evidence carries its ASA entry grade, source reliability A to F and information credibility 1 to 6, printed apart and never averaged [1][2]. Adversary threat statements appear as graded references, quoted only where the wording is the finding; channel items are held in the internal evidence pack.

Primary Analysis

Iran struck Qatar from 28 February 2026 into July. Al Udeid took a ballistic missile on 3 March. Ras Laffan lost two LNG trains on 18 and 19 March, 17 percent of export capacity, out for three years by the latest official estimate. The Emir told the Shura Council on 13 October that state revenue fell 42 percent in the first half of the year [3][4][5].

Doha did not break with Washington. The leadership kept the written guarantee, took an emergency Patriot resupply, and in one October week signed the Badr defense-industry memorandum with Türkiye, Pakistan, and Indonesia, bought four million tonnes a year of US LNG, and signed a letter of intent on defense security guarantees with France [6][7][8][9].

Tehran runs two lines on Qatar at once. The military channel casts Doha as the captor of three Iranian pilots; the civilian channel calls Doha a fair mediator and a brother. Both lines were live on 27 October. Tehran's spokesman put the pilots' fate on Qatar's shoulders on 26 October; the next day, in Moscow, the Emir met Iran's president, and Doha's readout says they discussed the negotiations and Hormuz while Tehran's says energy and bilateral ties [10][11][12][13].

The first test date is 9 November, when the ITU Plenipotentiary is due to open in Doha for 194 member states under a cancellation clause tied to UN security guidance [14]. Through April 2027, watch three things: whether Hormuz traffic recovers past Fitch's "limited number of cargos," whether the 500 replacement Patriot rounds arrive before the next exchange of fire, and whether the pilot dispute closes through the Red Crescent channel or hardens into a pretext [15][16][17].

Who

Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani rules and commands. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani is Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and carries mediation. Defense belongs to Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan Al Thani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs under Amiri Order No. 2 of 2024, not to Khalid Al Attiyah [18]. Lieutenant General (Pilot) Jassim bin Mohammed Al Mannai is Chief of Staff under Amiri Decision No. 77 of 2024 [19]. Khalfan bin Ali Al Kaabi heads State Security with ministerial rank under Amiri Decision No. 74 of 2024 [20]. The Interior Minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, commands Lekhwiya under Amiri Decision No. 24 of 2023 and was in post on 20 October 2026 [21][22]. The Father Emir died on 12 July 2026, aged 74 [23].

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What

A regional war reached Qatari soil. Qatar's Ministry of Defence recorded 65 ballistic missiles and 12 drones in its first release on 28 February, and Qatar's first UN letter counted 83 by day's end [24]; two Su-24 bombers shot down on 2 March with seven missiles and five drones intercepted; one of two missiles striking Al Udeid on 3 March; ten drones on 6 March; debris injuries in Muraikh on 7 April; a missile attack on 12 July that injured three; one more intercepted on 17 July, the last attack Qatar has confirmed [25][26][27][28][29][30]. QatarEnergy's own account puts the Ras Laffan damage at Trains 4 and 6, 12.8 million tonnes a year, with force majeure on contracts in China, South Korea, Italy, and Belgium [4].

So what

Qatar's model was simple. Host the United States, talk to everyone, pay for the insurance. Iran proved in 2026 that hosting Al Udeid draws fire onto Qatari soil, and that Qatari gas becomes the reply to strikes on Iranian gas. Israel proved in September 2025 that housing Hamas draws fire onto Doha itself. The leadership kept the model and added rings to it: Badr for industry, France for a second written guarantee, Türkiye and Pakistan for production, and a line to Tehran that never closed [7][9][31].

Why now

Three clocks run together. Hormuz is contested; on 27 October Iran's self-styled strait authority announced legal action against COSCO ships from 1 November, while CENTCOM says more than 95 percent of transits succeed [32][33]. Gaza phase two is stalled on Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament [34]. Qatar's defense minister published the review's priority list, announced a production center, and signed Badr inside one October week [35][7].

Impacts so far

Fiscal: H1 revenue down 42 percent against spending down 14 percent; a Q2 deficit of QAR 21.2 billion; a USD 3 billion bond in September; Fitch at AA, outlook Negative, with an 18.8 percent contraction forecast for 2026 [3][36][37][15]. Energy: force majeure since March; "only a limited number of cargos" through Hormuz by September; the first North Field East train slipping to the first half of 2027 [15][38][39]. Military: an emergency US sale of 500 Patriot interceptors with congressional review waived; 10,000 APKWS rockets on the same emergency basis; a KC-46A notification in August [6][40][41]. Security: two IRGC cells rolled up with ten arrests on 3 March; Iranian attachés expelled on 18 March [27][42]. Human: seven dead in a helicopter loss on 21 March, among them a Turkish air defense major and two ASELSAN technicians; 13 dead in the Barzan gas plant explosion of 21 June (reported 22 June), which the Interior Ministry attributes to a technical fault [43][44][45].

Outlook, three to six months, to 30 April 2027

The bands below govern Sections 4, 7, and 9. They are written once and reconciled.

- Qatar keeps US access at Al Udeid open and keeps a working channel to Tehran: Highly likely (85 to <95).
- Ras Laffan Trains 4 and 6 stay offline through April 2027: Almost certain (95 to 99).
- Iran strikes Qatari territory again before 30 April 2027: Unlikely (15 to <45). The driver is the unresolved US-Iran war, with the June 2026 Islamabad memorandum in dispute.

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- Hormuz traffic recovers enough for QatarEnergy to lift force majeure before 30 April 2027: Unlikely (15 to <45).
- Badr produces a named project involving Barzan Holdings, with a stated value or contract, by 30 April 2027: Roughly even chance (45 to <55).
- Qatar ends US basing: Almost no chance (1 to <5).
- The ITU Plenipotentiary, PP-26, opens in Doha on 9 November as scheduled: Likely (55 to <85). The ITU Council kept Doha unanimously on 25 August but let the Secretary-General cancel if UN security guidance stops UN staff travel, with Geneva, 11 to 29 January 2027, as the fallback [14].

Recommendations, one line each

Replenish interceptors on emergency timelines and plan stockpiles jointly. Fund passive defense at the energy sites now. Enter the Badr production center early so its output stays interoperable. Close the pilot dispute through a verifiable humanitarian process. Put releasable facts against the "Al Udeid abandoned" narrative. Keep the Hamas office question in closed channels. Stand up Persian, Arabic, and Russian channel monitoring with weekly scoring. Section 10 names the owner, the deadline, the trigger, and who cares for each.

Gaps, one line

Neither capital has said what Putin and the Emir discussed, and the Moscow Declaration is adopted but unpublished; the hacktivist fronts dormant or unreachable; the US side of the guarantee test absent from the public record. Section 11 lists all of them.

Current items, 26 to 27 October 2026

- 26 October. The Emir landed in Moscow for the 8th Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit with the Prime Minister [46].
- 26 October. The Prime Minister told the Saudi Foreign Minister that Saudi security is inseparable from Qatar's, a day after the Saudi-led coalition destroyed two launchers used against Riyadh [47].
- 26 October. Qatar and Egypt discussed maritime navigation and a path to a regional settlement [48].
- 26 October. Japan's Foreign Minister recorded "respect for Qatar's persistent efforts as a mediator toward the resumption of talks between the United States and Iran" [49].
- 26 October. Sanaa: al-Mashat said the Houthis "will determine how to deal with whoever stands with the Saudi enemy." Qatar not named [50].
- 27 October. Putin told the plenary that in "one of the global centres of gas production the situation has worsened" and supply routes are broken, paired it with Nord Stream, and proposed GECF crisis consultations covering "physical threats to gas infrastructure" [51][52]. The GECF Secretary General was the only speaker in the published transcript to say "Hormuz," crediting the disruption with doubling spot prices since February, and thanked the Emir for hosting the secretariat [51]. The Kremlin's English transcript records that the Moscow Declaration "was adopted"; no text was attached [53]. At 19:20 Moscow time the Kremlin posted a placeholder for Putin's conversation with Pezeshkian, transcript to follow [54]. Moscow has said nothing more. A Putin-Tamim meeting sat on Ushakov's schedule; at 16:30 UTC neither the Kremlin's Qatar catalog nor QNA carried a readout [55][56].
- 27 October. The Emir received President Pezeshkian at his residence before the summit, with the Prime Minister and Araghchi present. QNA: the meeting reviewed "the latest developments in the

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negotiations, the Strait of Hormuz and energy supplies" [12]. The Iranian presidency: bilateral relations and energy cooperation, nothing on the pilots, Al Udeid, mediation, or Hormuz [13]. Al-Manar reported it as energy cooperation [57].

- 27 October. Qatar's energy minister met Iran's acting oil minister in Moscow the same day [58].
- 27 October. Qatar's foreign ministry briefing, issued while the Emir was in Moscow: the region needs "a new regional security system that respects state sovereignty and affirms the principle of mutual non-aggression"; Qatar and Pakistan's efforts "complement" Saudi Arabia and the "Mecca Alliance"; US-Iran message traffic "continues without interruption" through the Qatari channel; and "the ball is now in the Iranian court" to stop threats against Gulf states and guarantee Hormuz navigation [59]. Mashregh carried the briefing with the Hormuz and "stop threats" lines removed [60].
- 26 to 27 October. Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry said the visit of Prince Khalid bin Salman and representatives of the Mecca pact states to Tehran supports the Qatari and Pakistani mediation; the Saudi cabinet affirmed the same on 27 October [61][62].
- 27 October. Pezeshkian told the plenary, with the Emir in the room, that the US "naval and air blockade" and "military interventions in the Persian Gulf region" must be "condemned and effectively confronted" by the world's major energy suppliers. Qatar was not named [63][64].
- 27 October. Iran's "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" warned COSCO of legal action from 1 November and called the strait "closed to unauthorized traffic" [32]. On 25 October CENTCOM's commander flew the strait and said primary routes "remain free and clear of Iranian sea mines" [33]. Both claims sit at C, 3 and are not merged.
- 26 October. Oman's Foreign Minister, at Girton College, Cambridge, called for "a new and inclusive framework, involving all eight Gulf littoral states," said "a Non-Aggression Pact between all eight states should be the goal," and said "the solution doesn't depend on friends and allies beyond the region," while adding that outside partnerships need not be abandoned [65].
- 27 October. Al Jazeera English published a Qatari author's case for "defence autonomy" and "diversified security guarantees" [66]. Rybar's single Qatar post of the autumn folded the Emir's visit into a Russian-led producer front [67].
- No Qatar Ministry of Defence statement, interception, or airspace closure was found for 26 or 27 October. The Watan 2026 tabletop phase, with "all military and civilian entities," began 25 October [68].

3. Military Capabilities and Force Structure

STEMPLES Plus baseline, Qatar, October 2026

STEMPLES Plus reads a state across eleven vectors: Social, Technical, Economic, Military, Political, Legal, Educational, Security, plus Demographics, Religion, and Psychology. Indicators of change are "the structural markers that signal capability and intent shifts before they manifest in observable operations" [69]. The table gives the October 2026 reading and the indicator to watch through April 2027.

Vector	Reading, October 2026	Indicator of change to watch	Grade
Social	Four days of national mourning in July; no unrest in window	Public dissent over casualties or debris injuries	A, 1 [23]

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Vector	Reading, October 2026	Indicator of change to watch	Grade
Technical	Air defense, counter-drone, and electronic warfare named as the top three gaps by the defense minister	Contract award for the announced defense production center	B, 2 [31]
Economic	Revenue down 42 percent H1; Q2 deficit QAR 21.2 billion; Fitch Negative; 18.8 percent contraction forecast	Q3 outturn; second bond; QIA transfer disclosed	A, 1 [3][15]
Military	Combat-proven fighter force; emergency Patriot replenishment with 36(b) waiver	Delivery schedule for the 500 Patriot rounds	A, 1 [26][6]
Political	Hereditary rule; no elected legislature after the 2024 referendum; Father Emir dead; no heir apparent named	Amiri Order naming an Heir Apparent	A, 1 [70][71]
Legal	US guarantee rests on an executive order revocable by any president; French guarantee rests on a letter of intent	Statutory or treaty language from either partner	A, 1 [72][73][9]
Educational	National Service Law 5 of 2018 unchanged; Idaho F-15QA training squadron planned for about 2030, announced without notice to Idaho's delegation	Change to conscription terms; LoA text for Idaho	A, 1 [74][75][76]
Security	Two IRGC cells, ten arrests, drone-trained saboteurs; Iranian attachés expelled	New espionage cases; attachés readmitted	A, 2 [27][42]
Demographics	Citizen minority inside a population above three million	Labor flight after casualties	A, 1 [45]
Religion	Badr named for the full moon in the official text; Pakistani and Turkish audiences read the Battle of Badr	Religious framing adopted by signatories	A, 1 [7]
Psychology	Official voice stresses calm and rumor discipline; the Emir: the state "did not succumb to panic"	Shift from calm to grievance in official voice	A, 1 [3]

Leadership and command, verified holders

Post	Holder	Instrument	Grade
Emir, Supreme Commander	Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani	Shura speech, 13 Oct 2026	A, 1 [3]
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister	Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani	MOFA readouts through 26 Oct 2026	A, 1 [47]
Deputy PM, Minister of State for Defence Affairs	Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan bin Ali Al Thani	Amiri Order 2 of 2024	A, 1 [18]
Chief of Staff	Lt Gen (Pilot) Jassim bin Mohammed Al Mannai	Amiri Decision 77 of 2024; active 24 Oct 2026	A, 1 [19][77]
Head of State Security	Khalfan bin Ali bin Khalfan Al Butti Al Kaabi	Amiri Decision 74 of 2024	A, 1 [20]
Commander, Lekhwiya	Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Interior Minister)	Amiri Decision 24 of 2023; in post 20 Oct 2026	A, 1 [21][22]

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Order of battle

The services are the Emiri Land Force, the Qatar Emiri Air Force, the Qatar Emiri Navy, the Emiri Guard, and the Internal Security Force. State Security sits outside the armed forces. Platform and personnel counts are baseline figures from SIPRI, free IISS material, and official releases, each graded on its own [78][79].

Air. Three Western fighter fleets, Rafale, F-15QA, and Typhoon. SIPRI records 100 combat aircraft delivered in 2021 to 2025: 48 from the United States, 33 from the United Kingdom, 13 from France, 6 from Italy. Qatar was the fourth-largest arms importer in the world in that period [78]. The kills of 2 March are confirmed by two originators, Qatar's Ministry of Defence and the US Joint Chiefs chairman, who said "Qatari fighters for the first time have shot down two Iranian bombers" [26][80]. Neither names the aircraft type. The F-15QA attribution rests on unnamed sources in US press reporting (C, 3, secondhand; Section 11). The joint UK-Qatar 12 Squadron deployed on 22 January; one of its Typhoons shot down an Iranian drone on 1 March; four more Typhoons arrived on 7 March [81][82][83][84].

Air and missile defense. Patriot is the backbone. The 1 May 2026 State Department notice for 200 PAC-2 GEM-T and 300 PAC-3 MSE carries an emergency determination waiving congressional review, and the Federal Register justification says the rounds will "replenish its missile defense capability" [6][16]. France deployed ground-based air defense to Qatar at the start of the conflict [9]. NASAMS was not observed in any primary source in the window.

Land. Leopard 2A7+ and PzH 2000 form the heavy core; counts not verified. The Elysée text records a letter of intent selecting KNDS France and John Cockerill Defense to modernize the Amiri Land Forces [9]. The 40th Infantry Competition closed on 25 October with the GHQ Support Force first [85].

Naval. Fincantieri's program is complete: four Al Zubarah-class corvettes, two offshore patrol vessels, and the landing platform dock Al Fulk, seven hulls delivered, plus a three-year contract from 21 July 2026 to run the navy's training and simulation center [86]. The navy shot down drones on 2 March [26]. Turkish frigates appear only in press reports of a TAIS-Barzan memorandum (secondhand; Section 11).

Unmanned. IISS lists six Bayraktar TB2 from 2018 and eight MQ-9B from 2025 at almost USD 2 billion; the Strategic Dialogue text calls it "the USD 2 billion deal with General Atomics" [79][87]. No primary source shows Akinci or Chinese SY-400 in Qatari service. Both leave the baseline until one appears.

Foreign military presence

United States. Al Udeid hosts CENTCOM's forward headquarters and, since 13 January 2026, the Middle East Air Defense Combined Defense Operations Cell with 17 nations [88]. The Strategic Dialogue records "significant military infrastructure upgrades at Al-Udeid," a USD 38 billion statement of intent on burden sharing, and the first bilateral combined command post for air defense [87]. Qatar's International Media Office confirmed personnel departures on 14 January "in response to the current regional tensions" [89]. The only text on lease duration is single-source press reporting from January 2024 (C, 4, secondhand); no primary document exists in the public record.

Türkiye. The 19 December 2014 agreement and the 28 April 2016 implementation agreement, a ten-year extendable term with costs borne by Qatar, as recorded in the Turkish parliament's committee report [90]. The Qatar-Turkish Combined Joint Force Command was flying on 21 March 2026; the lost helicopter carried a Turkish air defense major and two ASELSAN technicians [44].

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United Kingdom. Joint 12 Squadron under the Defence Assurance Agreement; four extra Typhoons tasked to support Bahraini and Emirati air defense from Qatari soil [81][84].

France. No standing base. Air defense deployed in 2026; PEGASE 26 with two Rafale, one A330 MRTT, and one A400M in Qatar from 3 to 7 October; a letter of intent on defense security guarantees signed 21 October [91][9].

4. Defense Modernization and Readiness

Acquisition pipeline, 2025 to 2026

Date	Item	Value	Status	Grade
20 Dec 2025	General Atomics remotely piloted aircraft; Raytheon counter-drone agreement	USD 2 billion; USD 1 billion	Recorded in Strategic Dialogue	A, 1 [87]
1 May 2026	Patriot replenishment, 200 PAC-2 GEM-T and 300 PAC-3 MSE (26-59)	USD 4.01 billion	Emergency; 36(b) waived	A, 1 [6]
1 May 2026	APKWS II, 10,000 rounds (26-66)	USD 992.4 million	Emergency; 36(b) waived	A, 1 [40]
2 Jun 2026	Barzan Holdings with Indonesian MoD and Republikorp	Not stated	MoU and statement of intent; “nothing is binding” per Indonesian MoD	B, 2 [92]
21 Jul 2026	Fincantieri training center operations	Not stated	Three-year contract	A, 1 [86]
31 Jul 2026	Boeing AH-64E maintenance support, Qatar FMS funds obligated	USD 22.3 million	Contract modification	A, 1 [93]
20 Aug 2026	Up to four KC-46A, eight PW4062 engines (26-80)	USD 4.5 billion	Notified; no contract	A, 1 [41]
21 Oct 2026	KNDS France and John Cockerill for land forces; Rafale upgrade; radar and satellite contracts	Not stated	Letter of intent	A, 1 [9]
21 Oct 2026	Badr memorandum with Türkiye, Pakistan, Indonesia	Not stated	Signed; industrial only	A, 1 [7]

APKWS is a cheap laser-guided rocket; 10,000 rounds is a counter-drone buy and matches the minister’s own list. The KC-46A points to longer sorties and more coalition tanking. Notices are approvals, not contracts. No Department of War contract announcement between 1 May and 27 October names Qatar as a Patriot customer; the only Qatar FMS obligation on record in the window is the Apache support modification [93]. Delivery dates are not public.

Defense review and industrial policy

On 19 October at the Global Security Forum, Sheikh Saoud said a defense review “last year” put air defense, counter-drone, and cyber and electronic threats at the top; that Qatar would “soon announce the establishment of a defence centre”; and that “we are working with our regional partners and Washington, London and Paris to strengthen our capabilities in munitions and air defence” [31][35]. He

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called Al Udeid “a Qatari base used by allied forces” and proposed a regional dialogue including Pakistan and Türkiye built on a non-aggression agreement [31].

Two days later, Badr. The Turkish ministry’s readout, reached through Anadolu, matches the Qatari host text [94]. The host text covers “defense manufacturing,” capability building, “technical defense training,” and research and development, with accession open to “other friendly nations.” It has no mutual-defense, consultation-on-attack, or armed-assistance clause [7]. The contrast is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement of 7 August 2026 between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan: “any armed attack on any of the three countries is an attack on all,” in the Saudi Press Agency’s joint statement [95]. The treaty itself, annexed to the Turkish ratification bill (Esas No. 2/3961, submitted 21 October 2026), runs to 16 articles. Article 2, in the English text the treaty says prevails: “Any external armed attack on any of the ‘Parties’ will be considered an attack against all the ‘Parties’… the ‘Parties’ will immediately assist the ‘Party’ so attacked,” deciding “the extent and nature of support to be provided after objective assessment,” including “military means and capabilities,” under Article 51 [96]. Ankara’s general justification adds that the clause “will not operate automatically” and rests on consensus after consultations [97]. Two other clauses set it apart from Badr. Article 10 commits the parties to logistic support “including arms, ammunition, fuel, spare parts” in “peace, war, and other contingencies.” Article 8 gives the three “core Parties” a veto by consensus over any new member, seats the secretariat in Saudi Arabia, and names a Pakistani as the first Secretary General [96]. Badr opens its door to “other friendly nations” on criteria the four agree; Mecca keeps the door in the hands of Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad. Qatar signed the industrial pact. Riyadh signed the defense pact. Different paper. The Qatari text says Badr means the full moon; the Battle of Badr reading comes from Pakistani and Turkish audiences, not from Doha [7].

Badr is the “regional partnership” previewed on 19 October: Likely (55 to <85). Something produced by April 2027 is a different question. The Indonesian MoD’s “nothing is binding so far” on the June Barzan documents is why the BLUF band sits at Roughly even chance (45 to <55) [92].

Exercises and readiness indicators

- Ferocious Falcon 6, Qatar-hosted, 16 to 20 November 2025, with US B-52 and F-16, Qatari Rafale, and equipment from Italy, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, and France [98].
- 12 Squadron deployment, 22 January 2026; ORION 2026 in France with Air Wing 6 Rafales [81][99].
- Chief of Staff with the GCC Unified Military Command and Peninsula Shield commanders, 16 April, “under current circumstances” [100].
- PEGASE 26 French air cooperation, 3 to 7 October [91].
- Watan 6, launched 22 October at Milipol with France as guest of honor; tabletop from 25 October [101][68].
- Dragon Group chiefs of defense in London, reported 24 October [77].

Combat performance is the strongest readiness signal in the file. The force killed crewed aircraft and intercepted missiles and drones from February to July. The Foreign Ministry put the interception rate above 90 percent on 16 March and the defense minister repeated the figure in October [102][31]. No denominator was published. The fact of the claim is A, 1; the figure is B, 3.

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Budget and dependencies

Qatar publishes no defense line. The 2026 budget law sets expenditure at QAR 220.8 billion and revenue at QAR 199 billion at USD 55 oil [103]. Spending fell 14 percent in the first half [3]. Defense escaped the cut: Likely (55 to <85); the evidence is the emergency Patriot and APKWS buys and the tanker notification.

The cushion. A revenue drop three times the size of the spending cut means something filled the hole. Fitch expects the 2026 deficit "to be largely funded by debt and drawdowns on the fiscal stabilization fund," with "a small part" from the Qatar Investment Authority, whose assets the government does not report [15]. The September bond raised USD 3 billion on a USD 7.7 billion book at 55 and 65 basis points over Treasuries, which is the market's price for a AA sovereign in a war [37]. S&P held AA with a stable outlook in March on the strength of "large financial buffers" [104], and Moody's affirmed Aa2 stable on 22 May (wire carriage; B, 2) while assuming Hormuz disruption through the autumn [105]. The central bank cut the reserve requirement from 4.5 to 3.5 percent, opened repo lines, and allowed loan deferrals [106], and government foreign-currency deposits in local banks rose about USD 13 billion between February and June, read by analysts as repatriated cash [107].

How long it lasts is a question the Q3 outturn will start to answer. Sustainment binds Qatar to US, French, and UK chains for three fighter fleets and to the United States alone for Patriot, which is why the hedge runs through industry and second-tier guarantees rather than core platforms. Major Non-NATO Ally status under Presidential Determination 2022-10 stands [108].

5. Political Developments and Leadership Intentions

The ruling core

Tamim decides. The Prime Minister carries mediation. Sheikh Saoud, a former army engineer officer and Chief of the Amiri Diwan from 2020 to 2024, is the public face of defense reform. The Father Emir's death removed the family's senior elder [23]. No contest is visible. The constitution requires an Heir Apparent to be named by Amiri Order after consultation with the ruling family; none was found in the window [71]. Tamim's authority through April 2027 remains undiminished: Highly likely (85 to <95).

Domestic politics stays closed. The November 2024 referendum ending Shura Council elections passed with 90.6 percent of valid votes on 84 percent turnout [70]. The Third National Development Strategy targets four percent average growth to 2030 [109]. The 2026 numbers sit far from that line.

Policy priorities as the Emir stated them

The 13 October Shura speech is the clearest statement of intent in the window and it is an A, 1 text. The Emir said Qatar "was attacked on its territory by Iran, in a blatant violation of its sovereignty" and set out four elements: defend firmly without being drawn into war; maintain services and supply chains; help secure a ceasefire and reopen waterways; urge negotiations [3].

Set those four against the record and they match. Qatar shot down Iranian aircraft and expelled attachés, and never fired across the Gulf. Doha bought American gas to cover its contracts, mediated, and kept talking.

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Mediation portfolio

Gaza. The Hamas political bureau is still in Doha. On 19 August the Prime Minister received Khalil Al Hayya as chairman and "praised the movement's decision to accept the roadmap for completing the implementation of the second phase" [110]. The spokesman had called, on 11 August, Israel's rejection of the 15-point roadmap "a continuation of its foot-dragging" [34]. The oft-repeated line that Qatar told Hamas the office "no longer serves its purpose" traces to one anonymous diplomatic source in November 2024 and a same-day ministry denial; no 2026 originator exists, and this assessment does not use it.

US-Iran. Qatar names itself, Oman, and Pakistan as facilitators and says "no final agreement has been reached" [111]. The Islamabad memorandum was signed electronically on 17 to 18 June with Pakistan's prime minister as mediator [112]. Witkoff and Kushner were in Doha on 30 June [113]. Japan recorded its respect for the effort on 26 October [49].

Other files. Venezuela, with a 3 January statement and a Doha channel [114]; the Afghanistan, DRC-M23, and Lebanon tracks are outside this assessment's scope. No 2026 tally exists for Russia-Ukraine child reunifications.

What the portfolio says about intent

Mediation is Qatar's main strategic export and the leadership is protecting it under fire. Sheikh Saoud: "Mediation doesn't mean that we should not be ready for any defensive action from our side" [31]. Doha treats mediation as part of defense, not a substitute for it: Highly likely (85 to <95).

6. Diplomatic Relations and Security Policies

The guarantee question

Executive Order 14353, signed 29 September 2025, makes it US policy "to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of the State of Qatar against external attack," treats an armed attack on Qatar's "territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure" as a threat to US peace and security, and orders joint contingency planning, leaving critical infrastructure undefined [72]. The American Journal of International Law records that it is not a treaty, was never sent to the Senate, and "can be revoked at any time and by any president" [73].

The order was tested from 28 February 2026. What the public record shows about the US side of that test:

- No CENTCOM, Department of War, White House, or State release names a US unit or system that engaged a launch aimed at Qatar. Releases for Bahrain name joint intercepts; none for Qatar does [115].
- No public US statement invokes the order, applies its critical-infrastructure clause to Ras Laffan, or announces a Section 2(c) planning session.
- Qatar's statements credit Qatari forces. The 18 March condemnation of the Ras Laffan attack invokes Article 51 and Security Council resolution 2817 and never mentions the United States [116].
- CENTCOM's posture statement credits the combined cell hosted at Al Udeid with more than 6,000 drone and 1,500 ballistic missile intercepts region-wide. Aggregate only [117].

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- The concrete US acts on record are the two emergency sales of 1 May, the tanker notification, and the January air defense cell [6][40][88].
- The defense minister credits the 90 percent interception rate to decades of partnership with Washington without naming a unit [31].

Silence is not proof of inaction; US and Qatari forces share one airspace and one Patriot network.

What the record shows is that neither government cited the guarantee while it was being tested, and that Doha's answer was to obtain a second written instrument from France [9]. Two readings fit. One: joint defense happened and both capitals chose not to advertise it, to deny Tehran a US-versus-Iran frame on Qatari soil. Two: the order added nothing operational to what existed before it. The French letter is consistent with either reading: insurance against the second, or a hedge after the first. A letter is not a treaty. Neither is proven. Which reading holds: Roughly even chance (45 to <55).

Iran

The most damaged relationship and the most actively managed. Qatar expelled Iran's military and security attachés within 24 hours on 18 March [42]. Iran answered on 19 March with a UN letter naming Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE as states owing reparation for lending territory to US attacks (graded one-line reference: A, 1 for publication via IRIB's YJC; the UN document itself not retrieved) [118]. Contact never stopped. Iran's Interior Minister came to Doha on 6 October praising Qatar's "fair and mediating role, together with Pakistan"; a Qatari delegation was in Tehran on 25 October, per a senior Iranian official speaking to Al Jazeera as carried by Sabereen (B, 2), after a false "delegation" story on 20 October had been denied by Tasnim within two hours; the Emir met Pezeshkian on 27 October [119][120][121][122][12]. Tehran's sharpest direct rebuke of Doha in the window was about vocabulary: on 22 October the foreign ministry spokesman objected to the term "Iran conflict" in the Qatar-France joint statement, calling the refusal to say "aggression" "a form of moral evasion" [123]. Fars had moved first, on 21 October, casting the statement as Qatar siding with France against Iran's "self-defense" [124]. On 3 September the same spokesman cited a Qatari filing at the ITU to argue Iranian strikes on Qatari soil hit only US military sites, and described the 18 March strike on a Qatari gas facility as the exception and as justified (graded one-line reference: A, 1 for publication; the ITU filing itself not retrieved) [125]. The filing is now identified. It is Qatar's Contribution 5 to the ITU Council's extraordinary session of 25 August, a "Safety and Security Risk Assessment" by Qatar's Risk Management Unit, restricted after the session at Qatar's request as security-sensitive [126]. Its purpose was to keep the ITU Plenipotentiary in Doha. It worked. The Council record has Qatar's ambassador finding "no indication" that the security situation would prevent or significantly disrupt the conference [14]. Nine days later Tehran's spokesman used a document written to reassure the ITU's members as a legal brief for Iran's own strikes. That is the closest thing on record to an Iranian official rationale for striking Qatari energy.

The shared field binds them. Israel struck South Pars on 18 March; Iran's armed-forces outlet framed Ras Laffan the same night as the answer to South Pars; QatarEnergy's damage report arrived the next day [127][4].

The pilot dispute is the live friction. Iran's MIA committee says three airmen were captured alive by Qatari forces (D, 3 for the claim; A, 1 for publication) [10]. Qatar's spokesman denied it "categorically" on 15 August, said the airmen ignored warnings after violating Qatari airspace, said search teams found one pilot's remains and offered to hand them over, and said an April invitation to an Iranian team went unanswered [128]. Iran announced a technical delegation on 6 October [119]. Tehran has accounted for one of the four airmen itself: the Army confirmed one pilot's death on 29 July [129]. On 16 August

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Sabereen published the names of the other three on a poster captioned as photos of men "in Qatari captivity"; the poster shows only flight-suit portraits (captivity claim D, 3) [130]. Treadstone 71 holds all four names and does not publish them: printing them would carry the IRGC captivity narrative forward in a Western product. On 26 October, the day before the Moscow meeting, the foreign ministry spokesman said Iran holds the Qatari government responsible for determining the pilots' fate [11]. The accounts conflict. Open sources cannot reconcile them.

Israel

Israel struck Hamas leaders in Doha on 9 September 2025 [131]. The Security Council condemned the strikes [132]. Netanyahu's own account of his call with the Qatari Prime Minister: "Israel was targeting terrorists. It wasn't targeting Qatar" [133]. Relations soured again in 2026. Channel 12 reported in August that Israel halted all defense exports to Qatar, with the defense establishment calling Qatar "an evil state"; no government confirmation exists (B, 3) [134]. At the General Assembly on 24 September, Netanyahu named Qatar "the first" foreign country to "spread lies" about Israel, cited Al Jazeera and US universities, and called it "the same Qatar that hosts the Hamas butchers" [135]. On 29 September Qatar rejected Israeli statements on annexing parts of south Lebanon and Gaza [136]. No normalization track exists. Normalization before 30 April 2027: Almost no chance (1 to <5).

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the GCC

Al Ula holds through April 2027: Highly likely (85 to <95). The Prime Minister told Riyadh on 26 October that Saudi security is "an integral part of the security of Qatar" [47]. Qatar condemned the Houthi strike on the power station serving the Prophet's Mosque on 2 October [137]. No UAE-Qatar friction surfaced in any primary source.

The GCC Supreme Council's extraordinary session of 15 September 2025 invoked the Joint Defence Agreement: "any aggression against any of them is aggression against all" [138]. The text does not use the word "activate" and tasks no force. The Unified Military Command's engagement shows up operationally in the 16 April meeting with Qatar's Chief of Staff [100]. The Doha summit communiqué of the same day affirmed "the concept of collective security and shared destiny" and the need to start building implementing mechanisms [139].

Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan on 17 September 2025, eight days after the Doha strike [140], then the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026 [95]. Qatar's Badr, with two of the same partners, is industrial. The Gulf now has two overlapping Pakistan-centered arrangements with different legal weight. No Saudi comment on Badr was found. What was found is alignment: on 26 October Riyadh's foreign ministry framed the Saudi defense minister's visit to Tehran with Mecca-pact representatives as support for the Qatari and Pakistani mediation, the Saudi cabinet said the same on 27 October, and Doha's spokesman said the same day that the Qatar-Pakistan effort "complements" the "Mecca Alliance" [61][62][59].

Türkiye, Pakistan, Indonesia, France, Egypt, Russia, China

Türkiye and Pakistan are formal industrial partners under Badr and defense partners through the joint force command and the 2014 and 2016 agreements [7][90]. Pakistan's prime minister visited Doha on 23 to 24 February and mediated the June memorandum [141][112]. Indonesia's defense ministry calls the Barzan documents a memorandum, not a contract [92]. France: the 21 October joint statement condemns "Iranian military attacks against countries in the region," calls for Hormuz "without constraints or fees,"

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and carries the defense letters of intent [9]. Egypt: the 26 October call on navigation and a comprehensive agreement [48].

Russia. The Kremlin's 2 March readout blamed "the United States and Israel's aggression against Iran" for the crisis and recorded the Emir reaffirming cooperation with Russia as a priority [142]. On 27 October Putin hosted the Emir and Pezeshkian in the same room, framed the gas market around lost supply, and floated a standing GECF consultation on infrastructure risk [51]. The adopted text of the Moscow Declaration was unposted at the close of collection. In the ITU Council on 25 August, Russia, speaking also for Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, argued against moving the Plenipotentiary out of Doha [14].

China. Beijing was asked on 3 March whether it had pressed Iran to spare Qatari gas and Hormuz shipping; the spokesperson did not deny it and answered on energy security [143]. On 19 March the ministry said "non-military targets should not be attacked, and shipping lane security should not be disturbed" [144]. Wang Yi, on 8 September, called China Qatar's "most reliable and longest-term partner," recorded Qatar's pledge to "prioritise guaranteeing China's energy supply," and spoke of "a security architecture embodying regional countries' autonomy" [145]. In the ITU Council, China entered the only reservation on the decision letting the Secretary-General cancel the Doha conference [14]. Check Point observed China-nexus intrusion activity against Qatari entities from 1 March, one day after the war began, the only vendor-primary cyber attribution against Qatar in the window [146].

Security policy framework

The National Cyber Security Strategy 2024 to 2030 is in force. MENAFATF has Qatar in enhanced follow-up with its next mutual evaluation due February 2030 [147]. No OFAC action in the window named a Qatar-based person [148]. The Strategic Dialogue records Qatar's "frontline role in global counterterrorism efforts" on terrorist financing [87].

7. Emerging Threats and Military Activities

Iranian missiles and drones

The dominant threat, proven not theoretical. Timeline from Qatari originators: 28 February, 65 missiles and 12 drones in the first MOD release, 83 and 12 by day's end in the first UN letter, one drone hitting an early-warning radar; 2 March, two bombers down, seven missiles and five drones intercepted, drone hits on a Mesaieed power-plant water tank and a QatarEnergy site; 3 March, one of two missiles strikes Al Udeid; 6 March, nine of ten drones intercepted; 18 to 19 March, Ras Laffan; 7 April, four injured by debris in Muraikh; 7 July, the LNG carrier Al Rekayyat struck near Hormuz and Iran's deputy ambassador summoned with a protest note; 12 July, missile attack, three injured including a child; 17 July, a missile attack intercepted [25][24][26][27][28][4][29][149][30]. The Army also claimed a drone strike on 9 July against "a satellite antenna (early-warning site)" in Qatar; no Qatari statement for that date was found (graded one-line reference: A, 1 for publication; E, 3 for the claim) [150]. Sabereen's Persian and Russian channels went further. Both reported missile fire or explosions in Qatar on 21 and 23 July, and both announced a missile wave on Al Udeid on the night of 30 August, the Russian one saying it "destroyed" the base (E, 4 for each claim) [151][152][153][154]. Qatar issued a ministry statement or a UN letter for every confirmed attack day from 28 February to 17 July. It issued none for those three dates, and on 31 August it condemned new Iranian attacks on Jordan and the UAE without naming any on Qatar [30][155]. Doha's record goes quiet after 17 July. No Iranian strike reached Qatari territory after 17 July: Likely (55 to <85).

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Iran's own channels claimed each strike by numbered communiqué and, on 18 March, published a warning naming Qatari energy facilities as targets (graded one-line references: A, 1 for publication via Defa Press; battle-damage claims E, 3 to F, 4) [156][157][158].

Attribution to Iran: Almost certain (95 to 99); Qatar's ministry named the launch origin and Iranian channels claimed the strikes. Motive: Tehran treated Qatari soil as US soil and Qatari gas as a lever on world markets and as retaliation for South Pars: Likely (55 to <85). Repeat strike on Qatari territory before 30 April 2027: Unlikely (15 to <45), the same band as the BLUF and Section 9.

US posture moved with the threat. The embassy in Doha was still on ordered departure on 1 August, non-emergency staff outside Qatar; on 18 October it warned that Houthi hostilities "have the potential to escalate rapidly"; on 23 October State held Qatar at Level 3 and added "Iranian efforts to target U.S. government officials in the region" [159][160][161]. On 21 October the State Department's spokesman called reports extending the Riyadh ordered departure to Qatar and other Gulf posts "inaccurate" (secondhand) [162]; the date Doha's own ordered departure ended was not located. Iranian outlets reported a tanker concentration at Al Udeid in September and an RC-135U in October. No originator confirms either (C, 4 and D, 4) [163][164].

Hormuz

Both sides claim the strait. CENTCOM: 3,000 transits in six months, lanes mine-free, more than 95 percent of ships through safely [33]. The IRGC's July position was that no oil or gas leaves the region while US attacks continue [165]; the IRGC Navy, 12 and 17 October: violators will face force; the self-styled strait authority on 27 October: closed to unauthorized traffic, COSCO on notice from 1 November [166][32]. UKMTO's own products settle the tempo. The week to 14 October: 12 attacks, ten of them in the strait; 254 transits, about 70 percent below pre-conflict; most attacked vessels declining to report; most AIS-broadcasting ships routing via the Iranian route [167]. JMIC on 18 October: 153 incidents since 1 March; Strait of Hormuz SEVERE; Arabian Gulf raised to SUBSTANTIAL after two tanker attacks off Al Jubayl; AIS-on vessels hailed toward the Iranian-controlled northern route; and "no substantiation" for the IRGC's 17 October mine claims [168]. UKMTO's own timeline records the Iranian strait authority as "established to regulate and toll transits" in May [169][170]. Qatar's LNG has no other exit. QatarEnergy's 21 September release: Qatar "decided not to use pipelines as an alternative based on commercial and technical criteria" and is "ready to resume normal operations within a few weeks of the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz" [171]. Treadstone 71's same-day brief reads the COSCO notice as a permit rule written on top of a closure claim [172].

Energy infrastructure

Ras Laffan and Mesaieed are proven targets. QatarEnergy's own account: Trains 4 and 6 damaged, 12.8 million tonnes a year, one Pearl GTL train offline, force majeure on four countries' contracts, associated losses in condensate, LPG, naphtha, sulfur, and helium [4]. QatarEnergy declared force majeure to affected buyers on 4 March, two days after halting production, and on 19 March said it would be "compelled to declare force majeure for up to five years on some long-term LNG contracts" [173][174]. Al-Kaabi's 21 September release: the GTL train back in the first quarter of 2027, the two LNG trains in three years [171][5]. Fitch: "only a limited number of cargos" since the war; Golden Pass volumes used to meet contracts; North Field East in 2027 "after a delay of few months"; North Field West the most delay-prone [15][38]. Bloomberg recorded Al-Kaabi on 20 September saying the expansion trains "depend a lot on the Hormuz Strait" [39]. The 22 October Cheniere purchase, four million tonnes a year from the early 2030s through 2054 at Henry Hub plus a fee, is supply substitution for contract cover, not replacement of

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lost capacity [8][175]. Tehran's channels read the same cargo flows as licence: Qatari LNG moves "with Iran's permission" on the Iranian route [176].

Israeli precedent

The September 2025 strike established that Israel will hit targets inside Doha. A repeat on Qatari soil before 30 April 2027: Highly unlikely (5 to <15). The US order, the Security Council statement, and the apology raise the cost; the August export halt and the UNGA speech show the hostility has not gone.

Houthis

The Houthis struck Saudi civil and energy targets through October; Qatar condemned the 2 October strike on the power station serving the Prophet's Mosque [137]. The Houthi reply came by name and on their own channel. Abdulmalik al-Houthi on 7 October told "the Qatari position" to remember Saudi betrayal and said Al Jazeera "has sunk to the level" of Saudi channels; on 8 October he said the Qatari "now adopts the Saudi aggression on our country politically and in the media" and invoked Saudi regime-change intent toward Doha; on 11 October the Sanaa foreign ministry called Qatar "a partner in the blood and suffering of Yemenis" whose role "has regressed from mediation" [177][178][179]. The ladder is rhetorical and legitimacy-based, aimed at Al Jazeera and at alignment. No Houthi post in the window names a Qatari facility or threatens Qatari shipping. The only facility naming in the Telegram layer comes from non-official Iranian channels: an IRGC-aligned channel's July listing of Qatari gas sites among regional energy facilities "within range," and a scenario map relayed in October that includes a Qatari bridge (graded references, C, 3 and C, 4; cited without reproducing the threat) [180][181]. No official Iranian, IRGC, Houthi, or hacktivist post in the window names a Qatari facility as a declared target. Al-Mashat's 26 October line on "whoever stands with the Saudi enemy" sets the envelope [50]. Israel Hayom reported on 26 October, citing Gulf diplomatic sources, a USD 1 billion Saudi offer to the Houthis brokered through Tehran; a Saudi official did not confirm any transfer (D, 3) [182]. If true, Riyadh is buying quiet through Iran while crediting Doha and Islamabad in public. Unconfirmed. Houthi kinetic action against Qatari territory or Qatari-flagged shipping before 30 April 2027: Unlikely (15 to <45).

Cyber

One vendor-primary attribution: Check Point's China-nexus campaign against Qatari entities from 1 March [146]. No vendor names an Iranian operation against Qatari critical infrastructure in the window. The defense minister lists cyber and electronic warfare among his three priorities [31]. Iranian state-linked cyber activity against Qatar during the kinetic phase: Likely (55 to <85). That is an analytic judgment, not an attribution.

Submarine cables entered the record in October, and the threat has a named originator. On 20 October the IRGC's political deputy, Brig Gen Yadollah Javani, told Al-Alam that Iran would target internet cables if its infrastructure were attacked (graded one-line reference: A, 1 for publication) [183]. Defa Press attributes a wider warning to SNSC Secretary Rezaei, that "many cables, data centers and AI facilities" would go if war resumed; Rezaei's own text was not found [184]. Qatar's foreign ministry answered "threats to target internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz" on 20 October: the region's peoples, "including the Iranian people," would take the damage [185]. Tasnim replied on Eitaa the next day, calling a cable cut "a deadly nightmare" for Qatar and a containable shock for Iran (graded one-line reference: A, 1 for publication) [186]. Defa Press kept the line running to 27 October, counting seven fiber lines near the Iranian coast [187]. Two prior Iranian statements give it context. The IRGC Navy claimed strikes on Oracle and Amazon data centers in Dubai and Bahrain on 2 April (C, 3 for the claim) [188]. In May the same outlet

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had floated licence fees and an Iranian repair monopoly over the Hormuz cables [189]. The cable threat is new. Tehran keeps it as a lever on Doha: Likely (55 to <85). An actual cut of a Gulf cable before 30 April 2027: Unlikely (15 to <45). The ITU's own advisory body on cable resilience, reporting in July, names Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez corridor as chokepoints and does not mention Hormuz [190].

The nearest high-value cyber target is a calendar date. PP-26 runs in Doha from 9 to 27 November, beside MWC26 Doha from 8 November and the Council's final meeting on 7 November: about 3,000 delegates from 194 states, electing the ITU's five top officials [191][192][193]. Qatar's host report to the Council lists security and movement-route planning with its sovereign authorities, and says preparations continue "despite the regional circumstances" [194]. Hostile cyber or influence activity aimed at PP-26 or its delegations, from any actor: Likely (55 to <85). That rests on target value, not on a collected plan. One out-of-region precedent: the Sunday Telegraph reported in August that Iranian hackers shut a small UK generator for four days; the plant is unnamed and the UK government has not attributed it (C, 3, secondhand) [195].

Espionage and terrorism

The March cell arrests are the main item: ten held, seven tasked with collection on "vital and military facilities," three with sabotage and drone training, coordinates and communications gear seized, per Qatar's fourth UN letter [27]. No jihadist threat indicator was collected.

8. Cognitive Warfare, Influence Operations, and Hybrid Threats

Frame

Qatar is a target and a heavy hitter in the information domain at the same time. Al Jazeera gives Doha reach no Gulf neighbor matches: 434 million homes, 150 countries, 70 bureaus by the network's own count [196]. Adversaries attack Qatar's standing as a neutral host. They do not deny it is a player.

Cultural Nexus scoring, Qatari citizen audience

The Cultural Nexus Framework scores one audience across seven measures to forecast reaction to narrative and pressure [197]. The scores below are analyst judgments on a 1 to 10 scale, where 10 is the strongest expression of the measure, with the evidence that moved each score. The audience is the Qatari citizen core, the population adversary narratives try to split from its rulers.

Measure	Score	Basis
Information control and media trust	8	State wire and ministries are the release channel; the ministries told residents to rely only on official sources; Al Jazeera is the house voice. Trust in state channels held through the strikes; no visible migration to foreign channels [198]
Institutional rigidity versus adaptive governance	7 toward adaptive	Four-element strategy stated and executed; emergency procurement; defense review; production center announced; conscription law untouched [3][31]
Symbolic power and identity saturation	6	Mourning for the Father Emir; "martyrs who laid down their lives in defence of Qatar"; sovereignty as "red line." Saturation is moderate, not fatigued [3]

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Measure	Score	Basis
Elite cohesion versus fragmentation	9 cohesion	One decider, one family, no heir contest visible, defense and foreign portfolios in family hands; Al Attiyah's exit absorbed without visible rupture [18]
Resistance culture and historical trauma	5	The 2017 to 2021 blockade is the formative grievance; 2026 adds a second. Grievance is directed outward at Tehran and Tel Aviv, not at the state [3]
Surveillance acceptance and privacy expectation	8 acceptance	Cell arrests announced and accepted; expatriate majority; security apparatus concentrated under one minister [27][21]
Technology adoption and generational divide	7	High adoption; the state still reaches citizens through legacy channels first, and QNA's own Telegram channel carries the official line in Arabic (Treadstone 71 observation); in Treadstone 71's reading, the Persian and Houthi content aimed at Qatar is written for Iranian and Yemeni audiences, not for Qataris

Reading: an audience with high elite cohesion, high trust in state channels, and grievance pointed outward is a poor target for the Iranian "hostage of Washington" line and a good target for the "mediator and brother" line. The Iranian civilian channel's October shift fits that reading: Likely (55 to <85).

Human Terrain Influence Mapping, Iranian captor narrative against the Qatari audience

HTIM averages three Characterize inputs into a Terrain Vulnerability Index and two Deliver inputs into a Pathway Exploitation Score, then weights them into the HTIM Index [199]. Scored for the "Qatar holds our pilots" narrative against Qatari citizens: Demographic Resonance 3 (the narrative speaks to Iranians, not Qataris); Cultural Norm Alignment 2 (it accuses the state of dishonor, which the audience rejects); Political Trend Volatility 3 (no domestic fault line to exploit). TVI 2.7. Channel Saturation 4 (Press TV, Al-Alam, Mehr Arabic, with no Qatari-facing Arabic amplifier found); Behavior Shift Velocity 1 (no observable behavior change in Qatar). PES 2.5. The published method does not fix the weights, so equal weighting is applied: HTIM Index 2.6 of 10, low. The narrative is built for Iranian domestic and pan-regional audiences, not for Qataris. Its effect on Doha runs through diplomacy, not through public opinion. Information age: most inputs under 30 days. Confidence inputs: data quality 3 of 5, source reliability 4 of 5.

Iran: the narrative phases

The phases below are built only from Iranian originators collected in Persian and Arabic, each graded in the citations table. Threat statements are referenced, not reproduced.

Dates	Narrative	Carrier	Reference
28 Feb to 18 Mar	Al Udeid as the US nerve center; maximal battle-damage claims; Qatar an address, not an actor	IRGC numbered communiqués via Defa Press and Mehr	[156]
15 to 19 Mar	Qatar a hostage of Washington "without real sovereignty"; Qatari energy sites named as targets; Ras Laffan framed as the answer to South Pars; UN letter names Qatar a co-belligerent	IRGC Public Relations; Defa Press; Iranian UN mission via YJC; Araghchi on X	[157][127][118][200]

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Dates	Narrative	Carrier	Reference
3 Mar	Qatar's cell arrests	No Iranian state carrier found; silence	(absence finding, B, 2)
mid-Jun	US bases as "magnets for attack"; the Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, advises neighbors to close them	Mehr analysis quoting the Leader	[201]
12 to 24 Jul	Nasr 2 communiqués on Al Udeid; then "US evacuated Al Udeid," sourced by Fars to "Sentinel-2 company" imagery and unnamed OSINT counts	IRGC PR; Fars; Press TV and Mehr relays	[158][202]
31 Jul to 22 Aug	Pilots narrative opens: Qatar "professes ignorance," then "captured alive," Geneva and war-crimes language, then "obstruction," then "held on water" and ill, then Qatar "accepts an expert team"	Army spokesman; MIA Search Committee	[203][10][204][205]
6 Aug to 6 Sep	Debt and basing frames: Al Udeid's expansion is "for no country but Iran"; support for the US economic war treated as an act of war (graded reference); in Tehran, Rezaei tells Qatar's Prime Minister that Iran "helped Qatar in hard days" while Araghchi demands no US use of regional soil; Defa Press asks what happens to LNG "if Ras Laffan is fired upon again"	Air Force deputy; SNSC Secretary; Foreign Minister; Defa Press	[206][207][208][209][210]
16 Aug to 29 Sep	Army reward announcement for action against US personnel, later extended in rhetoric to regional publics (graded reference only)	Army commander; Army spokesman to Al-Alam	[211][212]
3 to 14 Sep	Humanitarian channel: Red Crescent letters to ICRC; call with the Qatar Red Crescent, which "promised assistance and cooperation"	IRCS via Mehr, Al-Alam	[17][213]
early Sep	MFA: regular relations with Qatar, Doha's role in the US track, "we declare our reservations," in one sentence	Baghaei via Mehr Arabic	[214]
23 Sep to 4 Oct	Tehran names Doha as the channel: contact with Washington "was through the Qatari mediator"; US proposals "transmitted through Qatar"; in the same fortnight a senior adviser to the Commander-in-Chief claims most US bases in Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain were destroyed (F, 4)	MFA spokesman; MP Boroujerdi; Safavi	[215][216][217]
24 Sep	IRGC Intelligence institutionalizes "evacuation and deactivation of CENTCOM bases"	Press TV	[218]
6 to 13 Oct	Qatar a "fair mediator, with Pakistan," holding "a special place"; technical delegation; "Doha pledged cooperation"; Army legal deputy keeps an "accountability" and "independence test" line	Interior Minister; government spokesperson; Army legal deputy	[119][219][220]
20 to 22 Oct	Legalization: the Army legal deputy says Qatar bears "international responsibility" for the airmen and a legal file is in preparation; Fars and the MFA	Army legal deputy; Fars; MFA; Tasnim (Eitaa)	[221][124][186]

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Dates	Narrative	Carrier	Reference
	attack the Qatar-France wording; Tasnim frames a cable cut as Qatar's nightmare		
25 to 27 Oct	Split screen: Mashregh's hardline piece on Gulf rulers; the spokesman holds Qatar responsible for the pilots on 26 Oct; presidency readout of the Emir meeting cooperative and silent on pilots; Qatar says "the ball is now in the Iranian court"; Mashregh carries that briefing with the Hormuz and threat lines cut; Defa Press floats an RC-135U at Al Udeid as a "prelude" to war (D, 4)	Mashregh; IRGC-aligned channel; president.ir; QNA	[222][11][13][59][60][164]

Narrative Chain Analysis on the evacuation claim: origin Fars, 24 July, citing a satellite "company" that is in fact the European Sentinel-2 constellation at 10-meter resolution and anonymous counts; amplification Press TV, Mehr English, and Mashregh within 48 hours; institutionalization by IRGC Intelligence on 24 September; a US senator's denied base visit in October fed it from the other side, with the Pentagon's stated reason, a 3 March travel directive, reaching the public only through an official speaking to a trade paper [202][218][223][224]. The claim is adversary information operations: Likely (55 to <85). No analyst, handle, or image was ever named.

Volume and mix. Across the Iranian state agencies' and armed forces' channels, Qatar coverage peaked in July and eased by about a third by September without returning to its pre-war level [225][226]. The mix moved more than the total. Al Udeid nearly vanished after July. The pilots line peaked in August. Hormuz faded through the autumn. France appeared only in October, after the Elysée text. Sabereen's Persian channel ran on a different clock: its Qatar coverage peaked in June, around the Doha talks, then again in July [227].

The Russian-language relay. Sabereen also runs a Russian-language channel. Its output peaked in March and has since fallen by close to nine-tenths [228]. Qatar holds a small share of it every month, peaking in March and July with the strikes. Most of it is wire digest from Reuters, Axios, and Al Jazeera wrapped around IRGC communiqués. Three items go further. A debt frame: Mottaki on video saying Qatar "owes Iran 400 billion dollars" from the shared gas field, then that Washington stopped Doha releasing 12 of 24 billion dollars in Iranian funds [229][230]. Insinuation: a satellite heat reading at Ras Laffan posted as "fire or attack?" [231]. Unsourced claims: a Qatari colonel who "interrogated" the Iranian pilots on Al Jazeera, posted the day Doha denied holding them; the 30 August Al Udeid strike; and on 23 October an order for Russian diplomats to leave Qatar and four Gulf states, which no Russian state outlet carried and which the Emir's Moscow visit three days later contradicts (E, 4 to E, 5) [232][154][233]. None carried a source. The channel puts Tehran's Qatar line in front of Russian readers with Iranian sourcing stripped away. Its unsourced Qatar claims run ahead of every originator: Likely (55 to <85).

The pattern across the phases: the captor and hostage frames ride the military channel (Army spokesmen, the MIA committee, Defa Press, Mashregh); the mediator and brother frames ride the civilian channel (presidency, MFA, Interior, Red Crescent). Both ran concurrently from mid-August. The civilian line gained weight from 6 October. The hardline frame was not retired before the Moscow meeting.

Tehran calibrates pressure so it does not close the channel it needs: Likely (55 to <85).

The channel layer adds a timing pattern the web originators did not show. The grievance line spiked on 15 August, 20 October, 22 October, and 26 October, each within a day of a visible Qatari step: the pilot denial, the delegation stories, the Qatar-France joint statement of 21 October, and the eve of the Moscow

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meeting [10][123][11]. The same channels that carried the evacuation claim in July reported on 21 August, citing the same satellite constellation, that US tankers and Qatari C-17s were back at Al Udeid, “the first time since 12 July” [234]. The pilots line is a pressure instrument timed to the mediation calendar: Likely (55 to <85).

The 19 March UN letter and the 18 March target warning fit the five-stage sequence Treadstone 71 documented in August for Iranian coercion of the GCC: delegitimize, legalize, threaten, deny and distance, cross-amplify [235]. The Fire and Darkness brief of 7 August judged that Gulf energy threats had lost force despite the March strikes [236]; Defa Press’s September repeat-strike framing on Ras Laffan and the October cable threats cut against that call [210][183].

Russia

Collected framing is transactional. The Kremlin blamed Washington and Jerusalem for the war and recorded the Emir’s priority on Russia [142]. Rybar’s one Qatar-specific line of 25 July claims Ukrainian counter-drone crews and radars around Doha and a plan for “more than 20 thousand interceptors,” unsourced (D, 4) [237]. No Rybar or RT line frames Ras Laffan as a Russian LNG gain; Vedomosti reported the damage straight [238]. Putin’s GECF framing (see current items) is the Russian commercial read of Qatar’s outage. Two Majors posted nothing on Qatar; WarGonzo placed Qatar in the Saudi bloc on Yemen [239]. Sabereen amplified the Qatari Prime Minister’s September call for a regional security framework that includes Iran [240]. Sabereen’s purpose is to advance Tehran’s line that US protection failed the Gulf: Likely (55 to <85).

China

Beijing’s line is energy security plus regional autonomy. The non-denial of 3 March that China pressed Iran over Qatari gas, the 19 March line on non-military targets and shipping, Wang Yi’s partner language, and Qatar’s recorded pledge to prioritize China’s supply are all ministry transcript (A, 2) [143][144][145]. Chinese commentary on Badr reads it as proof that “the US fundamentally cannot protect its allies,” and a SISU scholar’s own text calls US bases “attack targets, not security guarantees” [241][242]. The China Global South Project relays Ding Long’s read of Saudi-Qatari competition over minilateral frameworks; the Chinese original was not found (B, 3) [243]. Chinese framing of Qatar stays low-intensity and commercial through April 2027: Likely (55 to <85).

Houthi and Hezbollah media

Saba carried the IRGC base list and Hamas’s framing of Qatar as a victim of Israel [244]. Al-Masirah turned on Qatar by name between 7 and 11 October, five days after Doha’s first condemnation of the strikes on Saudi Arabia (Section 7). Al-Manar relayed one line of that attack the same day and otherwise treats Qatar as Lebanon’s funder and a mediation channel, reporting the Moscow meeting as energy cooperation [178][57]. The Axis media chain works on Qatar in one direction only: Sanaa attacks, Beirut relays once, Tehran’s official channels carried nothing of the Houthi line on Qatar (absence finding, B, 2).

Israel

Israeli narrative pressure rose after the Doha strike and again in 2026. The UNGA passage is verbatim on gov.il [135]. A September 2026 Israeli government report names Sheikha Moza as “a central figure in Qatar’s terror-financing apparatus” and ties Qatar Foundation to named clerics; it is a government information product and its characterizations are advocacy (A, 4) [245]. Channel 12’s export-ban report

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and the October interrogation leaks in Israel's own Qatar-lobbying affair, with a Netanyahu adviser admitting continued work for Qatar into 2024, keep Qatar in Israeli domestic politics [134][246]. The purpose is to delegitimize Qatar as a Gaza mediator in Washington: Likely (55 to <85). No attributed covert Israeli influence operation against Qatar surfaced in the window.

Saudi, UAE, and Egyptian networks

No revival of blockade-era campaigns. Saudi-owned Al Arabiya's July coverage carried Qatar's protest to Iran over the tanker straight [247]. Egypt's Youm7 ran a 2026 series on Brotherhood media networks without naming Qatar, where its 2020 series had [248]. Meta's August 2026 report names no Gulf-origin network and none targeting Qatar [249]. The one live item cuts the other way: FDD documented an eleven-site network of fake watchdog and news sites recasting Qatargate as "Belgiumgate," "likely acting at Qatar's behest," with no documented payment (B, 3) [250]. Platform-level detection was not run; absence here is weak evidence.

Qatar's own instruments

Al Jazeera remains the reach tool, and on 27 October it carried a Qatari author's argument for defense autonomy and diversified guarantees, which matches the official line [66]. In Washington, FARA filings show the Embassy paying Mercury USD 32,500 a month, USD 195,000 for January to June 2026, for engagement with policy and academic institutions, including Doha Forum invitations to former senior US officials and meeting requests to the leaders of Georgetown, Northwestern, Carnegie Mellon, and VCU [251]. Holland & Knight and Moran Global Strategies hold the embassy's strategic-advice line; GRV Strategies serves the International Media Office for "positive messaging through the US media" [252][253]. The Education Department's own Section 117 data files, as of 30 September 2026, show Qatar as the largest foreign source of reported gifts and contracts to US institutions at USD 8.98 billion across 1,338 reports, ahead of China at USD 5.34 billion; Georgetown's Qatar-attributed total is USD 1.11 billion and Northwestern's USD 819 million, almost all of it contracts [254]. Earlier press readings of USD 6.6 billion were taken from an older data cut [255]. Netanyahu's UNGA line targets exactly this footprint; Qatar's spokesman answered it within a day as "an attempt to divert attention" (via The Peninsula, B, 2) [256].

Treadstone 71 Adversary Index sub-index note

The Adversary Index scores eight sub-indices from executed operations, not stated intent [257]. For Iran's activity against Qatar in the window, two sub-indices moved: Narrative Volume rose sharply from July (the evacuation claim, the pilots, the reward) against the pre-July baseline, peaked in July in Treadstone 71 collection, and eased by about a third by September without returning to baseline [226], and Cognitive Warfare Velocity rose from August as the two-channel pattern took hold. Doctrinal Maturity is unchanged; the coercion sequence is the same one documented in August [235]. Israel's Narrative Volume rose from August to September. Russia and China did not move. Blockade-era Gulf networks stayed flat, with the collection gap noted.

9. Critical Thinking, Reasoning, and Strategic Foresight

The methods in this section follow Treadstone 71's published practice: structured techniques that put reasoning on paper where a second reader can attack it, Kent-style bands with half-open intervals, and

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foresight built from patterns, trends, and tendencies rather than from a single trajectory [258][259][260][261][262][263].

Types of reasoning used, and where

Deductive. From the Al Meezan decrees to the office holders: if the Gazette records the appointment and no later instrument revokes it, the holder is in post. Applied to all six posts in Section 3.

Inductive. From a dated series of Qatari ministry statements and UN letters between 28 February and 17 July to the judgment that Iran struck repeatedly: the conclusion rests on the fullest series of originator texts available, not on a sample.

Abductive. The guarantee question. Two explanations fit the silence; the French letter of intent is the discriminating observation, and it favors neither fully. The band is set at even chance for that reason, not for lack of effort.

Analogical. The Mecca pact as the comparison case for Badr: same partners, different clause. The analogy shows what Badr is not.

Causal. South Pars to Ras Laffan inside 24 hours, with Iran's own outlet stating the link. One instance with a stated mechanism is causal evidence; it is not yet a law.

Valid and invalid interpretations

Valid: Qatar hedged through industrial pacts and a second written guarantee while keeping the US core, because every platform and every interceptor it depends on is Western. Invalid: Qatar is tilting toward Iran, because a meeting in Moscow and a cooperative readout sit beside an expulsion, a denial, and an American gas purchase in the same month. Also invalid: the US guarantee failed, because the public record cannot show what did or did not happen inside a shared air-defense network. Valid: the guarantee was not cited by either party under test, which is a fact about signaling.

Patterns, trends, tendencies

Pattern. Iranian strikes on Qatari energy followed strikes on Iranian energy, with Tehran's own outlet naming the link [127]. A second pattern: Iranian grievance output spikes within a day of a visible Qatari mediation or alignment step and runs alongside the civilian channel rather than yielding to it.

Trend. Fiscal deterioration quarter over quarter: Q1 deficit QAR 10.3 billion, Q2 QAR 21.2 billion, H1 revenue down 42 percent, a bond in September, and Fitch's shift from Stable in March, through Rating Watch Negative, to Negative in September [36][264][15]. A second trend: minilateral security frameworks multiplying around Pakistan and Türkiye, three in thirteen months [140][95][7]. A third: three Gulf voices converging on one vocabulary in eight days. Qatar's defense minister proposed a regional dialogue with a non-aggression agreement on 19 October; Oman's foreign minister called for an eight-state framework and a non-aggression pact on 26 October; Qatar's foreign ministry asked for "a new regional security system" built on "mutual non-aggression" on 27 October [31][65][59]. Beijing's September language on "a security architecture embodying regional countries' autonomy" and Riyadh's visit to Tehran point the same way [145][61].

Tendency. Doha absorbs and mediates rather than retaliates; the four-element strategy is a statement of that tendency. Washington acts through sales and notifications rather than statements.

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Technical and aggregation analysis

The Qatari ministry statements, aggregated, give a strike record across 28 February to 17 July with at least ten dated attack days, most intercepted, at least six with ground effects: the radar on 28 February, Mesaieed on 2 March, Al Udeid, Ras Laffan, Muraikh, and the 12 July injuries. Aggregating the US notices gives USD 9.5 billion in approvals across three cases in four months, two of them on emergency waivers. The fiscal releases add up to a first-half deficit above QAR 31 billion, against a budget law that planned a full-year deficit of about QAR 21.8 billion. Fitch kept AA and moved the outlook to Negative [15].

Decomposition of uncertainty

Tier 1, closable with one document: Moscow's account of what Putin and the Emir discussed; the Moscow Declaration text; the Patriot delivery schedule; the Badr production center award. Tier 2, closable with more collection: private Telegram channels; UKMTO October advisories; buyer-side force majeure statements. Tier 3, beyond open sources: what happened inside the shared air-defense network in March; the fate of the three airmen beyond the two governments' statements.

Key assumptions check

1. The US-Iran war stays unresolved through April 2027. If a settlement lands, every band in the forecast moves toward Scenario C.
2. Qatar's leadership stays united. Nothing in the window contradicts it.
3. Hormuz does not reopen fully. Both sides' October claims support it.
4. No Israeli strike on Qatari soil. The apology and the order hold it; the UNGA speech argues the hostility remains.

Analysis of competing hypotheses

Question: have the 2025 strikes and the 2026 war shifted Qatar's security alignment?

Evidence	H1 Double down on US	H2 Anchor plus hedge	H3 Tilt to Iran	H4 No change
EO 14353 kept; Strategic Dialogue reaffirmed [72][87]	C	C	I	N
Emergency Patriot, APKWS, KC-46A [6][40][41]	C	C	I	I
Badr signed; production center announced [7][35]	N	C	N	I
French letter of intent on security guarantees [9]	N	C	N	I
Attachés expelled; pilot claim denied [42][128]	C	C	I	I
Emir meets Interior Minister, then Pezeshkian [119][265]	I	C	C	N
Defense minister: "Iran is our neighbour"; regional dialogue with Pakistan and Türkiye [31]	N	C	C	N
US LNG purchase [8]	C	C	I	N

C consistent, I inconsistent, N neutral. H3 and H4 each carry four inconsistencies and fail. H1 cannot explain Moscow and is neutral on Badr and France. H2 is consistent with all eight. Qatar has moved to anchor plus hedge: Likely (55 to <85). Tilt to Iran: Highly unlikely (5 to <15).

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Scenarios to 30 April 2027

Scenario A, armed truce with a thin strait. US-Iran talks limp on through Qatar and Pakistan; Hormuz stays contested with partial flows; no new strike on Qatar; Badr yields no Barzan project with a stated value or contract; force majeure stays. Likely (55 to <85). Indicators: a new mediated round in Doha or Islamabad; the pilot file closed through the Red Crescent; UKMTO weekly attack counts falling below ten; a Barzan memorandum with no value or contract; the Mecca-pact states' Tehran channel continuing to defer to the Qatar-Pakistan track.

Scenario B, the war resumes and Qatar is hit again. A US or Israeli strike on Iranian energy or a blockade incident triggers Iranian fire that reaches Qatari soil; a second emergency FMS case follows. Unlikely (15 to <45), the band carried from the BLUF. Indicators: US force surges; Al Udeid personnel departures as in January; UN travel guidance that moves PP-26 to Geneva; Iranian channels naming Qatari sites again; a Persian Gulf Strait Authority enforcement action against a Qatari-chartered hull.

Scenario C, a settlement with Qatar as co-guarantor. Hormuz reopens; QatarEnergy lifts force majeure within weeks of reopening, as Al-Kaabi said undamaged units could; attachés return. Unlikely (15 to <45). Indicators: a signed framework; the Iranian hard channel dropping the pilots line; Oman, Qatar, and Pakistan named in the text.

Scenario D, rupture with Washington. The order revoked or a drawdown announced. Highly unlikely (5 to <15). Scenario D is broader than ending basing, which stays at Almost no chance (1 to <5). Indicators: a congressional move against the guarantee; a Gaza collapse blamed on Doha; a Hamas office crisis.

What would change the assessment: mutual-defense language inside Badr; evidence that the Moscow meeting produced a security arrangement; revocation of the executive order; a Saudi reaction to Badr that reads it as competition.

Indicators and warnings matrix

Indicator	Threshold	Implication	Source and cadence
New State Department notice for Qatar air defense	Any notice with a 36(b) waiver	Stocks still short, threat expected	state.gov PM releases, daily
MOD Qatar interception statements	One in any seven-day period	Kinetic phase resumed	MOD Qatar, QNA, continuous
QatarEnergy force majeure	Extension past December 2026, or lifting	Revenue path and strike-risk read	QatarEnergy, weekly
LNG departures from Ras Laffan	Below 60 percent of the February 2026 baseline for two weeks	Interdiction or new damage	Kpler or Vortexa, weekly
Iranian state media naming Qatari sites	Two outlets in 48 hours	Strike warning	Defa Press, Tasnim, Fars, Al-Alam, daily
Al Udeid personnel movement	IMO or DoD confirmation	US expects strikes	IMO Qatar, DoD, event-driven
Israeli statements on the Hamas office	Named threat by PMO or IDF	Strike precedent risk	Israeli PMO, IDF, daily

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Indicator	Threshold	Implication	Source and cadence
Badr project naming Barzan	First named project with a value	Hedge maturing	MOD Qatar, Turkish MoD, SSB, weekly
Congressional action on EO 14353	Bill or hearing	Scenario D indicator	congress.gov, weekly
Heir Apparent named	Amiri Order	Succession settled	Amiri Diwan, Al Meezan, event-driven
Iranian civilian channel drops the pilots line	Two weekly pressers without it	De-escalation signal	MFA pressers via Mehr; IRGC-aligned channels, weekly
Houthi channel names a Qatari facility or vessel	First instance	Rhetorical ladder turning kinetic	Al-Masirah channels, Saba, daily
UKMTO weekly attack count	Above 15, or Arabian Gulf raised to SEVERE	Strait enforcement hardening	ukmto.org weekly overview and JMIC updates
UN security guidance for Qatar	Any guidance stopping UN personnel travel	ITU Secretary-General cancels PP-26 in Doha; Geneva fallback	ITU Council Chair and Secretary-General notices, daily to 9 November

10. Actionable Items: Who, What, When, Why They Care

Three audiences read this product and each has a different reason to care.

A CENTCOM or OSD planner cares because the host's interceptors ran short enough for an emergency waiver, the host is now building munitions with Türkiye and Pakistan, and the host's defense minister has named the exact gaps he wants filled. Interoperability of what Badr produces is a 2027 planning problem.

A State Department or NSC Gulf desk cares because the written guarantee was tested and neither capital cited it. The next ask from Doha will be for something stronger than an executive order, and the French letter shows Doha is already shopping. Know the answer before the ask.

An energy-security or market stakeholder cares because 17 percent of Qatar's LNG is gone for three years, the strait is contested on both sides' say-so, and the first expansion train has slipped to 2027 on Bloomberg's reporting and Fitch's. Qatar is buying US LNG to cover contracts.

#	Decision	Owner	By when	Trigger	Why it matters to the owner	Basis
1	Second emergency FMS case for PAC-3 MSE and counter-UAS interceptors; shared stockpile plan under the order's contingency clause	State PM Bureau; OSD Policy; CENTCOM J4	Before Q2 2027	Any new MOD Qatar interception statement, or Iranian outlets naming Qatari sites	The May waiver set the precedent; the next shortfall arrives faster than a 30-day review	[6][72]

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#	Decision	Owner	By when	Trigger	Why it matters to the owner	Basis
2	Minority Western participation in Qatar's defense production center so Badr output stays NATO-standard	OSD Industrial Base Policy; UK MoD DE&S; French DGA	Before the first Badr project is named	Barzan, SSB, or Turkish MoD project announcement	Sheikh Saoud invited exactly this on 19 October; the window closes when a Turkish or Pakistani partner is named first	[35][7]
3	Passive defense program at Ras Laffan and Mesaieed: dispersal, spares for Trains 4 and 6, point air defense	QatarEnergy; Qatar MOD; US Army Corps of Engineers Middle East District; UK MoD	Design by Q1 2027	Force majeure extended; Iranian channels naming energy sites	Repair is three years; a second hit resets the clock and the force majeure	[4][5]
4	Releasable fact sheet on Al Udeid operations; resolve congressional access	DoD Public Affairs; 379th AEW; State; OSD Legislative Affairs	By 27 November 2026	Evacuation claims reappear in Fars or Press TV	A senator's denied visit fed an adversary narrative that IRGC Intelligence has now institutionalized	[202][218][223]
5	Verified humanitarian process on the three airmen through the Qatar Red Crescent and ICRC	Qatar MOFA; ICRC; US quiet support	By 27 December 2026	MIA committee statements; Press TV cadence on the pilots line	Tehran's most durable line against Doha; the civilian channel has already offered the exit	[128][17]
6	Keep the Hamas office question in closed channels	NSC; State NEA	Review by 15 January 2027 and at each Gaza phase-two milestone	Public US statements on the office; Israeli PMO statements	The office is the phase-two channel that produced roadmap acceptance	[110][34]
7	Decide the answer to Doha's next ask on the guarantee before it is made	NSC; State L; OSD Policy	Before the next Strategic Dialogue (expected Q4 2026; no later than 31	French letter implemented; Qatari request for statutory language	Doha has shown it will shop guarantees; a no with no alternative pushes toward Scenario D indicators	[73][9]

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#	Decision	Owner	By when	Trigger	Why it matters to the owner	Basis
			March 2027)			
8	Contract cover review for Qatari LNG offtakers through 2027	LNG buyers' supply teams; insurers	Q4 2026	Fitch outlook change; NFE start date	Golden Pass and Cheniere cover some contracts, not all; North Field East timing has already slipped to 2027	[38][8][39]
9	Sustain Persian, Arabic, and Russian Telegram and Eitaa channel monitoring on Qatar with weekly Adversary Index scoring	Collection manager	First scored report by 9 November 2026 (PP-26 opening), then weekly	Any Iranian, Houthi, or Russian channel naming a Qatari site, official, or the pilots	The timing pattern between Iranian grievance spikes and Qatari mediation steps was visible only at the channel layer	[257][266]
10	Threat brief and device-hygiene pack for PP-26 and MWC26 Doha delegations: phishing on registration and visa flows, DDoS on conference services, hack-and-leak against delegations, influence operations around the ITU elections	National delegation security officers; ITU security; Qatar's Communications Regulatory Authority and National Cyber Security Agency	Before 7 November	UN travel guidance changes; any Iranian, Russian, or hacktivist channel naming the conference	Qatar's own risk assessment underwrote the Doha decision, and Tehran has already repurposed that document once	[14][126]

Opportunity. The Idaho training squadron, the KC-46A, and PEGASE-style French training deepen Qatari air integration with the West through 2030 [75][41][91]. Keep those tracks moving; they are the counterweight to Badr inside Qatar's own force.

11. Collection Gaps and Follow-ups

- Channel layer: Persian, Arabic, and Russian Telegram and Eitaa channels were collected; some private groups and the Iranian super-apps (Rubika and similar) were temporarily out of reach. Coverage detail is held in the internal evidence pack.

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- Hacktivist fronts: no Iranian or Gulf-focused hacktivist channel reviewed in the window named Qatar as a target; the Gulf-specific leak channels found were dormant or gone.
- Channel-derived volume figures are minimums.
- Kremlin: the Putin-Pezeshkian conversation is posted as a placeholder with the transcript promised; no Putin-Tamim item in the news feed or the Qatar catalog; the Moscow Declaration recorded as adopted, text not posted; QNA and the Amiri Diwan silent on a Putin meeting, all at 16:30 UTC on 27 October. The Iranian presidency readout and QNA's readout of the Emir-Pezeshkian meeting are in hand and diverge.
- Rezaei's statement on cables, data centers, and AI facilities: reached only through Defa Press; no original text found. Javani's 20 October Al-Alam remarks are the named originator in hand.
- Al-Kaabi, 20 September: the phrase "very small amount" attributed in press to his Hormuz remarks appears in neither QatarEnergy's release nor the Bloomberg text and is not used here.
- UKMTO weekly overviews for 23 and 27 October: not available; the week to 14 October and the 18 October JMIC update are the latest originators in hand.
- Al Ansari's 25 September rejection of the UNGA claim: original post not located; wording consistent across three Qatari and regional carriers.
- Moody's 22 May 2026 release: original release not located; wording via three wire carriers.
- Patriot: no contract or delivery announcement naming Qatar after the 1 May notification.
- US side of the guarantee test: no release names a unit or system engaged over Qatar; no invocation of EO 14353; no Section 2(c) session announced. Pentagon briefing transcripts not searched line by line.
- Tehran's 19 March UN letter: YJC carriage only; UN document symbol not retrieved. The Qatari ITU filing cited by Iran's spokesman on 3 September: identified as C26-EXT/5 of 24 August, restricted at Qatar's request; its content is known only through the Council's summary record and Iran's quotation.
- Patriot interceptor expenditure: the justification memorandum to Congress is not public; the chairman refused quantities.
- Al Udeid basing agreement: no primary text on any extension.
- Buyer-side force majeure statements (JERA, KOGAS, CNPC, Sinopec, Eni): not found. IEA, GECF, Kpler volume series: not retrieved.
- QIA liquidity statement; MoF financing method for the deficit: not located.
- Akinci, SY-400, NASAMS: no primary source in window.
- F-15QA as the 2 March shooter: unnamed sources in US press only; no originator names the type.
- TAIS-Barzan frigate memorandum: press reports only; no originator text found.
- UK Hawk unit status; Eagle Resolve, Invincible Sentry, Peninsula Shield in window: not found.
- Ding Long's Chinese original on Badr; Belgian prosecutor's 2026 Qatargate release; Qatar EU mission statement on the UAE: not found.
- FARA full registrant enumeration: not done.
- Heir Apparent: no Amiri Order found.

12. Wrap-up

Qatar spent eight months of war learning what its insurance covers. The United States replaced the interceptors and said little. France wrote a second letter. Türkiye, Pakistan, and Indonesia signed for a

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factory. Iran struck the gas in March, claimed the base in July, accused Doha of holding its airmen in August, and in October sent its interior minister to call Doha a fair mediator. The Emir's answer to the Shura Council named four elements.

The next six months turn on three documents that do not yet exist: a Hormuz arrangement, a Patriot delivery schedule, and a Barzan contract. Until they do, the anchor-plus-hedge judgment stands at Likely, the repeat-strike band stays at Unlikely, and the pilots file stays open. On 27 October 2026 the Emir was in Moscow telling Iran's president about Hormuz while Tehran's readout recorded gas, Doha's spokesman was saying the ball sat in Iran's court, the strait authority in Tehran was writing a permit rule for COSCO, and QatarEnergy's force majeure, declared on 4 March, was 237 days old.

Annex A. Citations Table

Numbers match the bracketed citations in the body. Source reliability (Rel.) and information credibility (Cred.) are the ASA Evidence Standard entry grades, stated apart and never averaged. For adversary media, the printed grade is for the fact of publication by the originator; the grade of the claim itself is given in the body or the Used-for column. 'Secondhand' marks items reached through a carrier; the originator is named in the Originator column.

#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
1	Treadstone 71	ASA Evidence Standard (source reliability A to F and information credibility 1 to 6, printed apart and never averaged)	2026	Evidence grading used throughout	A, 1	No
2	Jeffrey S. Bardin, Treadstone 71, LLC (Zenodo)	The ASA Evidence Standard: Grading evidence, deception, and endgame confidence in intelligence work, Public Edition 1.2, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23137881	4 Oct 2026	Citable standard	A, 1	No
3	Amiri Diwan	HH The Amir Inaugurates 55th Ordinary Session of Shura Council (English and Arabic text)	13 Oct 2026	Revenue down 42 percent, spending down 14 percent, H1 2026; 'attacked on its territory by Iran'; four-element strategy	A, 1	No
4	QatarEnergy (official X account; same text as media center release ItemId 3897)	Update on the damage from the missile attacks on Ras Laffan Industrial City	19 Mar 2026	Trains 4 and 6, 12.8 mtpa, 17 percent, three to five years, force majeure, Pearl GTL	A, 1	No
5	QNA (Al-Kaabi remarks)	Minister of State for Energy Affairs: LNG cannot be transported via pipelines;	21 Sep 2026	Repair timeline update	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
		GTL back Q1 2027, LNG trains three years				
6	US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs	Qatar, Patriot Missile Replenishment, Transmittal 26-59, USD 4.01 billion, emergency determination	1 May 2026	200 PAC-2 GEM-T, 300 PAC-3 MSE; 36(b) review waived	A, 1	No
7	Qatar Ministry of Defence via QNA	Qatar, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkiye sign Badr MoU to promote defense industries cooperation	21 Oct 2026	Badr text: industrial only, open accession, name means full moon	A, 1	No
8	QNA (QatarEnergy release)	QatarEnergy signs long-term agreements to purchase 4 MTPA of US LNG (Cheniere, 2031 to 2054)	22 Oct 2026	Supply substitution signal	A, 1	No
9	Elysee (French Presidency)	Joint Statement between the State of Qatar and the French Republic on the occasion of President Macron's visit to Doha	21 Oct 2026	LoI on defence security guarantees; KNDS and John Cockerill; French air defence deployment; Hormuz 'without constraints or fees'	A, 1	No
10	Armed Forces General Staff MIA Search Committee (Brig Gen Bagherzadeh) letter to ICRC, full text via Fararu	Three Iranian pilots 'captured alive by Qatari forces'; Geneva violations; 'chapters relating to war crimes'	15 Aug 2026	Captor frame; capture claim D,3	A, 1	Partly
11	IRGC news channel, MFA spokesman Baghaei	Iran holds the Qatari government responsible for determining the fate of the Iranian pilots (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-250)	26 Oct 2026	Pilots line restated the day before the Emir meeting	B, 2	Yes (MFA statement carried by an IRGC channel)
12	QNA	HH the Amir meets Iranian President (at the Emir's residence before the summit; 'the latest developments in the negotiations, the Strait of Hormuz and energy supplies')	27 Oct 2026	Doha's account of the Moscow meeting	A, 2	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
13	Iranian Presidency (president.ir)	Meeting of Dr Pezeshkian and the Emir of Qatar on the GECF sidelines: bilateral relations and energy cooperation (no mention of pilots, Al Udeid, mediation or Hormuz)	27 Oct 2026	Tehran's account of the same meeting	A, 2	No
14	ITU Council, Summary Record of the extraordinary session (C26-EXT/8), signed by the Secretary-General and the Council Chair	25 Aug 2026 session: Qatar's ambassador presents the Risk Management Unit assessment ('no indication' the security situation would prevent or significantly disrupt PP-26); unanimous support for Doha, 9 to 27 Nov 2026; Secretary-General authorized to cancel Doha if UN security guidance stops UN personnel travel; China reservation; Geneva CICG fallback 11 to 29 Jan 2027; Reserve Account up to CHF 1,003,950 for cancellation fees	25 Sep 2026	PP-26 decision, cancellation trigger, positions of Russia, China, Arab and African groups	A, 1	No
15	Fitch Ratings	Fitch Affirms Qatar at 'AA'; Outlook Negative (RWN removed; 2026 contraction 18.8 percent; deficit funded by debt and stabilisation fund; 'only a limited number of cargos')	4 Sep 2026	Fiscal and LNG-flow baseline	A, 1	No
16	Federal Register (public inspection)	Arms sales notification, Transmittal 26-59 (Patriot replenishment), policy justification 'to replenish its missile defense capability'	1 Jun 2026	Quantities and justification	A, 1	No
17	Iranian Red Crescent Society via Mehr	Kolivand calls for follow-up on three Iranian pilots in Qatar; Qatar Red Crescent 'promised assistance and cooperation'	14 Sep 2026	Humanitarian channel	A, 1	No
18	Al Meezan (Qatar Legal Portal), Official Gazette	Amiri Order No. 2 of 2024 amending the Council of Ministers (Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Deputy PM and Minister of State for Defence Affairs)	12 Nov 2024	Defence portfolio holder	A, 1	No

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19	Al Meezan, Official Gazette	Amiri Decision No. 77 of 2024 appointing Lt Gen (Pilot) Jassim bin Mohammed Al Mannai Chief of Staff	14 Nov 2024	Chief of Staff	A, 1	No
20	Al Meezan, Official Gazette	Amiri Decision No. 74 of 2024 appointing Khalfan bin Ali Al Kaabi Head of State Security, ministerial rank	12 Nov 2024	Head of State Security	A, 1	No
21	Amiri Diwan	Amiri Decision No. 24 of 2023 appointing the Minister of Interior Commander of the Internal Security Force (Lekhwiya)	27 Mar 2023	Lekhwiya commander (still in post Oct 2026)	A, 1	No
22	QNA via The Peninsula	Minister of Interior and Commander of Lekhwiya meets French Minister Delegate; Qatar-France MOI action plan 2027-2030	20 Oct 2026	Lekhwiya commander confirmed in post	B, 1	No
23	Amiri Diwan	Amiri Diwan Statement on the passing of the Father Amir	12 Jul 2026	Death of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, aged 74	A, 1	No
24	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Permanent Mission to the UN)	First identical letter to the UN Secretary-General and Security Council on the Iranian aggression: 83 ballistic missiles and 12 drones by end of 28 Feb; 92 and 17 by the morning of 1 Mar; one drone hit an early-warning radar; 16 injured	1 Mar 2026	Fuller first-day count than the MOD release carried by Anadolu	A, 1	No
25	Qatar MOD statement via Anadolu Agency	Qatar says 65 ballistic missiles, 12 drones intercepted in Iranian retaliatory strikes; 8 injured	28 Feb 2026	First-day salvo count	B, 2	Yes
26	Qatar Ministry of Defence via QNA	MOD announces downing of two aircraft, interception of 7 ballistic missiles and 5 drones from Iran	2 Mar 2026	Two Su-24 shot down; fighter type not named	A, 1	No
27	Qatar Ministry of Defence via QNA (4th UN letter)	MOD: one ballistic missile intercepted, a second struck Al Udeid without casualties	3 Mar 2026	Al Udeid missile impact; IRGC cell arrests (10 held, 7 spies, 3 saboteurs)	A, 1	No
28	Qatar Ministry of Defence via QNA	MOD: 9 of 10 drones intercepted, one fell in an unpopulated area	6 Mar 2026	6 Mar drone wave	A, 1	No

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29	Qatar Ministry of Interior via QNA	MOI: 4 injuries from falling Iranian missile debris in Muraikh	7 Apr 2026	Civilian injuries from interceptor debris	A, 1	No
30	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Permanent Mission to the UN)	Two identical letters to the UN on the Iranian aggression: Al Rekayyat targeted 7 Jul; missile attack 12 Jul, three injured including a child; missile attack intercepted 17 Jul; Article 51 reserved	20 Jul 2026	July strikes; last dated Iranian attack on Qatari territory in the window, 17 July	A, 1	No
31	Al Jazeera Arabic	Global Security Forum opens in Doha; Qatar calls for regional dialogue with Iran (Sheikh Saoud remarks)	19 Oct 2026	Three priorities; more than 90 percent; regional partnership; dialogue including Pakistan and Turkiye; Al Udeid 'a Qatari base used by allied forces'	B, 2	Partly
32	'Persian Gulf Strait Authority' statement via Press TV	Iran's Hormuz authority issues warning to COSCO shipping; strait 'closed to unauthorized traffic'; legal action from 1 November	27 Oct 2026	Permit-and-prosecution rule (conflicts with CENTCOM)	C, 3	Partly
33	US Central Command	CENTCOM Commander visits Strait of Hormuz during milestone week: 3,000 transits in six months, lanes mine-free, over 95 percent sailed safely	25 Oct 2026	US Hormuz claim (self-serving cap applies to adversary-facing claims)	A, 2	No
34	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (weekly briefing)	Israel's rejection of Gaza peace plan continues foot-dragging on ceasefire deal	11 Aug 2026	Gaza phase two posture	A, 2	No
35	Al-Sharq (Doha)	Deputy PM: we will soon announce the establishment of a defence centre in Qatar	19 Oct 2026	'Working with Washington, London and Paris on munitions and air defence'	B, 2	Partly
36	Qatar Ministry of Finance via QNA	State budget posts QAR 21.2 billion deficit in Q2 2026	8 Sep 2026	Q2 deficit, revenue QAR 25.6 billion	A, 2	Partly
37	Qatar Ministry of Finance via QNA (The Peninsula carriage)	Qatar successfully completes USD 3 billion dual-tranche bond issuance	28 Sep 2026	Bond, UST+55 and +65, book USD 7.7 billion	A, 2	Partly
38	Fitch Ratings	Fitch Affirms QatarEnergy at 'AA'; Outlook Negative	18 Sep 2026	LNG recovery path	A, 1	No

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		(exports through Hormuz up 'in the last month' but limited; Golden Pass used to meet contracts; NFE 2027; NFW most delay-prone)				
39	Bloomberg (syndicated via gCaptain)	Qatar energy chief says Bessent wrong about Hormuz's future; expansion trains 'depend a lot on the Hormuz Strait'; 2027 expansion startup	20 Sep 2026	Expansion timing (Bloomberg paraphrase)	B, 2	Partly
40	US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs	Qatar, Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System, Transmittal 26-66, USD 992.4 million, emergency determination	1 May 2026	10,000 APKWS-II rounds	A, 1	No
41	US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs	Qatar, KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft, Transmittal 26-80, USD 4.5 billion	20 Aug 2026	Up to four KC-46A; no emergency determination	A, 1	No
42	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Qatar declares the Iranian military and security attaches and their staff personae non gratae	18 Mar 2026	Expulsion of Iranian attaches, 24-hour deadline	A, 1	No
43	Qatar Ministry of Defence via QNA	MOD: helicopter crash toll rises to seven (names; technical fault)	22 Mar 2026	Helicopter loss, Qatari-Turkish Joint Forces officer among dead	A, 1	No
44	Turkish Ministry of National Defence statement, reproduced in full by Anadolu Agency	Three Turkish nationals among seven killed in Qatar helicopter crash; cooperation continues uninterrupted	22 Mar 2026	Qatar-Turkish Combined Joint Force Command activity	A, 1	Partly
45	Qatar Ministry of Interior via QNA	MOI: Ras Laffan incident resulted in 13 deaths and 66 injuries; no leak detected	22 Jun 2026	Barzan gas plant explosion, official casualty count	A, 1	No
46	QNA	HH the Amir arrives in Moscow (8th GECF summit)	26 Oct 2026	Moscow trip	A, 1	No
47	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Foreign Minister hold phone call	26 Oct 2026	'Security of Saudi Arabia is an integral part of the security of Qatar'	A, 1	No
48	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egyptian	26 Oct 2026	Freedom of navigation,	A, 1	No

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		Foreign Minister hold phone call		comprehensive agreement		
49	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan	Courtesy call on Foreign Minister Motegi by Minister of State Al Khulaifi	26 Oct 2026	Japan's respect for Qatar's US-Iran mediation; Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb	A, 1	No
50	Saba (Sanaa)	Al-Mashat: we will determine how to deal with whoever stands with the Saudi enemy	26 Oct 2026	Houthi threat envelope (Qatar not named)	A, 1	No
51	Kremlin (transcript, part one)	Plenary session of the 8th GECF summit: Putin on 'disruption of gas supplies', crisis consultations covering 'physical threats to gas infrastructure'; GECF Secretary General names Hormuz and thanks the Emir	27 Oct 2026	Russian framing of the Qatari outage, verbatim	A, 1	No
52	TASS (Putin GECF plenary remarks)	Putin proposes GECF nations team up to optimize gas supply routes: 'the main problem today is the disruption of gas supplies'	27 Oct 2026	Russian framing of the Qatari outage	B, 2	No
53	Kremlin (English transcript)	Plenary Session of the 8th GECF Summit: 'At the conclusion of the GECF Summit, the Moscow Declaration was adopted'	27 Oct 2026	Declaration adopted; text not attached	A, 1	No
54	Kremlin	Conversation with President of Iran Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the 8th GECF summit; 'transcript of the start of the meeting will be published'	27 Oct 2026, 19:20 MSK	Putin-Pezeshkian meeting confirmed; substance unpublished	A, 1	No
55	RIA Novosti (Kremlin aide Ushakov)	Putin to meet the Emir of Qatar in Moscow	26 Oct 2026	Moscow schedule	B, 1	No
56	Kremlin, Qatar country catalog	Qatar events list: latest item the 2 Mar 2026 phone call; no Putin-Tamim item for 27 Oct at check	checked 27 Oct 2026, 16:30 UTC	Absence of a Putin-Tamim readout	A, 1	No
57	Al-Manar	Pezeshkian and the Emir of Qatar discuss bilateral relations and energy cooperation in Moscow	27 Oct 2026	Hezbollah framing of Qatar alongside Iran	A, 1	No

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58	QNA	Minister of State for Energy Affairs meets Iran's acting oil minister in Moscow	27 Oct 2026	Parallel energy channel	A, 2	No
59	Qatar MOFA weekly briefing via QNA (spokesman Ibrahim Al-Hashemi)	The region needs a new regional security system that respects state sovereignty and mutual non-aggression; 'the ball is now in the Iranian court'; Qatar-Pakistan efforts complement Saudi Arabia and the 'Mecca Alliance'; US-Iran message traffic continues 'without interruption' through the Qatari channel	27 Oct 2026	Doha's same-day line, issued while the Emir was in Moscow	A, 1	No
60	Mashregh News	Qatar: the region needs a new security system (carries the Qatari briefing with the 'ball in Iran's court', 'stop threats' and Hormuz lines removed)	27 Oct 2026	Selective omission as a framing technique	A, 1	No
61	Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (X) via Sabq	Visit of Prince Khalid bin Salman and representatives of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement states to Tehran supports the Qatari and Pakistani mediation	26 Oct 2026	Saudi alignment behind Qatar-Pakistan mediation	A, 2	Partly
62	QNA	Saudi cabinet affirms support for the mediation efforts of Qatar and Pakistan (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-229)	27 Oct 2026	Saudi backing	A, 2	No
63	Iranian Presidency (president.ir)	Pezeshkian plenary speech, 8th GECF summit: US 'naval and air blockade' and 'military interventions in the Persian Gulf region' must be 'condemned and effectively confronted' by major suppliers	27 Oct 2026	Iranian ask of fellow gas exporters, Qatar in the room	A, 1	No
64	Kremlin (supplement)	Heads of delegation at the 8th GECF plenary (Emir Tamim and President Pezeshkian; UAE at minister-of-state level)	27 Oct 2026	Who was in the room	A, 1	No
65	Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs (full lecture text)	Minister Albusaidi, 'Inclusive Security in the Gulf', Girton College: 'a new and inclusive	26 Oct 2026	Regional-architecture signal, originator	A, 1	No

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		framework, involving all eight Gulf littoral states'; 'a Non-Aggression Pact between all eight states should be the goal'; 'the solution doesn't depend on friends and allies beyond the region'				
66	Al Jazeera English (analysis by Abdullah Al-Emadi)	Qatar's path to defence autonomy	27 Oct 2026	Qatar's own strategic communication on diversified guarantees	B, 2	No
67	Rybar	'Gas crisis: what Putin said at the gas exporters' summit' (Qatar as fellow producer in a Russian-led GECF front; the Emir's meeting as routine summit diplomacy) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-230)	27 Oct 2026	Rybar's only Qatar post, 31 Aug to 27 Oct	A, 1	No
68	Marsal Qatar (Government Communications Office, X)	Tabletop phase of Watan 2026 begins with all military and civilian entities	25 Oct 2026	Current items	A, 2	No
69	Treadstone 71 / Cyber Intelligence Training Center	STEMPLES Plus: The Strategic-Assessment Framework (eleven vectors; indicators of change)	2026	Section 3 baseline	A, 1	No
70	QNA (Minister of Interior announcement)	Constitutional amendment approval was 90.6 percent; turnout 84 percent	6 Nov 2024	End of Shura Council elections	A, 1	No
71	Government Communications Office	Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar (Articles 8 and 9 on succession)	2005 (PDF posted Sep 2025)	Heir Apparent appointed by Amiri Order; none located in window	A, 2	No
72	Federal Register (govinfo)	Executive Order 14353, Assuring the Security of the State of Qatar, 90 FR 48143	29 Sep 2025 (published 6 Oct 2025)	Guarantee text; 'critical infrastructure' undefined	A, 1	No
73	American Journal of International Law, Vol. 120 Issue 2	President Trump Issues Executive Order Providing Qatar with a U.S. Security Guarantee	Apr 2026	EO is revocable, not a treaty, not submitted to the Senate	A, 2	No
74	Al Meezan	Law No. 5 of 2018 on National Service (in force)	4 Apr 2018	Conscription terms: males 18 to	A, 1	No

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				35, one year, reserve to 40		
75	Mountain Home AFB, 366th Fighter Wing (Environmental Assessment release)	Final EA: beddown of 12 F-15QA and about 300 QEAF and USAF personnel for ten years	8 Apr 2022	Baseline scope of the Idaho training squadron	A, 1	No
76	Office of Senator Jim Risch (joint letter with Gov. Little, Sen. Crapo, Rep. Simpson)	Letter to Secretary Hegseth on the Qatari Air Force facility at Mountain Home AFB	16 Oct 2025	Congressional reaction to Idaho training facility	A, 1	No
77	Al-Sharq (Doha)	Chief of Staff attends the annual Dragon Group meeting in London	24 Oct 2026	GCC, UK, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon chiefs	B, 2	Partly
78	SIPRI	Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 (Qatar 4th largest importer 2021 to 2025; 100 combat aircraft; 5 major warships)	Mar 2026	Import baseline	A, 1	No
79	IISS Strategic Dossier, Uninhabited Middle East, ch. 4	Table 4.2: Qatar, 6 Bayraktar TB2 (2018); 8 MQ-9B (2025, almost USD 2 billion)	Mar 2026	UAV holdings	A, 2	No
80	US Department of War (transcript)	Secretary Hegseth and CJCS Gen. Caine press briefing: 'Qatari fighters for the first time have shot down two Iranian bombers'	4 Mar 2026	US confirmation of Qatari kills; refusal to give interceptor quantities; 500 missiles and 2,000 drones region-wide	A, 1	No
81	UK Ministry of Defence (gov.uk)	UK joint squadron deploys Typhoon jets to Qatar (UK-Qatar Defence Assurance Agreement)	22 Jan 2026	Pre-war deployment	A, 1	No
82	UK Ministry of Defence (official X account)	RAF Typhoon of the joint UK-Qatar squadron shot down an Iranian drone heading toward Qatari territory	1 Mar 2026	Allied kinetic contribution	A, 1	No
83	UK Ministry of Defence (gov.uk)	UK sends warship and drone-busting helicopters to the Eastern Mediterranean (names joint UK-Qatar 12 Squadron)	3 Mar 2026	12 Squadron attribution	A, 1	No
84	Royal Air Force	Four more RAF Typhoons deploy to Qatar to operate	7 Mar 2026	UK reinforcement	A, 1	No

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		alongside 12 Squadron and the Qatari Typhoon squadron				
85	Al-Sharq (Doha)	Chief of Staff attends closing of the 40th Armed Forces Infantry Competition	25 Oct 2026	Routine readiness item	B, 2	Partly
86	Fincantieri	Fincantieri signs contract in Qatar for training and simulation centre operations; seven naval vessels delivered, programme complete	21 Jul 2026	Naval programme status	A, 1	No
87	US Department of State (joint text with Qatar MOFA)	Joint Statement on the Seventh United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue: An Enduring Strategic Partnership	20 Dec 2025	Al Udeid upgrades; USD 38 billion statement of intent; General Atomics USD 2 billion; Raytheon counter-drone USD 1 billion; NATO interoperability	A, 1	No
88	US Central Command	US, regional partners open new air defense operations cell in Qatar (MEAD-CDOC, 17 nations)	13 Jan 2026	Combined air defence cell at Al Udeid, pre-war	A, 1	No
89	Qatar International Media Office (text via The Peninsula)	Statement regarding media reports about departure of certain personnel from Al Udeid Air Base	14 Jan 2026	Pre-war personnel departure	A, 2	Partly
90	Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (TBMM), committee report 697	Agreement on military training, defence industry and deployment of Turkish Armed Forces in Qatar (19 Dec 2014); ten-year extendable implementation agreement (28 Apr 2016), costs borne by Qatar	2 Mar 2015 (report)	Legal basis of the Turkish presence	A, 1	No
91	French Ministry of the Armed Forces (operational update)	Qatar air cooperation: 2 Rafale, 1 A330 MRTT, 1 A400M trained with the QEAF, 3 to 7 Oct 2026 (PEGASE 26)	8 to 15 Oct 2026	French training tempo	A, 1	No
92	ANTARA (Indonesian MoD spokesman Brig	Indonesia, Qatar deepen defense industry ties through joint venture; ‘the	3 Jun 2026	Barzan-Indonesia: MoU, not a binding contract	B, 2	No

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	Gen Rico Ricardo Sirait)	specific cooperation model has yet to be finalized'				
93	US Department of War, Contracts for July 31, 2026	Boeing AH-64E maintenance support modification, USD 22,282,170, Fiscal 2026 Foreign Military Sales (Qatar) funds obligated	31 Jul 2026	Qatar FMS money moving in window; no Patriot award naming Qatar	A, 1	No
94	Turkish Ministry of National Defence statement via Anadolu Agency	Turkiye, Qatar, Indonesia and Pakistan sign defense cooperation pact	21 Oct 2026	Turkish readout of Badr	B, 2	Yes
95	Saudi Press Agency	Joint statement of the Makkah Joint Defence Summit (Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan): 'any armed attack on any of the three countries is an attack on all'	7 Aug 2026	Mecca pact originator	A, 1	No
96	Grand National Assembly of Turkiye, Kanun Teklifi Esas No. 2/3961 (Presidency of the Republic transmittal Z-90666677-599-417047, 20 Oct 2026), with the treaty annexed in Turkish, Arabic, and English	Agreement on Joint Defence among the Republic of Turkiye, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Mecca Agreement), 16 articles: Article 2 (external armed attack on one is an attack on all; immediate assistance after objective assessment, including military means, under UN Charter Article 51); Article 8 (core-party consensus on accession; secretariat in Saudi Arabia; first Secretary General from Pakistan); Article 10 (logistic support including arms and ammunition in peace and war); English text prevails	21 Oct 2026 (bill); 7 Aug 2026 (treaty)	Mecca pact text, originator (bill PDF on file; TBMM announcement linked)	A, 1	No
97	Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (TBMM) news page	Mecca Joint Defence Agreement ratification bill submitted: the collective defence provision 'will not operate automatically' and rests on consensus after consultations	21 Oct 2026	Legal weight of the Mecca clause	A, 1	No
98	US Department of War (news story	US, regional partners establish new air defense	Jan 2026	Exercise record	A, 1	No

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	and photo captions)	operations cell in Qatar; Exercise Ferocious Falcon 6, 16 to 20 Nov 2025				
99	QNA (co-issued text)	Joint Statement on Fourth Qatar-France Strategic Dialogue	22 Oct 2026	27th High Military Committee, 11 Jan 2026 LoI, ORION 2026	A, 1	No
100	Al-Raya (Doha)	Chief of Staff meets Commander of the GCC Unified Military Command	16 Apr 2026	GCC Unified Military Command engagement	B, 2	Partly
101	QNA	Prime Minister visits Milipol Qatar 2026, launches sixth Watan exercise	22 Oct 2026	Watan 6 national exercise	A, 1	No
102	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Al Ansari briefing)	Interception rate against Iranian attacks exceeded 90 percent	16 Mar 2026	90 percent interception figure, official origin	A, 1	No
103	Government Communications Office	HH the Amir approves 2026 general budget (Law No. 26 of 2025)	Dec 2025	Expenditure QAR 220.8 billion, revenue QAR 199 billion at USD 55 oil; no defence line published	A, 1	No
104	S&P Global Ratings via The Peninsula	S&P affirms Qatar ratings at AA/A-1+ with stable outlook	15 Mar 2026	Second rating view	B, 2	Yes
105	Moody's Ratings release via Investing.com	Moody's affirms Qatar at Aa2, stable outlook; assumes prolonged Hormuz disruption through autumn	22 May 2026	Third rating view	B, 2	Yes
106	Qatar Central Bank measures via Zawya	Qatar Central Bank rolls out liquidity support measures amid Iran war (reserve requirement 4.5 to 3.5 percent; repo; loan deferrals)	Mar 2026	Monetary response	B, 2	Yes
107	AGBI (QCB monthly data)	Qatar repatriates about USD 13 billion to shore up domestic banks (government FX deposits up QAR 46 billion, Feb to Jun 2026)	Aug 2026	Cushion mechanics	B, 3	Yes
108	Federal Register	Presidential Determination No. 2022-10, Designation of the State of Qatar as a Major Non-NATO Ally	10 Mar 2022	MNNA status	A, 1	No

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109	Government Communications Office	Qatar launches Third National Development Strategy 2024-2030	Jan 2024	NDS3 targets	A, 2	No
110	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs meets Chairman of Hamas Political Bureau	19 Aug 2026	Hamas office still in Doha; roadmap acceptance praised	A, 2	No
111	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs (weekly briefing)	Qatar keeps Washington-Tehran dialogue channel open as mediators push for lasting deal	4 Aug 2026	Qatar, Oman, Pakistan named as facilitators	A, 2	No
112	PM Shehbaz Sharif statement via APP	Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran electronically signed; Pakistan as mediator	18 Jun 2026	US-Iran MoU, June 2026	B, 2	Yes
113	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs meets US envoys (Witkoff, Kushner)	30 Jun 2026	US-Iran track in Doha	A, 2	No
114	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Qatar expresses deep concern over developments in Venezuela and calls for dialogue	3 Jan 2026	Mediation portfolio	A, 2	No
115	US Central Command	US, partner forces defend against aggressive Iranian behavior (Bahrain intercepts named; Qatar not named)	2 Jun 2026	Guarantee test negative finding	A, 2	No
116	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Qatar condemns and denounces blatant Iranian attack on Ras Laffan Industrial City	18 Mar 2026	Article 51 and UNSCR 2817 invoked; no mention of the United States	A, 1	No
117	US Central Command (posture statement text)	CENTCOM posture statement: MEAD-CDOC hosted at Al Udeid; 6,000 drones and 1,500 ballistic missiles intercepted in aggregate; May 2025 US-Qatar Statement of Intent on Defense Cooperation	2026	Aggregate intercept credit, no Qatar-specific count	A, 2	No
118	Iranian UN mission letter via YJC (IRIB)	Iran's letter to the UN following the action of Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE: 'internationally wrongful acts … require reparation'	19 Mar 2026	Qatar named co-belligerent	A, 1	Partly
119	Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni	Iran to send technical delegation to Qatar for further talks on pilots; 'fair	6 Oct 2026	Mediator frame	A, 1	Partly

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	statements via Press TV	and mediating role of Qatar, together with Pakistan'				
120	Sabereen News, senior Iranian official to Al Jazeera	A Qatari delegation arrived in Tehran today within the mediation framework (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-235)	25 Oct 2026	Qatari delegation in Tehran, 25 Oct, per a senior Iranian official to Al Jazeera	B, 2	Yes
121	Sabereen News	'A Qatari delegation entered Iran' as Pakistan's army chief left Tehran (aircraft tracking) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-231)	20 Oct 2026	Story later denied within two hours (claim C,4)	A, 1	No
122	IRGC news channel, Tasnim 'informed source'	No delegation from Qatar has travelled to Iran (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-251)	20 Oct 2026	Intra-system contradiction on the same evening	B, 2	Yes (Tasnim statement carried by an IRGC channel)
123	IRGC news channel, MFA spokesman Baghaei	Baghaei rebukes the term 'Iran conflict' in the Qatar-France joint statement: refusing to call 'aggression' by its name 'is not neutrality but a form of moral evasion' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-249)	22 Oct 2026	Sharpest direct Iranian official rebuke of Doha in window	B, 2	Yes (MFA statement carried by an IRGC channel)
124	Fars	'Qatar sides with France in condemning Iran's self-defense' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-070)	21 Oct 2026	Hardline framing of the Elysee statement	A, 1	No
125	Sabereen News, quoting MFA spokesman Baghaei	Baghaei: a Qatari filing at the ITU 'confirmed' Iranian strikes on Qatari soil were directed only at US military facilities; the 18 March strike on a Qatari gas facility described as the exception and justified (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-232)	3 Sep 2026	Iranian official framing of the Ras Laffan strike (graded reference)	A, 1	No
126	ITU, Extraordinary session of the 2026 Council (C26EXT), contributions list	C26-EXT/5, Qatar, 24 Aug 2026: 'Safety and Security Risk Assessment', public access restricted after the session at Qatar's request as security-sensitive; C26-EXT/4 Russian Federation multicountry contribution on	Aug to Sep 2026	Identity, date, and restriction of the Qatari ITU filing Iran quoted	A, 1	No

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		PP-26 place and dates; C26-EXT/3 Arab Group letter; C26-EXT/7 African Group letter				
127	Defa Press	Iran's crushing response to the enemy attack on South Pars: Ras Laffan 'successfully hit'	18 to 19 Mar 2026	Iranian framing of Ras Laffan as revenge for South Pars (claim C,2, corroborated by QatarEnergy)	A, 1	No
128	Dr Majed Al Ansari, MOFA spokesperson (official X account)	Categorical denial of detaining Iranian pilots; remains of one pilot found; April invitation to an Iranian team unanswered	15 Aug 2026	Qatar's position on the three pilots	A, 1	No
129	Army Public Relations via Defa Press	Death confirmed of one of the four Su-24 airmen of the 2 March Al Udeid sortie (name withheld) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-037)	28 to 29 Jul 2026	One of four airmen accounted for by Iran itself	A, 1	No
130	Sabereen News	'Photos of our pilots who are in Qatari captivity': poster naming three airmen (names withheld); flight-suit portraits only; demands release 'from Qatar's rulers' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-239)	16 Aug 2026	Names A,1 for publication; captivity claim D,3; image carries no captivity evidence	A, 1	No
131	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Qatar delivers message to UN Secretary-General and Security Council on Israeli attack on Doha (S/2025/563)	10 Sep 2025	Qatar's record of the 9 Sep 2025 strike	A, 2	No
132	UN Security Council press statement SC/16163 (UNISPAL mirror)	Security Council members condemn the recent strikes in Doha	11 Sep 2025	UNSC response	A, 1	No
133	Israel Prime Minister's Office (gov.il transcript)	Netanyahu statement, Washington: 'Israel was targeting terrorists. It wasn't targeting Qatar'	30 Sep 2025	Israeli account of the apology call	A, 1	No
134	N12 / Mako (Nir Dvori)	Israel's dramatic step: ban on all defence exports to Qatar; defence establishment describes Qatar as 'an evil state'	18 Aug 2026	Export halt report; no government confirmation located	B, 3	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
135	Israel Prime Minister's Office (gov.il)	PM Netanyahu's speech at the UN General Assembly 2026 ('The first to do so was Qatar … toxic media outlets like al-Jazeera … hosts the Hamas butchers')	24 Sep 2026	Israeli narrative on Qatar, verbatim	A, 1	No
136	Qatar MOFA via QNA	Qatar rejects Israeli statements on annexing areas in southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip	29 Sep 2026	Qatar-Israel posture	A, 1	No
137	QNA	Qatar strongly condemns Houthi attack on power station serving Prophet's Mosque	2 Oct 2026	Qatar's public line on Houthi strikes	A, 1	No
138	GCC Supreme Council statement via QNA	Final statement of the extraordinary session of the GCC Supreme Council on the Israeli aggression against Qatar	15 Sep 2025	Joint Defence Agreement invoked: 'any aggression against any of them is aggression against all'	A, 1	No
139	QNA (host text)	Final Communique issued by the Arab-Islamic Emergency Summit in Doha	15 Sep 2025	Collective security language after the Israeli strike	A, 1	No
140	Pakistan PM Office joint statement via APP	Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sign Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement: 'any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both'	17 Sep 2025	Regional defence pact context	B, 2	Yes
141	Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Curtain raiser for the visit of the Prime Minister to Qatar, 23 to 24 Feb 2026	Feb 2026	Qatar-Pakistan track	A, 2	No
142	Kremlin	Telephone conversation with Emir of Qatar: crisis 'provoked by the United States and Israel's aggression against Iran'; Emir reaffirms cooperation with Russia as a priority	2 Mar 2026	Russian framing of Qatar	A, 2	No
143	PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (press conference transcript)	Spokesperson Mao Ning, 3 Mar 2026: asked whether China is pressing Iran to avoid action affecting Qatari gas exports; answer on energy security	3 Mar 2026	Beijing's non-denial	A, 2	No

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144	PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (press conference transcript)	Envoy Zhai Jun spoke with Qatar's Minister of State; 'non-military targets should not be attacked, and shipping lane security should not be disturbed'	19 Mar 2026	Chinese line on GCC sovereignty	A, 2	No
145	PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Wang Yi holds talks with Qatari PM: China 'the most reliable and longest-term partner'; Qatar to 'prioritise guaranteeing China's energy supply'; 'security architecture embodying regional countries' autonomy'	8 Sep 2026	Chinese framing of Qatar	A, 2	No
146	Check Point Research	China-nexus activity against Qatar observed amid expanding regional tensions (PlugX via DLL hijacking from 1 Mar 2026)	9 Mar 2026	Only vendor-primary cyber attribution against Qatar in window	B, 2	No
147	MENAFATF annual report 2025	Qatar enhanced follow-up report adopted; third-round mutual evaluation February 2030	2025 (42nd Plenary, May 2026)	AML/CFT status	A, 2	No
148	US Department of the Treasury	Treasury targets Hamas financing network (no Qatar nexus)	2 Oct 2026	Negative finding on Qatar-based designations	A, 2	No
149	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	MOFA summons Iran's deputy ambassador (Mohsen Mohammad Ghanei) and hands a protest note over the targeting of the Qatari tanker Al Rekayyat near Hormuz; demands 'urgent clarification'	7 Jul 2026	Tanker strike and diplomatic protest, originator text	A, 1	No
150	Army Public Relations via Defa Press	Army drone strikes on a Patriot system in Kuwait, a 'satellite antenna (early-warning site)' in Qatar, and US fuel tanks in Bahrain (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-036)	9 Jul 2026	Fact of publication A,1; strike claim E,3, no Qatari MOD statement for 9 Jul found	A, 1	No
151	Sabereen News	'Air defense active in Qatar'; 'Iranian missile attack on the US base in Qatar'; 'explosion heard in Qatar' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-236)	21 Jul 2026	Fact of publication A,1; strike claim E,4, no Qatari statement	A, 1	No

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152	Sabereen News	'Missile fired at Qatar'; 'explosion in Qatar' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-237)	23 Jul 2026	Fact of publication A,1; strike claim E,4, no Qatari statement	A, 1	No
153	Sabereen News	'A number of missiles targeted the American military base in Qatar' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-240)	30 Aug 2026	Persian counterpart of the Russian-channel claim; E,4	A, 1	No
154	Sabereen News	'Urgent: Iranian missile strikes on Al Udeid'; 'a wave of Iranian missile strikes destroyed the American base Al Udeid' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-245)	30 Aug 2026	Fact of publication A,1; strike claim E,4, no Qatari statement	A, 1	No
155	Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Qatar Condemns Renewed Iranian Attacks on Jordan and UAE (missiles on Jordan, a drone on the UAE; no attack on Qatar named)	31 Aug 2026	Discriminating evidence against the 30 August Al Udeid claim	A, 1	No
156	IRGC Public Relations via Defa Press (Iranian Armed Forces outlet)	Four main US bases under heavy IRGC missile strikes (Al Udeid named)	28 Feb 2026	Fact of publication A,1; battle-damage claim E,3	A, 1	No
157	IRGC Public Relations via Defa Press	IRGC warning to the people of regional countries: stay away from refineries (names Mesaieed Petrochemical, Mesaieed Holding, Ras Laffan phases 1 and 2; rulers 'lack any real sovereignty')	18 Mar 2026	Target list and 'no sovereignty' frame	A, 1	No
158	IRGC Public Relations, Communique No. 24 (Nasr 2) via Defa Press	Long-range radar system and US strategic tankers destroyed (Al Udeid); warning to 'hosts of his bases'	17 Jul 2026	Fact of publication A,1; claim E,3	A, 1	No
159	U.S. Embassy Doha	Security Alert, 1 Aug 2026: embassy remains on ordered departure; non-emergency personnel relocated outside Qatar; US diplomatic facilities have been targeted	1 Aug 2026	US posture in Qatar after the July strikes	A, 1	No
160	U.S. Embassy Doha	Security Alert, 18 Oct 2026: Houthi hostilities against Saudi Arabia 'have the	18 Oct 2026	US warning cadence in October	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
		potential to escalate rapidly'; Iran and supportive groups may target US interests; aerial-attack guidance				
161	U.S. Department of State, Travel Advisory: Qatar	Level 3, Reconsider Travel; summary updated 23 Oct 2026 for 'potential armed attacks by the Iranian-supported Houthis and Iranian efforts to target U.S. government officials in the region'	23 Oct 2026	Indicator: official US threat language on Qatar	A, 1	No
162	State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott on X, via RIA Novosti and Interfax	Ordered departure applies to Saudi Arabia only; reports extending it to other Gulf embassies 'inaccurate'	21 to 22 Oct 2026	Corrects the relayed AFP claim that the order covered Qatar	B, 2	Yes
163	Khabarfouri	'More than 25 US tankers now at Al Udeid, the largest concentration in eight months' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-103)	21 Sep 2026	Posture claim, unsourced; feeds the I&W row on Al Udeid	C, 4	Partly
164	Defa Press	'Unofficial reports' of an RC-135U Combat Sent at Al Udeid; 'could be the prelude to a military conflict' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-049)	26 Oct 2026	Fact of publication A,1; deployment claim D,4 (no originator)	A, 1	No
165	IRGC statement via Fars News (English)	'Not a single drop of oil or gas … will be exported from the region' while US attacks continue	21 Jul 2026	Iranian Hormuz position	A, 1	No
166	IRGC Navy statement via IRNA English	IRGC Navy warns vessels violating Strait of Hormuz rules will 'burn in the fire of trusting the terrorist US military'	17 Oct 2026	Iranian Hormuz posture	A, 1	Partly
167	UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area Weekly Overview No. 11	12 attacks in the week to 14 Oct (10 Strait of Hormuz); transits about 70 percent below pre-conflict; majority of attacked vessels not reporting; most AIS vessels routing via the Iranian route	16 Oct 2026	Hormuz tempo, originator	A, 1	No
168	JMIC Advisory Note Update 106 (UKMTO)	153 incidents since 1 March; Strait of Hormuz SEVERE; Arabian Gulf raised to	18 Oct 2026	Threat levels and the IRGC claim check	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
		SUBSTANTIAL; IRGC mine claims of 17 Oct 'no substantiation'; AIS-on vessels hailed toward the Iranian-controlled northern route				
169	UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area Weekly Overview No. 3	Timeline: 'PGSA established to regulate and toll transits' (May 2026)	21 Aug 2026	Toll regime as recorded by UKMTO	A, 2	No
170	JMIC advisory via Seatrade Maritime	JMIC raises Strait of Hormuz threat level to severe; IRGC hailing and routing pressure	7 Jul 2026	Who stops ships, where (July baseline)	B, 2	Yes
171	QatarEnergy (media center release)	Minister Al-Kaabi on alternative routes: LNG cannot be transported via pipelines; Qatar 'ready to resume normal operations within a few weeks of the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz'; GTL repair Q1 2027; three years for the two LNG trains	21 Sep 2026	Restart and repair timeline, originator	A, 1	No
172	Treadstone 71 (Substack, Daily Adversary Brief)	Tehran Calls Hormuz Closed, Then Writes a Permit Rule	27 Oct 2026	Same-day Hormuz read	A, 1	No
173	QatarEnergy (media center release)	QatarEnergy declares force majeure (notified affected purchasing customers)	4 Mar 2026	Force majeure start date, originator	A, 1	No
174	QatarEnergy (media center release)	Minister Al-Kaabi: the missile attacks reduced Qatar's LNG export capacity by 17 percent; 'force majeure for up to five years on some long-term LNG contracts'	19 Mar 2026	Prolonged force majeure, originator	A, 1	No
175	Cheniere Energy	Cheniere signs long-term sale and purchase agreements with QatarEnergy (2 mtpa each from Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi, early 2030s, Henry Hub plus fee)	22 Oct 2026	Counterparty confirmation	A, 1	No
176	IRGC news channel	'Iran's show of force in the LNG market': Qatari cargoes move by Iranian permission via the Iranian route	16 Oct 2026	Licence frame on Qatari LNG (claim C,3)	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
		(Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-252)				
177	Al-Masirah, Abdulmalik al-Houthi	The Qatari position should remember how the Saudi regime betrayed and besieged it; Al Jazeera 'has sunk to the level' of Saudi channels (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-226)	7 Oct 2026	First Houthi public turn against Qatar in window	A, 2	No
178	Al-Masirah, Abdulmalik al-Houthi	The Qatari 'now adopts the Saudi aggression on our country politically and in the media'; Saudi regime-change intent toward Doha invoked (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-227)	8 Oct 2026	Complicity-by-alignment frame; no facility named	A, 2	No
179	Al-Masirah, Sanaa Foreign Ministry	The Qatari regime's hostile political and media activities make it 'a partner in the blood and suffering of Yemenis'; the Qatari role 'has regressed from mediation' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-225)	11 Oct 2026	Escalation ladder, official Sanaa line	A, 2	No
180	Sabereen News	Post listing Qatari gas facilities among regional energy sites 'within range' of Iranian missiles (facility reference only) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-234)	31 Jul 2026	Facility naming by IRGC-aligned media, recorded without threat text	C, 3	No
181	Khabarfouri, relaying a 'Jaryan' scenario map	Post naming a Qatari bridge among regional 'zero hour' targets (facility reference only; non-official outlet) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-228)	15 Oct 2026	Facility naming by non-official media, recorded without threat text	C, 4	Yes
182	Israel Hayom	Saudi Arabia reportedly offers the Houthis USD 1 billion in an Iran-brokered deal to halt attacks; Saudi official does not confirm any transfer	26 Oct 2026	Unverified Saudi-Houthi channel through Tehran	D, 3	Yes
183	IRGC political deputy Brig Gen Yadollah Javani to	'If our infrastructure is attacked, we will target internet cables'; US bases in the region 'destroyed'	20 Oct 2026	Graded one-line reference: named originator of the cable threat	A, 1	No

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	Al-Alam, via Defa Press	(Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-047)				
184	Defa Press international desk, quoting SNSC Secretary Mohsen Rezaei	'Internet cables: an asymmetric target'; at least seven main cables in the Hormuz seabed; Rezaei quoted that 'many cables, data centers and AI facilities' would be destroyed if war resumes (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-048)	25 Oct 2026	Rezaei cable line reached only through this carrier	A, 1	Partly (Rezaei original not found)
185	Qatar MOFA weekly briefing, Director of Media and Communication Ibrahim bin Sultan Al-Hashemi	On threats to target internet cables in Hormuz: the region's peoples 'including the Iranian people' will be harmed most; Iran responsible for water security; diversifying defense partners does not conflict with mediation	20 Oct 2026	Submarine-cable threat answered on the record	A, 1	No
186	Tasnim	'Cutting internet cables: a deadly nightmare for Qatar, a containable shock for Iran' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-218)	21 Oct 2026	Graded one-line reference: cable-cut framing aimed at Qatar	A, 1	No
187	Defa Press	'The armed forces' ability to throw the world back to the nineteenth century': seven high-capacity fiber lines near the Iranian coast named as the likeliest option (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-050)	27 Oct 2026	Graded one-line reference: cable threat sustained on the armed-forces outlet	A, 1	No
188	IRGC Navy command via Defa Press	'We targeted the data centers of the American companies Oracle in Dubai and Amazon in Bahrain' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-034)	2 Apr 2026	Fact of publication A,1; strike claim C,3; digital infrastructure already struck in the region	A, 1	No
189	Defa Press	'Three practical steps for Iran to earn revenue from the Hormuz internet cables': licence fees, operation under Iranian law, Iranian repair monopoly (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-035)	9 May 2026	Cable sovereignty claim predates the threat	A, 1	No
190	ITU and ICPC, International	Chokepoint examples: Bab el-Mandeb (at least 17	Jul 2026	Hormuz absent from the	A, 1	No

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	Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience, Report of the Working Groups 2026 (ISBN 978-92-61-40561-8); approval announced 10 Jul 2026	cables, 17 to 20 percent of global traffic) and the Suez corridor; Hormuz not named		international resilience agenda		
191	ITU News	ITU Plenipotentiary: Together for a connected digital future (PP-26 in Doha; about 3,000 delegates; elections of the five top officials, Council, and Radio Regulations Board; resilience of submarine cables a theme)	19 Oct 2026	Scale and agenda of PP-26	A, 1	No
192	ITU News	Mobile World Congress co-locates with ITU Plenipotentiary in Doha (MWC26 Doha 8 to 10 Nov at DECC; PP-26 9 to 27 Nov)	1 Sep 2026	Event calendar	A, 1	No
193	ITU Council 2026 portal	Final meeting of the 2026 Council: 7 Nov 2026, Doha	Oct 2026	Event calendar	A, 1	No
194	State of Qatar, Communications Regulatory Authority, ITU document C26-EXT/6	Preparations for hosting PP-26 in Doha, 9 to 27 Nov 2026: Cabinet Resolution No. 17 national committee; security and movement-route planning with sovereign authorities; preparations proceeding 'despite the regional circumstances'	24 Aug 2026	Host-country readiness claim (self-serving, credibility capped)	A, 2	No
195	The Sunday Telegraph (report not retrieved), carried by Middle East Eye and New Civil Engineer	Iranian hackers shut a small UK power generator for four days; plant unnamed; NCSC has not commented on attribution; DESNZ: 'small-scale energy generator'	22 to 24 Aug 2026	Out-of-region precedent for Iranian OT targeting; unattributed by the UK government	C, 3	Yes
196	Al Jazeera Media Network	Who we are (self-reported reach)	current at 27 Oct 2026	434 million homes, 150 countries, 70 bureaus	B, 3	No
197	Treadstone 71	Cultural Nexus Framework (seven measures scoring a target audience's reaction to narrative and pressure)	2026	Section 8 audience scoring	A, 1	No

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198	Qatar Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs (joint press conference)	Armed Forces intercepted waves of Iranian missiles; MOI urged the public to obtain information from official sources and not to be misled by rumors	1 Mar 2026	Official-sources instruction to residents	A, 1	No
199	Treadstone 71	Human Terrain Influence Mapping (Terrain Vulnerability Index, Pathway Exploitation Score, HTIM Index)	2026	Section 8 narrative-pathway scoring	A, 1	No
200	Foreign Minister Araghchi X post via Mehr	Araghchi: Iran's brother neighbours should expel the foreign aggressors; US 'security umbrella … full of holes'	approx. 15 to 16 Mar 2026	Expulsion frame	A, 1	Partly
201	Mehr analysis quoting the Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei	Half a century of strategic error: what US bases brought upon the Persian Gulf ('close those bases as soon as possible')	approx. mid-Jun 2026	Leader's message to neighbours (quote B,2)	A, 1	Partly
202	Fars News Agency	America evacuated all its military aircraft from Al Udeid (cites 'Sentinel-2 company' imagery and unnamed OSINT counts)	24 Jul 2026	Originator of the evacuation narrative; claim E,4	A, 1	No
203	Army spokesman Brig Gen Mohammad Akraminia via Mehr	Follow-up on the fate of the three Su-24 pilots continues; Qatar 'has so far professed ignorance'	31 Jul 2026	Opening of the pilots narrative	A, 1	No
204	IRNA English (MIA Search Committee)	Iran urges Qatar to allow Air Force fact-finding team over missing pilots; 'repeated obstruction and stalling'	16 Aug 2026	Obstruction frame	A, 1	Partly
205	MIA Search Committee via Fars, carried by Fararu	Pilots 'severely injured', held 'on the water'; Qatar's acceptance of an Iranian expert team welcomed	22 Aug 2026	Captor-now-cooperating frame; 'held on water' claim E,4	A, 1	Partly
206	Air Force deputy coordinator Brig Gen (Pilot) Masoud Jafari via Defa Press	'The expansion of Al Udeid is for no country but Iran' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-038)	6 Aug 2026	Al Udeid framed as an anti-Iran asset	A, 1	No
207	SNSC Secretary Maj Gen Mohsen	Iran will treat any country's participation in or support for the US 'economic war' as	23 Aug 2026	Graded one-line reference: threat	A, 1	No

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	Rezaei via Defa Press	an act of war (graded reference) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-039)		statement A,1 for publication		
208	SNSC Secretary Rezaei meeting Qatar's PM, via Defa Press	'Iran helped Qatar in hard days'; Rezaei stresses friendship while warning Washington (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-040)	27 Aug 2026	Debt frame paired with brotherhood frame in one meeting	A, 1	No
209	FM Araghchi meeting Qatar's PM, via Defa Press	Regional states must not let the US use their soil against Iran (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-041)	27 Aug 2026	Basing demand delivered to the mediator in Tehran	A, 1	No
210	Defa Press international desk	'The fate of the LNG market if Ras Laffan is fired upon again'; Qatar described as 'small and weak' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-042)	6 Sep 2026	Repeat-strike framing on the armed-forces outlet (graded reference)	A, 1	No
211	Army Commander-in-Chief Maj Gen Amir Hatami via Mehr	USD 30,000 or 5 billion toman reward for killing or capturing an 'aggressor' American soldier; double for women; funded by 'financial jihad'	16 Aug 2026	Originator of the bounty	A, 1	No
212	Army spokesman Akraminia to Al-Alam, carried by Press TV	Iran Army demands Qatar clarify fate of missing pilots who struck Al Udeid; 'some cooperation … but our expectation is far greater'; reward extended rhetorically to 'people of regional countries'	29 Sep 2026	Dual frame; bounty extension	A, 1	Partly
213	Al-Alam	Iranian Red Crescent: we follow the status of the Iranian pilots in Qatar ('place of their detention')	4 Sep 2026	Arabic-language carriage asserts detention as fact	A, 1	No
214	MFA spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei via Mehr Arabic	'While we have regular relations with Qatar, and Doha plays a role in the diplomatic process between Iran and the US, we declare our reservations'	early Sep 2026	Mediator and withholding party in one sentence	A, 1	No
215	MFA spokesman Baghaei via Defa Press	'Engagement with the American side was through the Qatari mediator'; Iran's conditions conveyed	23 Sep 2026	Tehran confirms Doha as the channel	A, 1	No

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		(Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-043)				
216	MP Alaeddin Boroujerdi via Defa Press	'Recent US proposals were transmitted through Qatar'; US unlikely to escalate before its elections (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-045)	4 Oct 2026	Second Iranian confirmation of the Qatari channel	A, 1	No
217	Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, via Defa Press	'Most US military bases in the region, including Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, were destroyed or seriously damaged' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-044)	28 Sep 2026	Fact of publication A,1; damage claim F,4	A, 1	No
218	IRGC Intelligence Organization statement via Press TV	IRGC: Iran's strikes force US toward dispersal, concealment, minimal presence ('evacuation and deactivation of CENTCOM bases')	24 Sep 2026	Institutionalisation of the evacuation narrative; claim E,3	A, 1	Partly
219	Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani via Tehran Times	Iran pursues fate of pilots in Qatar; 'Doha had pledged cooperation'	13 Oct 2026	Civilian channel	A, 1	Partly
220	Army legal deputy Brig Gen Moslem Yaghoubi via Mehr Arabic	'Qatar must be held accountable'; its conduct 'will reflect the extent of their independence'	approx. 7 to 9 Oct 2026	Independence-test frame	A, 1	No
221	Army legal deputy Brig Gen Moslem Yaghoubi via Defa Press	'The Qatari government must answer for the Iranian pilots; we consider them alive; it bears international responsibility'; legal file being prepared (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-046)	20 Oct 2026	Legalization stage of the pilots line	A, 1	No
222	Mashregh News (IRGC-aligned)	Eight months of Arab sheikhs' duplicity: 'they gave milk and must also be ploughed' (Qatar as host of the largest US base)	25 Oct 2026	Hardline frame on the eve of the Moscow meeting	A, 1	No
223	Office of Senator Chris Murphy	Murphy denied access to military facility by Hegseth in unprecedented move	7 Oct 2026	Al Udeid access denial (Murphy's own words)	A, 2	No

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224	Senior Defense Department official to Military Times	Pentagon barred Qatar base access to hide Iran war damage, US senator claims	8 Oct 2026	DoD reason: 3 Mar 2026 travel directive	B, 3	Yes
225	Treadstone 71 channel collection	Collection record (method and identifiers held internally) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-054)	27 Oct 2026	Volume and phase counts	A, 1	No
226	Treadstone 71 channel collection	Collection record (method and identifiers held internally) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-062)	27 Oct 2026	Narrative Volume measure for the Adversary Index note	A, 1	No
227	Treadstone 71 channel collection	Collection record (method and identifiers held internally) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-241)	27 Oct 2026	Volume and Qatar share, Persian channel	A, 1	No
228	Treadstone 71 channel collection	Collection record (method and identifiers held internally) (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-248)	27 Oct 2026	Volume, share, and timing of Qatar content in the Russian-language relay	A, 1	No
229	Sabereen News, video of Manouchehr Mottaki	‘Qatar owes Iran 400 billion dollars, not 12 billion’ from the shared South Pars and North Field reservoir (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-242)	8 Jul 2026	Debt frame aimed at the shared field	A, 1	No
230	Sabereen News, Mottaki	‘Qatar was to release 12 billion of 24 billion dollars of Iranian funds’; the United States ‘said not a cent should be paid’ (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-243)	22 Jul 2026	Frozen-funds grievance; claim C,3	A, 1	No
231	Sabereen News	‘Suspicious heat at Ras Laffan: fire or attack?’ citing a satellite thermal anomaly (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-246)	6 Sep 2026	Insinuation pattern on Qatari energy; claim D,4	A, 1	No
232	Sabereen News, no link given	‘A Qatari army colonel told Al Jazeera he interrogated the Iranian pilots’ (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-244)	16 Aug 2026	Fact of publication A,1; claim E,4, no Al Jazeera interview found	A, 1	No
233	Sabereen News, no source given	‘Russia ordered its diplomats to leave Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain immediately’	23 Oct 2026	Fact of publication A,1; claim E,5, no Russian MFA, TASS,	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
		(Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-247)		RIA, or Interfax carriage found		
234	IRGC news channel, citing Sentinel-2 imagery	Four US tankers and five Qatari C-17s back at Al Udeid, 'the first time since 12 July' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-253)	21 Aug 2026	The channel's own reconstitution marker, contradicting the evacuation line (claim C,3)	A, 1	No
235	Treadstone 71	GCC Iranian Coercion (five-stage sequence: delegitimize, legalize, threaten, deny and distance, cross-amplify)	Aug 2026	Pattern template for Iranian coercion of Qatar	A, 1	No
236	Treadstone 71 (Substack)	Fire and Darkness, Discounted	7 Aug 2026	Prior Treadstone 71 judgment on Gulf energy threats	A, 1	No
237	Rybar	'How so-called Ukraine sells combat experience to Qatar' (claims Ukrainian counter-drone crews around Doha, 'more than 20 thousand interceptors') (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-193)	approx. 25 Jul 2026	Fact of publication A,1; claim D,4 (unsourced)	A, 1	No
238	Vedomosti	Iran's strike damaged the world's largest LNG production complex in Qatar	18 Mar 2026	Russian business-press framing	B, 2	No
239	WarGonzo	Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Pakistan 'have sided with Saudi Arabia' on Yemen (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-254)	8 Sep 2026	Russian war-blogger frame: Qatar in the Saudi bloc (claim C,3)	A, 1	No
240	Sabereen News amplifying Qatar's PM	Qatar's PM: the Middle East needs a 'new regional security framework' that includes Iran; the war 'a wake-up call' (Internal evidence pack, ref T71-QAT-EP-233)	22 Sep 2026	Amplification of the Qatari line that serves Tehran's 'US protection failed' frame	A, 1	No
241	The Paper (compilation from Xinhua and CCTV)	Middle East conflict escalates again: can the four-country memorandum help? ('the US fundamentally cannot protect its allies')	23 Oct 2026	Chinese commentary on Badr	C, 3	No
242	The Paper (author Wu Jiangshuai, SISU)	'These bases are now no longer security guarantees but attack targets'	26 to 27 Oct 2026	Chinese academic framing of US bases	B, 3	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
243	China Global South Project (quoting Ding Long, SISU, via Jiefang Daily)	How the Badr defense deal could reshape Pakistan's reliance on China ('decline in US hegemony'; Saudi-Qatari competition over minilateral frameworks)	26 Oct 2026	Chinese scholarly read of Badr	B, 3	Yes
244	Saba (Sanaa) relaying IRGC via Al-Manar	IRGC announces wave 62 of True Promise 4 (Al Udeid among bases named)	18 Mar 2026	Houthi carriage of Iranian frame	C, 4	Yes
245	Israeli government report (gov.il)	Anti-Israel Statements by the UN Secretary-General and His Inner Circle (names Sheikha Moza as 'a central figure in Qatar's terror-financing apparatus')	Sep 2026	Israeli information product targeting Qatar's soft-power network (characterisations are advocacy)	A, 4	No
246	N12 / Mako (Omri Maniv)	Urich admitted he continued working with the Qataris at least until mid-2024	19 Oct 2026	Israeli 'Qatargate' affair	B, 3	No
247	Al Arabiya	Qatar to Iran: we reject the threat to navigation security (Qatar summons Iranian deputy ambassador over the Al Rekayyat tanker)	9 Jul 2026	No revival of anti-Qatar framing on Saudi-owned outlets	C, 2	No
248	Youm7	Brotherhood 'terrorist platforms' pump rumours against Egypt (2026 series does not name Qatar)	22 Sep 2026	Egyptian framing in 2026	C, 3	No
249	Meta	August 2026 Second Half Adversarial Threat Report (no Gulf-origin or Qatar-targeting network named)	Aug 2026	Negative finding on blockade-era network revival	A, 2	No
250	Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Max Lesser, Maria Riofrio)	FDD exposes network of fake watchdog and news websites advancing Qatari interests ('likely acting at Qatar's behest'; no documented payment)	1 Oct 2026	Pro-Qatar inauthentic site network; attribution inferred	B, 3	No
251	US DOJ FARA eFile	Mercury Public Affairs LLC, Reg. 6170, Supplemental Statement (Embassy of the State of Qatar; USD 195,000 Jan to Jun 2026; Doha Forum invitations; Education City meeting requests)	22 Jul 2026	Qatar's US influence instruments	A, 1	No
252	US DOJ FARA eFile	Holland & Knight, Reg. 3718, Supplemental Statement	30 Sep 2026	Qatar's US influence instruments	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
		(Embassy of Qatar through Moran Global Strategies)				
253	US DOJ FARA eFile	GRV Strategies LLC, Reg. 7458, Exhibit AB (International Media Office of the State of Qatar: 'positive messaging through the US media')	6 Sep 2024	Qatar's US influence instruments	A, 1	No
254	US Department of Education, Section 117 foreign gift and contract data	Qatar USD 8,977,545,835 across 1,338 reports, rank 1; Georgetown from Qatar USD 1,110,642,440; Northwestern from Qatar USD 818,799,209 (data as of 30 Sep 2026)	30 Sep 2026	Soft-power footprint, originator figures	A, 1	No
255	US Department of Education Section 117 dashboard, as read by Inside Higher Ed and The Hoya	Qatar the largest foreign funder of US universities, USD 6.6 billion since 1981; Georgetown about USD 1 billion	28 Jan and 16 Apr 2026	Soft-power footprint figures	B, 2	Yes
256	Al Ansari X post via The Peninsula	Qatar rejects Netanyahu's UN accusation of campaign against Israel ('categorically reject'; 'an attempt to divert attention')	25 Sep 2026	Qatar's reply to the UNGA speech	B, 2	Yes
257	Treadstone 71	Treadstone 71 Adversary Index (eight sub-indices scored 0 to 100; posturing bands)	2026	Section 8 sub-index note	A, 1	No
258	Treadstone 71	Structured Analytic Techniques (Kent-style spectrum with half-open intervals; ACH; premortem)	2026	ACH, key assumptions, probability bands	A, 1	No
259	Treadstone 71	Strategic Intelligence Analysis, Forecasting, Estimative and Warning Intelligence (patterns, trends, tendencies; cone of plausibility; emergence)	2026	Section 9 foresight method	A, 1	No
260	Treadstone 71	Advanced Analytic Dominance SATs (NCA, HWVM, DUM, EICA, CIDD, DBNA and the decision engines)	2026	Advanced techniques applied in Sections 8 and 9	A, 1	No

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#	Originator	Item	Date	Used for	Rel., Cred.	Second-hand
261	Cyber Intelligence Training Center	Critical Thinking and Cognitive Bias for Cyber Intelligence	2026	Reasoning and bias checks	A, 1	No
262	Cyber Intelligence Training Center	Structured Analytic Techniques (indicators, ACH, key assumptions check, scenario analysis)	2026	Method reference	A, 1	No
263	Cyber Intelligence Training Center	On Demand Strategic Intelligence Analysis (Estimative and Warning)	2026	Method reference	A, 1	No
264	Fitch Ratings	Fitch Affirms Qatar at 'AA'; Outlook Stable (pre-war baseline: conflict under one month assumed)	13 Mar 2026	How wrong the March baseline was	A, 1	No
265	Iranian Presidency readout via Mehr	Meeting of the Emir of Qatar with Pezeshkian: emphasis on strengthening bilateral relations and energy cooperation	27 Oct 2026	Moscow meeting readout; silent on pilots and Al Udeid	A, 1	Partly
266	Treadstone 71	Adaptive Cyber Intelligence Lifecycle: Built for Disruption, Driven by Foresight (six phases)	2026	Collection plan structure	A, 1	No

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Grouped by source class. Each entry gives originator, item, date, URL, and the citation number used in the body.

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